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Abstract
Background: Pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) is a controversial form
of advertising that markets prescription pharmaceuticals to patients and consumers. The
positions, power, interests and influence of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders shape
Canadian DTCA policies; however, no focused analysis of DTCA stakeholders has occurred.
Methods: This study involved a two-pronged stakeholder analysis: First was a broad analysis
of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders using Canadian publicly available documents and
websites. The second analyzed interveners on pharmaceutical litigation at the Supreme Court
of Canada, and the comparisons to a leading tobacco advertising case, RJR-MacDonald v
Canada (A.G) and a pharmaceutical DTCA case CanWest Media Works Inc. v Canada (A.G).
Results: There is a broad range of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders, with varying
positions, power, interests and influence. Positions on DTCA policy ranged from supporting
less regulation to maintaining current regulations. Stakeholders are often networked with
each other through participation in self-regulatory groups or membership in associations;
pharmaceutical industry stakeholders were most highly networked. All interveners identified
in the second analysis are stakeholders identified in the first analysis. Pharmaceutical
litigation interveners were either brand or generic pharmaceutical industry stakeholders.
Public policy stakeholders were notably absent in pharmaceutical case litigation despite their
participation in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest. Conclusion: Future pharmaceutical DTCA
policy may be shaped by ‘high’ power stakeholders who favour maintaining the current
regulations. Those same ‘high’ power stakeholders can be found participating in
pharmaceutical litigation at the Supreme Court. Indications are that pharmaceutical industry
stakeholders would be accepted to participate in Supreme Court pharmaceutical advertising
litigation while public health stakeholders might apply as a coalition to participate.

Keywords: Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, Stakeholders, Interveners,
Policy Analysis, Legal Analysis
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising is explained as “an effort (usually
via popular media) made by a pharmaceutical company to sell its prescription products
directly to patients” (Ventola, 2011, p.669). Pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer
advertising, commonly abbreviated as ‘pharmaceutical DTCA,’ is a controversial form of
advertising that markets prescription pharmaceuticals to patients and consumers through
a number of different mediums (television, radio, print, internet, etc.) Pharmaceutical
DTCA has become an increasingly prevalent practice in Canada; spending on
pharmaceutical DTCA has increased from $1.2 billion to $4.5 billion, and continues to
prompt discussion and argument (Ventola, 2011). Harker (2007) summarized the debate
surrounding pharmaceutical advertising by stating that pharmaceutical advertising is “a
controversial issue as it operates at the nexus of population healthcare and ‘for profit’
enterprise” (p. 76). This study identified the stakeholders operating at this nexus and
analyzed their influence, power, and position on future pharmaceutical DTCA policy.

1.2 Pharmaceutical Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
In 2015, drug expenditure was the second largest category of health spending,
accounting for 15.7% of total Canadian health expenditure, or $946 per person, and
constituting an increase in spending of 0.7% over the previous year (Canadian Institute
for Health Information, 2015). The Canadian Institute for Health Information cites
increased drug utilization as a major driver of prescription drug spending, which
experienced average annual expenditure growth of 10.1% from 1998 to 2007 (CIHI,
2011), and identifies pharmaceutical DTCA as one factor that may influence drug use and
expenditure (CIHI, 2012). A number of studies have made similar arguments, suggesting
an association between drug costs and pharmaceutical DTCA, typically citing advertising
by pharmaceutical companies to consumers through mediums such as television and
print, and consequent increased pressure from patients on physicians to prescribe drugs
(Wilkes, 2000; Kravitz, 2005; Law, 2009). This increased pressure on physicians to
prescribe pharmaceuticals may be a factor driving increased drug use and expenditures
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(CIHI, 2012). Concerns about pharmaceutical DTCA have led to calls from prominent
health groups such as the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) and Canadian
Pharmacists Association (CPhA), for increased regulation (CMA, 2002; CPhA, 2009). In
Canada and abroad, pharmaceutical DTCA regulation continues to be a point of debate
(Auton, 2006; Frosh, 2010).
The policy positions on pharmaceutical DTCA exist on a continuum ranging from
completely prohibiting pharmaceutical DTCA to unregulated pharmaceutical DTCA;
both positions can be found in the literature but most academics and stakeholders hold
views somewhere in between the two extremes. The position to further regulate and
restrict DTCA practices argues that pharmaceutical DTCA is driving patients to request
unnecessary treatment, negatively impacts physician-patient relationships, and increases
costs on the healthcare system. The argument that pharmaceutical DTCA should be
deregulated maintains that less restricted dissemination of health information would
better inform patients about the existence of health conditions and treatments, possibly
leading to consultations with physicians that might contribute to reducing under diagnosis
and under treatment amongst the public. The proliferation of pharmaceutical DTCA has
been found to be financially advantageous to drug producers and manufacturers (Liu &
Gupta, 2011; Roberts, 2011). Intrinsic to all positions is a set of stakeholders who are
invested in the regulatory status of pharmaceutical DTCA and who thus may choose to
play a role in future policy and legal proceedings involving pharmaceutical DTCA.

1.3 Policy and Stakeholders
Public policy, the focus of this research, is “a course of action or inaction chosen
by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems” (Pal,
2010, p.2). Policy is typically developed in a non-linear process, but often aligns with
key stages: problem identification, policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy
evaluation. Health policy is a subset of public policy, defined by Buse et al. (2012) as
“assumed to embrace courses of action (and inaction) that affect the set of institutions,
organizations, services and funding arrangements of the health and health care system”
(p.4). It includes policy made in the public sector (by governments) and as well as
policies in the private sector (Buse et al, 2012, p.4). All stages of the policy process are
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entirely dependent on actors who are participants and have a stake or interest in the
policy processes that affect policy, including individuals, organizations, and governments
(Buse et al, 2012, p.4). These actors are often referred to as stakeholders.
Pharmaceutical advertising policy is an outcome of the legislative process in
Canada: a function of policy-making at the federal level (as will be explained further in
Chapter 3). Pharmaceutical policy development often involves stakeholders such as
healthcare providers, pharmaceutical companies, media companies, and health-associated
organizations, some of whom may make contributions to the relevant federal legislation
while it is being considered in either the House of Commons or the Senate. These
stakeholders should have their policymaking intentions and means understood to better
understand how pharmaceutical advertising policy may develop.
Under the Canadian system of government, while Canada’s executives (its
cabinets are subordinate to its legislatures, a characteristic of all “responsible
governments” of the post-1830s British model). The courts are independent of Canada’s
legislatures (including the federal Parliament) and executives, and can rule both
legislation and regulations invalid if they find fundamental legal tenets have been
violated by the legislatures or executives involved (for instance, by violating provisions
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). A Charter case is the type of court
intervention that occurred in Canada’s leading case of tobacco DCTA and which may
well, for reasons to be explored in this thesis, can also occur in the context of
pharmaceutical DTCA. The presence of interveners, a type of stakeholder, in litigation is
a relatively new phenomenon in Canada (Kearney & Merrill, 2000) – traditionally only
the parties to litigation (those who bring the litigation and those who defend against it)
have been able to appear in Canadian courts or make submissions to court. That Canadian
courts will now, on occasion, accept interveners into their processes gives those who
intervene another means of influencing policy. As will be described in this thesis, when a
court gives a stakeholder standing as an intervener it is both evidence of recognition of
stakeholder status in a given policy area and also an opportunity for that intervener to
influence a completely different aspect of law-making than is available through the
democratic channels that culminate in legislation and regulation.
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Thus, two stakeholder analyses are completed in this study to better understand
DTCA stakeholders and how they may impact DTCA policy: those who attempt to
influence the democratic processes of law-making and those who attempt to influence
judicial decision-making. Neither stakeholder group has been well studied in any context
in Canada.

1.4 Relevance to Health Information Sciences
The World Health Organization states that health information systems provide the
underpinnings for decision-making and have four key functions: data generation,
compilation, analysis and synthesis, and communication use (WHO, 2008). At Western
University, the goal of health information science is partly described as to:
Understand the existing and emerging sources of recorded health information in
its many forms; understand, through examination of relevant research, the need of
particular health user groups (e.g., health policy makers, health professionals,
health vendors, patients, advocates and members of the public) (Western
University, 2017).
This policy analysis relies on a series of stakeholder analyses to identify stakeholders
who could play an important role in shaping Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy. The
intended result of this project is identification of a set of stakeholders who are positioned
to influence not only legislative and regulatory policy outcomes but also legal
proceedings that themselves could change legislative and regulatory outcomes.
Generating and compiling data on pharmaceutical DTCA policy stakeholders, and then
analyzing that data in order to communicate stakeholder position, power, interests, and
influence for the purposes of informing government and private organization
policymaker’s health and healthcare decision making situates this project firmly in the
domain of the Health Information Sciences.

1.5 Research Gap
Although there is research on DTCA, healthcare stakeholders, and interveners at
the Supreme Court, at this time there is a lack of literature which addresses the specific
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stakeholders in Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA, and how those stakeholders are
positioned and functioning in the policy and legal settings.

1.6 Problem Statement
As concerns continue amidst increasing costs of drugs and the potential role of
DTCA on consumers and health providers, pharmaceutical DTCA policy continues to be
a focus of stakeholders including pharmaceutical companies, health groups, and
government. Identifying Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders, and their
positions, power, interests, and influence, and then situating those stakeholders in terms
of their potential ability to influence legislative or regulatory policy or to play roles as
future legal intervenors in the Supreme Court provides analysis of two complementary
but different avenues through which a policy change in pharmaceutical DTCA can be
achieved. This study employed stakeholder analysis and examined the current
pharmaceutical advertising environment. It also analyzed the key Supreme Court of
Canada decision which involved healthcare advocates and addressed key constitutional
limitations on tobacco DCTA regulation (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199,
hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”) as a prelude to examining current pharmaceutical legal
proceedings which may key indicators of how the Supreme Court would treat a
pharmaceutical DTCA case should it come before the Court. The two analyses, taken
together, identify stakeholders positioned to influence pharmaceutical DTCA policy in
Canada.

1.7

Research Questions
Stakeholder analysis methods used in conjunction with content analysis methods

were used to interpret primary and secondary documents. The primary and secondary
documents were retrieved from publicly available websites and a small set of primary
documents were retrieved from the Supreme Court of Canada archives. These methods
and documents were used to answer the following research questions:
1. Given that there is a literature gap on Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA
stakeholders, what can be learned about these stakeholders? This overall
question leads to a number of subsidiary questions:
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• Who are the direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising
stakeholders in the Canadian policy environment, and what are their
interests, positions, power, and influence?
• what is the potential for these stakeholders to shape future DTCA
policy?
This first set of questions is explored in Chapter 2.
2. Given the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court process in
Canada and the presence of interveners in the landmark advertising case in the
Supreme Court of Canada, RJR-MacDonald, are the stakeholders identified in
Research Question #1 found as interveners in current pharmaceutical related
Supreme Court litigation?
•

If so, which and to what extent?

•

For those interveners found in answer to Research Question 1 and also
found present in Supreme Court of Canada litigation, do the interests,
positions, influence, and power parallel those found in the broader
policy environment of Research Question 1?

This second set of questions is explored in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 will discuss the
stakeholder and intervener findings from Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 respectively.

1.8 Format
This thesis has begun with this introductory chapter briefly outlining the concepts
of pharmaceutical DTCA, policy, stakeholders, and interveners. Problem statements,
relevance to Health Information Science, and the research questions explored in the next
two chapters have been explained.
Chapter 2 explores the positions, power, interests and influence of Canadian
pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders and answers Research Question #1. Chapter 3
answers Research Question #2 by reviewing and analyzing recent pharmaceutical court
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada and involving interveners at the Supreme
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Court. The final chapter discusses these two investigations and draws conclusions drawn
by examining and comparing the two sets of findings from Chapters 2 and 3.

8

1.9 References
Auton, F. (2006). Direct-To-Consumer-Advertising (DTCA) of pharmaceuticals: AN
updated review of the literature and debate since 2003. Institute of Economic
Affairs, 24–32. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0270.2006.00646.x
Buse, K., Mays, N., Walt, G. (2012). Making Health Policy (2nd ed.). UK: McGraw-Hill
Education.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
Canadian Institute for Health Information. (2015). National Health Expenditure Trends,
1975 to 2015. Ottawa. Retrieved from:
https://secure.cihi.ca/free_products/nhex_trends_narrative_report_2015_en.pdf
Canadian Institute for Health Information. (2012). Prescribed Drug Spending in Canada,
2012: A Focus on Public Drug Programs. Ottawa. Retrieved from:
https://secure.cihi.ca/free_products/Prescribed_Drug_Spending_in_Canada_EN.p
df
Canadian Institute for Health Information. (2011). Health Care Cost Drivers: The Facts.
Ottawa. Retrieved from
https://secure.cihi.ca/free_products/health_care_cost_drivers_the_facts_en.pdf
Canadian Medical Association. (2002). Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA).
Retrieved from: https://www.cma.ca/Assets/assets
library/document/en/advocacy/CMA_advertising_PD03-01
e.pdf#search=advertising
Canadian Pharmacists Association. (2009). CPhA position state on direct-to-consumer
advertising (DTCA). Retrieved from: http://www.pharmacists.ca/cphaca/assets/File/cpha-on-the-issues/PPDirectToConsumerAdvertising.pdf

9

Frosch, D. L., Grande, D., Tarn, D. M., & Kravitz, R. L. (2010). A decade of
controversy: Balancing policy with evidence in the regulation of prescription
Drug advertising. American Journal of Public Health, 100(1), 24–32.
http://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2008.153767
Harker, M., & Harker, D. (2007). Direct‐to‐consumer‐advertising of prescription
medicines. Leadership in Health Services, 20(2), 76–84.
http://doi.org/10.1108/17511870710745411
Kearney, J. D., & Merrill, T. W. (2000). The influence of amicus curiae briefs on the
Supreme Court. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 148(3), 743-855.
Liu, Q., & Gupta, S. (2011). The impact of direct-to-consumer advertising of prescription
drugs on physician visits and drug requests: Empirical findings and public policy
implications. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 28(3), 205–217.
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijresmar.2011.04.001
Law, M. (2009). Costs and consequences of direct-to-consumer advertising for
clopidogrel in Medicaid. Arch Intern Med, 169(21). Retrieved from:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19933958
Pal, L. A. (2005). Beyond policy analysis: Public issue management in turbulent times.
Toronto, ON: Nelson.
RJR-MacDonald v Canada, [1995] 3 Supreme Court Reports 199.
Roberts, C. (2011). Addressing the health system impacts of domestic and international
direct-to-consumer advertising in Canada (Master’s Major Research Project).
Retrieved from: file:///Users/tomeldik/Downloads/etd6581_CRoberts%20(7).pdf
Western University. (2017). Master of health information science: goals & objectives.
Retrieved from:
http://www.fims.uwo.ca/programs/graduate_programs/master_of_health_informat
ion_science/goals_objectives.html

10

Wilkes, M. S., Bell, R. a., & Kravitz, R. L. (2000). Direct-to-consumer prescription drug
advertising: Trends, impact, and implications. Health Affairs, 19(2), 110–128.
http://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.19.2.110
World Health Organization. (2008). Health information systems. Retrieved from:
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/toolkit_hss/EN_PDF_Toolkit_HSS_Infor
mationSystems.pdf
Ventola, C. (2011). Direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising: therapeutic or toxic?
Pharmacy and Therapeutics, 36(10), 669–84.

11

2

Chapter Two: Analysis of Policy Stakeholders

2.1 Introduction
A report by the Canadian Institute for Health Information (CIHI) found that
prescription drug expenditures were the second largest category of drug spending as a
proportion of the national gross domestic product (GDP), accounting for 15.7% of total
Canadian health expenditures; a share of health spending that has been increasingly since
the 1980s and is now only behind hospital spending in health expenditures (CIHI, 2015).
CIHI identified increased drug utilization as a major contributor and driver of the
increase in prescription drug expenditures, and names direct-to-consumer advertising
(DTCA) as a potential catalyst for increased prescription drug utilization (CIHI, 2015;
CIHI, 2012; Law, 2008). Supporting the claim that DTCA contributes to increased drug
utilization is a cross-sectional study by Mintzes et al (2002) that found that patient
requests for prescription pharmaceuticals are a driver of physician prescribing
behaviours. Kravitz et al. (2005) similarly found that DTCA could increase prescription
drug utilization, but added that it could mitigate underuse and promote overuse of drugs
for major depression and adjustment disorders.
Pharmaceutical DTCA is defined as “an effort (usually via popular media) made
by a pharmaceutical company to promote its prescription products directly to patients”
(Ventola, 2011, p.669). Canadian spending on DTCA has risen sharply since 1999, from
$2 million in 1999 to $22 million in 2006. American spending on DTCA increased from
$340 [US] million in 1995 to $4.5 [US] billion in 2009; which is notable because
American advertising likely affects Canadian pharmaceutical drug utilization (Law et al.,
2008; Mintzes, 2009; Pharma Marketing, 2010; Ventola, 2011). The reach of American
pharmaceutical DTCA into Canada has contributed to a discussion and debate
surrounding the effects, benefits, and detriments of the practice. Harker (2007)
summarized the debate surrounding pharmaceutical advertising by stating that
pharmaceutical advertising is “a controversial issue as it operates at the nexus of
population healthcare and “for profit” enterprise” (p. 76).
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There is a potential for harm in misdiagnosis by patients, over-prescription, and
misinformation about prescription pharmaceuticals; all concerns prompted by the
introduction of DTCA (Health Council of Canada, 2006). The pharmaceutical industry is
largely located in the private sector, where the primary developers and manufacturers of
prescription drugs are found. These companies are incentivized by profit to proliferate
the sale of these drugs to make a return on investment and further the financial standing
of their corporations. Pharmaceutical DTCA has both the potential to spread essential
health information about drugs and diseases that may benefit populations who may not
otherwise receive this information, but also the risk of advertising campaigns incentivized
by profit that contribute to misdiagnosis, over-prescription, and misinformation about
certain drugs and diseases (Health Council of Canada, 2006).
In Canada, and internationally, there are two predominant perspectives on the
effects of pharmaceutical DTCA. The first perspective suggests that there is a
relationship between pharmaceutical advertising and increased pressure on physicians to
prescribe drugs from patients who have been influenced by television, print, or electronic
advertisements, a relationship which has resulted in a broad increase in prescription drug
utilization (CIHI, 2012; Wilkes et al., 2000; Law, 2009; Wilkes et al., 2000;). Mintzes
(2002) identified a perceived change in the prescribing behaviour in the physician-patient
relationship with the introduction of DTCA: ‘Patients’ requests for medicines are a
powerful driver of prescribing decisions. In most cases physicians prescribed requested
medicines but were often ambivalent about the choice of treatment” (Mintzes, 2002,
p.279). This perceived change in prescribing behaviour and the physician-patient
relationship has prompted concern among prominent health groups who have taken a
stance against the practice, often articulated as a policy statement expressing support for
increased regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA. The second perspective on the effects of
pharmaceutical DTCA is that the pharmaceutical advertisements serve as a vehicle for
communicating health information about health ailments and their remedies to potential
patients. These advertisements may be encouraging patients to seek out their physicians
for consultation, thereby addressing issues such as under-diagnosis and under-treatment
of the patient population. This perspective suggests that the deregulation and proliferation

13

of DTCA should be advantageous to both patients and the pharmaceutical companies that
manufacture and develop the drugs (Liu & Gupta, 2011; Roberts, 2011).
The positions to further regulate and to deregulate pharmaceutical DTCA are
located along a spectrum of regulation, ranging from completely unregulated to
completely prohibited DTCA. Canada’s current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations are
best interpreted as being closer to complete prohibition than they are to completely
unregulated DTCA (Gardner, 2003); this spectrum of regulation and positions informs
the study going forward. The positions to further regulate pharmaceutical DTCA and the
positions to reduce regulation are supported and advanced by sets of stakeholders,
individuals, and groups who have an interest in policy, who are invested in the regulatory
status of DTCA and may choose to assume a role in future policy or legal developments
involving pharmaceutical DTCA. Stakeholders may have a role in pharmaceutical DTCA
policy, may particularly influence any legislative or regulatory developments, and are
important to understand in the broader context of developing policy for DTCA.
The aim of this aspect of the study was to identify Canadian pharmaceutical
advertising stakeholders, their positions, power, interests, and influence to influence
future Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy, either through legislative or regulatory
change or through influence upon judicial outcomes in legal proceedings.

2.2 Background
2.2.1

Stakeholders and Stakeholder Analysis
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) is used as the framework and lens through

which this policy analysis was conducted. All stages of the policy process are dependent
on stakeholders, who are described by Freeman as those that “can affect or be affected by
the achievement of the organizations perspectives” (Freeman, 1984, p.46). Adapted to a
policy context, it is more appropriate to use the description posited by Buse, Mays, and
Walt (2012), who defined policy stakeholders as “those individuals and groups with an
interest in an issue or policy, those who might be affected by a policy and those who may
play a role in relation to make or implementing a policy” (p.4). Stakeholders can be
individuals, groups, organizations, or governments. On the topic of stakeholders, Guba
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and Lincoln add that “…interest may be measured in terms of money, status, power, face,
opportunity or other coin, and may be large or small, as construed by the groups in
question” (Guba and Lincoln, 1989, p.52).
Policy and stakeholders can often be referred to as operating within a policy
network, defined as “inter-dependent organizations involved in an area of policy that
exchange resources and bargain to varying degrees to attain their specific goals” (Buse et
al., 2012, p. 106). A more focused policy network, focusing on a single issue, are often
referred to as an ‘issue network’ (Buse et al., 2012). Within these networks there are
competing individuals and organizations, who may themselves form smaller networks
and communities to advance policy objectives.
Stakeholders can be organized into a number of categories, and one means of
doing this is to organize them according to their interests. Stakeholders organized
according to their interests can be divided into “sectional” groups and “cause” groups.
Sectional groups are “groups whose main goal is to protect and enhance the interests of
their members and/or of the section of society they proclaim to stand for” (Buse et al.,
2012, p. 111): an example of sectional stakeholder groups in pharmaceutical DTCA
policy are unions (e.g Canadian Autoworkers Union) or the Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical Association, whose focus is, in-part, to represent the views of their
respective members. Cause groups are described as “groups whose main goal is to
promote a particular issue or cause and whose membership is open to anyone who
supports the cause without necessarily having anything to gain personally if the case is
successful” (Buse et al, 2012, p. 111). The Canadian Health Coalition is one example of a
cause group stakeholder because it is a public advocacy organization dedicated to the
preservation and improvement of public healthcare in Canada, which includes advocating
in a number of DTCA policy areas (Canadian Health Coalition, 2016).
Another common categorization of interest groups is that of ‘insider’ and
‘outsider’ groups. Insider groups are those groups which are well connected within
government, considered legitimate by policymakers, and will often be able to consult
policymakers or advance their policy agendas (Buse et al., 2012). Outsider groups are
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described as the contrasting set of groups to the insider groups, are often seen as
illegitimate groups by policymakers, and either reject the processes of government or
have been unable to gain legitimacy (Buse et al., 2012). Insider and outsider groups will
have varying levels of public policy influence; typically, insider groups will have more
influence than an outsider group. Understanding which stakeholders have insider or
outsider status contributes to our understanding of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy
landscape. An insider group, BIOTECanada, is a member of the Pharmaceutical
Advertising Advisory Board, a self-regulatory pre-clearance DTCA group, and so has
more potential to influence change to the policy landscape than the Consumer
Association of Canada, which was identified in this study only as a witness on the
Standing Committee on Health report (2004) but may be interested in pharmaceutical
DTCA policy nonetheless.

2.2.2

Pharmaceutical DTCA Legal Regulation
Health Canada, the federal Ministry of Health, is mandated with regulating

pharmaceutical DTCA and enforcing pharmaceutical advertising legislation: the Food
and Drugs Act (RSC 1985, c F-27), originally enacted in 1920 (and most recently
consolidated in 1985),, is the Canadian federal statute that governs pharmaceutical
advertising in Canada. Alongside the Act are the Food and Drug Regulations (CRC, c
870), which Health Canada describes as: “…regulations [which], where applicable, set
the standards for composition, strength, potency, purity, quality, or other property, or the
other property of the article of food or drug to which they refer” (Health Canada, 2007,
p.1). Together, these set out the policies for pharmaceutical DTCA in Canada.
Specifically, Section 9(1) of the Food and Drugs Act prohibits false, misleading,
deceptive, or erroneous advertising of products. Section 20(1) states that “no person shall
label, package, treat, process, sell, or advertise in a manner that is false, misleading or
deceptive, intended use, quantity, character, value, composition, merit or safety”. Section
3(1) prohibits consumer-directed advertisements for health products that make claims to
treat, prevent, or cure any diseases listed in Schedule A to the Act. The Food and Drug
Regulations contain sections C.01.044 and C.08.002(1). Section C.01.044 prohibits
consumer directed prescription advertising beyond the drug’s name, price, and quantity.
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Section C.08.002 (1) prohibits the advertising of new drugs that have not been approved
for sale by Health Canada. Canada’s legislation and regulations on pharmaceutical DTCA
frame the policy discussion around it, as different stakeholders adopt various policy
positions that may be intended to alter the current legislation and regulations.
In the absence of specific pharmaceutical DTCA definitions and categorization of
advertisements in the relevant Canadian legislation and regulations, the U.S Food and
Drug Administration (US FDA) provides information that may be relevant to
understanding different types of pharmaceutical DTCA. The US FDA recognizes three
types of pharmaceutical DTCA: 1) product claim advertisements, which are the only type
of ad to feature both the name of the drug and explain its benefits and risks; 2) reminder
advertisements, which provide the name of the drug, but not the uses, benefits, or risks of
the drug; and 3) help-seeking advertisements (sometimes referred to as disease-oriented
ads) which describe a disease or condition but do not recommend or suggest a specific
drug treatment (FDA, 2015).
Health Canada’s policy on pharmaceutical DTCA, in accordance with its Food
and Drugs Act and the Food and Drug Regulations, does not have a permitted category
for the first category of advertisements above, those that feature both the name of
pharmaceutical and the use of said drug: such ads are prohibited in Canada (Health
Council of Canada, 2006). The second and third types of ads, reminder advertisements
(as defined by the US FDA) and help-seeking announcements are permitted in Canada
(Health Council of Canada, 2006). Help seeking announcements, as defined by Health
Canada, cannot mention a specific drug, cannot imply that a drug is a sole treatment for
any disease or ailment, can make no mention of a drug manufacturer, and can be
considered an advertising if other factors indicate that the purpose of the announcement is
to promote sale or disposal of a drug (Health Canada, 2005)
Although Health Canada is the federally mandated regulator of pharmaceutical
advertising in Canada, industry body stakeholders, such as the Pharmaceutical
Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB) and Advertising Standards Canada (ASC), have
become prominent in the Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory environment. In
particular, PAAB provides pre-clearance services to assist advertisers in meeting federal
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regulatory standards and ASC provides regulatory advice on the compliance of
promotional messages (Vakratsas & Kolsarici, 2014). However, as Health Canada is the
only legally recognized regulator, all complaints about pharmaceutical advertisements are
handled by Health Canada.

2.2.3

Policy Context for Direct-to-Consumer Advertising
A 2004 report by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Health (“the

Standing Committee”) explored the role of prescription drugs in the health care system in
terms of the potential of those drugs to improve the lives of Canadians and reviewed the
costs of those drugs on the healthcare system. One area of focus of the report was
pharmaceutical DTCA (Standing Committee on Health, 2004). The committee’s mandate
is described as follows by the Federal Government: “The House of Commons Standing
Committee on Health … is empowered to study and report on all matters relating to the
mandate, management, and operation of Health Canada.” (HESA Standing Committee on
Health Mandate, 2015, p.1)
In its 2004 report, the Standing Committee expressed concern about both the
rising costs of health expenditures (of which drug expenditures are a sizeable share), and
the evidence that suggests a relationship exists between DTCA and growing costs. The
Standing Committee agreed with the original rationale for prohibition of pharmaceutical
DTCA and rebuffed calls for legislative changes to allow wider public advertising of
prescription drugs. In regards to the DTCA pre-clearance services offered by the PAAB
and Advertising Standards Canada, the Standing Committee was concerned with the
voluntary approach to pre-clearance of prescription drug advertisements. PAAB’s process
of reviewing advertisements prior to submission of advertisements to Health Canada, and
Health Canada’s evident dependence on these agencies for regulatory oversight, was
described as a “feeble mechanism”, and the Standing Committee found that Health
Canada has disregarded its responsibility to enforce existing regulations (Standing
Committee on Health, 2004).
The Standing Committee’s recommendations included the following:
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1. Health Canada immediately enforce the current prohibition on all industry
sponsored advertisements on drugs to the public;
2. Health Canada ensure the provision of independent, unbiased and publicly
financed information on prescription drugs to Canada;
3. Health Canada should dedicate specific resources to Health Products and Food
Branch Inspectorate for vigorous enforcement of the DTCA regulations on
prescription drugs include active surveillance of all relevant media, identification
of potential infractions, appropriate corrective action, and production of annual
public reports; and
4. Health Canada should ensure that all DTCA complaints about prescription
drugs received by Advertising Standards Canada or the Pharmaceutical
Advertising Advisory Board are forwarded to Health Canada for investigation and
action (Standing Committee on Health, 2004, p. 14).
Following upon this 2004 report, the now defunct Health Council of Canada, a federal
council that was mandated to monitor the progress of health care renewal in Canada
(Health Council of Canada, 2006), again examined the issue of pharmaceutical DTCA in
2006. Its report, titled: “What are the Public Health Implications? Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising of Prescription Drugs in Canada” (Health Council of Canada, 2006),
described the legislative and regulatory state of pharmaceutical DTCA in Canada, United
States and New Zealand, summarized research evidence examining the effects of DTCA,
looking at pharmaceutical DTCA policy developments in countries where the practice
was prohibited, proposed legislative changes in Canada to introduce some pharmaceutical
DTCA into the country, and made a number of recommendations in that light (Health
Council of Canada, 2006). The Health Council of Canada report elaborated on
recommendations in the Standing Committee report (Health Council of Canada, 2006;
Standing Committee on Health, 2004). The recommendations from the Health Council of
Canada report included [recommendations are paraphrased]:

19

1. Independent, publicly financed, information and education on drugs and other
medical treatments;
2. Better enforcement of regulations governing both physician-oriented drug
promotion and DTCA;
3. Given the lack of justification for allowing reminder advertising from public
health perspective, clause C.01.033 of the Food and Drugs Act should be
repealed;
4. Canada’s approach to cross-border television broadcasting should be reviewed
(Health Council of Canada, 2006).
Despite the policy recommendations that were made by the Standing Committee
on Health (2004) and the Health Council of Canada (2006), the regulations on
pharmaceutical advertising have not been changed (Health Council of Canada, 2006;
Standing Committee on Health, 2004). The lack of change to pharmaceutical DTCA
regulation by the Government of Canada has been described as a “stalemate…in
initiatives for legislative change” (Mintzes et al, 2005, p.326). The authors are referring
to the absence of new DTCA which uses the recommendations from the reports, which
mainly call for improved enforcement on the current regulations and legislation, and that
Health Canada’s interpretation of the Food and Drugs Act by Health Canada in 1996 and
2000 softened the restrictions on pharmaceutical DTCA (Health Canada 1996; Canada,
2000) instead of increasing regulation.
The Standing Committee Report (2004) also addressed post-market surveillance
and clinical trials, the importance of attracting a wide range of stakeholders in the
pharmaceutical, pharmaceutical advertising sector, and health sectors as witnesses before
the Standing Committee or inviting them to submit policy briefs to the Standing
Committee with intentions of contributing to and informing the report with respect to
their positions and interests. It is important to identify and understand these stakeholders,
and the policy networks they operate in, to better understand the broader pharmaceutical
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advertising policy environment as they shape the policy discussions and debates
regarding pharmaceutical DTCA.

2.3 Literature Review
To establish an understanding of the current state of the research pertaining to
Canadian pharmaceutical advertising policy and stakeholders, a literature search was
conducted. CINAHL, PubMed, Scopus, Google Scholar, and Western’s Library
Catalogue were all accessed in a database search for research that addressed Canadian
pharmaceutical advertising policy and stakeholders that was published between 2000 and
2016 in English. Search terms used in each database included “Canada” or “Canadian”
combined with “direct-to-consumer advertising”, “DTCA”, or “pharmaceutical
advertising”, and “stakeholder” or “stakeholders”. A search with all three main search
terms combined (Canadian, DTCA, and stakeholders) yielded no results. The use of
“Canada” (and Canadian) with “DTCA” (and Pharmaceutical Advertising” search terms
was next used, titles and abstracts were reviewed to determine if they included content on
Canadian DTCA appropriate for this review. This search produced 38 works on Canadian
DTCA. Of the 38 works, 35 were peer reviewed journal articles, two were journal
published commentaries on DTCA, and one was a graduate major research project.
A search using only “pharmaceutical advertising” and “stakeholders” search
terms produced one study: “Marketing and societal welfare: A multiple stakeholder
approach” (Matear & Dacin, 2010). Although the study is relevant to DTCA and
stakeholders, the authors do not focus on Canada or policy. However, the study provides
insight on the relationship and scope of business strategy, societal welfare, and consumer
behaviour in relation to DTCA (Matear & Dacin, 2010), and broadly describes groups of
stakeholders in the DTCA environment. The study is a secondary literature review of 86
published works pertaining to DTCA, stakeholder theory, societal welfare, consumer
behavior, or business strategy; which intersects with this project, with our shared interests
in DTCA and stakeholders. The study aimed to “help identify the nature, scope and
domain of the business strategy-consumer behaviour-societal welfare link, and ways to
explore the trade-offs between individuals and societal gain” (Matear & Dacin, 2010,
p.1173) while using stakeholder theory as a lens to examine DTCA. The authors briefly
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described pharmaceutical DTCA, the link between DTCA and societal welfare (including
a summary and list of arguments for and against DTCA), and identified groups of
stakeholders involved in pharmaceutical advertising: consumers, physicians, insurance
companies and formularies, pharmacists, and the government.
Matear & Dacin (2010) identified stakeholder groups but did not engage in any
search for specific stakeholders or seek to understand the stakeholder groups outside of
their interests in DTCA through the perspective of societal welfare, business strategy or
consumer behaviour. The study did not name many specific stakeholders within each
broad grouping, or explore specific stakeholder position, power, interests, and influence,
or the nuances between stakeholders in each grouping. The authors do not acknowledge
that stakeholders of similar type (or within the same grouping) are not homogenous in
their positions, power, interests, and influence, and this study does not provide sufficient
granularity to understand the differences between stakeholder groups or between the
constituents of each stakeholder groups – necessitating further research.
Once the literature search was broadened to include all Canadian works on
pharmaceutical DTCA, and not just those specific to DTCA stakeholders (this was
necessary to broaden the search, as no Canadian DTCA literature involving policy
stakeholders is currently available), one master’s research project was identified:
Addressing the health system impacts of domestic and international DTCA in Canada
(Roberts, 2011). Roberts’ problem statement is that DTCA has negative impacts on
health and increases inappropriate use of the healthcare system, which echoes concerns
with DTCA expressed in other literature (Roberts, 2011), and the study addressed four
research questions:
What range of impacts does DTCA have on the health system in British
Columbia?; What strategy is British Columbia employing with the goal of
addressing the negative impacts of DTCA on the health care system? If the
province employs any strategy, how effective is it at addressing the negative
impacts of DTCA? What strategies have been employed in other jurisdictions to
address negative impacts of DTCA on their health system? (Roberts, 2011, p. 4).
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Roberts (2011) conducted a thematic content analysis of government documents, case
studies, ministry interviews, and expert interviews. Roberts’ analysis produced a number
of themes and the identification of a number of regulatory loopholes and flaws. Four
policy options are evaluated: 1) funding a working group on DTCA in Canada; 2)
improving public discourse on DTCA; 3) using financial penalties to encourage DTCA
compliance; 4) relieving pressure on the health care system through education. To discuss
possible policy options, Roberts introduces a criterion of ‘Stakeholder Acceptability’ for
four policy options, where Roberts hypothesizes whether certain stakeholder groups
would be accepting or rejecting of the policy recommendation. After analyzing the policy
options, Roberts (2011) suggests two policy recommendations: funding a working group
on pharmaceutical DTCA in Canada, and relieving pressure on the healthcare system
through education on pharmaceutical DTCA.
The literature review suggested an absence of research investigating the role of
stakeholders on Canadian pharmaceutical advertising policy. This study sought to
address this gap.

2.4 Research Aim
The aim of this study was to identify and conduct an analysis of the stakeholders
relevant to DTCA in terms of their positions, power, interest, and ability to influence or
affect future pharmaceutical policy and legal proceedings that pertain to pharmaceutical
advertising – and thus to better understand pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking.

2.5 Methods
2.5.1

Study Design
This study is guided by a stakeholder analysis approach (Brugha, 2000;

Varvasovszky, 2000). Stakeholder analysis is described as: “one of a number of different
but closely related policy research or strategic tools now found in the health policy
literature.” It is said that “the usefulness of the tool, along with other-nonlinear policy
analysis approaches, is that stakeholder analysis highlights the importance of actors and
interest groups in the policy making process” (Brugha, 2000, p.243). Stakeholder analysis
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is a versatile tool used to describe stakeholders, and is a method that is commonly used in
policy circles. Understanding the role of stakeholders in Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA
policy informs our broader understanding of how and why certain DTCA policies exist,
what the pharmaceutical DTCA policy positions are, and how pharmaceutical DTCA
may continue to evolve.
Varvasovszky (2000) states that a stakeholder analysis is “a tool or set of tools
for generating knowledge about actors – individuals and organizations – so as to
understand their behavior, intentions, interrelations and interests; and for assessing the
influence and resources they bring to bear on decision-making or implementation
processes” (p.338) and describes how one might conduct a stakeholder analysis. A
stakeholder analysis is a snapshot of a context that is always changing and there are limits
to the data that can be accessed about stakeholders. Some considerations must be made
for the validity and of the analysis, mainly, the researcher must recognize that public
stakeholder positions, or those collected in an interview, may change over time. Also, the
position of a single member of an organization may not always represent the position of
the organization as a whole. (Varvasovszky, 2000).
This stakeholder analysis is purposefully broad and does not focus on any one
interest group but rather on a range of interest groups (Wu et al, 2013). The stakeholder
analysis focused on describing the position, power, interest, and influence of stakeholders
relative to Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy. Researchers should also be aware of
their biases during the research process (Varvasovszky, 2000). Buse, Mays, & Walt
(2012) suggest that a stakeholder analysis should identify policy stakeholders, their
political resources, and understand their positions and interests.

2.5.2

Data Collection
Both primary and secondary documents were accessed and analyzed for this

study: 1) primary documents, in the form of policy documents and websites that describe
each stakeholder’s position, power, interests, and influence; and 2) secondary documents
in the form of government documents and reports which address DTCA policy that met
the inclusion criteria. Inclusion criteria were 1) documents and websites that listed
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Canadian pharmaceutical advertising stakeholders, 2) were written in English, 3) were
published in the years between 2000 and 2015, and 4) were publicly available.
Identifying Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders meant first identifying
documents that were relevant to pharmaceutical advertising. Collecting documents that
met the inclusion criteria involved database searches (CINAHL, PubMed, Scopus,
Google Scholar, and Western’s Library Catalogue) and a Google search engine search
with the search terms “DTCA” or “Pharmaceutical Advertising” and “Canada” or
“Canadian”, and from the year 2000 onwards.
The website of the Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada
(“Romanow Commission”), a federal government commission mandated in 2002 to
review Canada’s Medicare and recommend policies and measures to improve the system
and long term sustainability including pharmaceutical policies (Commission on the
Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002), was accessed. A number of submissions by
stakeholders were made to the Romanow Commission, submissions were either requested
by the Commission, or received in an “open” call. Documents were screened for
pharmaceutical advertising content by using the text search feature available on all pdf
viewers, Microsoft Word, and web browsers. The terms: “DTCA”, “pharmaceutical”,
“advertising”, “pharma”, “advert”, and “direct” were used to find pharmaceutical
advertising content in the documents. If the document included content that pertained to
pharmaceutical advertising then it met the inclusion criteria, and the individual or
organization that produced and submitted the document was recorded in Microsoft Excel.
The relevant text was then excerpted and organized in a Microsoft Excel document for
coding. A total of 10 documents were identified, and 10 excerpts were included in this
analysis. A google search for the website of stakeholders identified in the documents
produced 10 websites, from which the constituent members of each stakeholder
organization found in the Romanow Commission submissions were also identified,
totaling 63 constituent organizations. ‘Constituent organizations’ are the individuals or
organizations which constitute or form the member base of each association or
organization identified, and are stakeholders themselves.
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The Health Canada main website page search bar was searched to identify
pharmaceutical advertising documents. Entering “DTCA” or “Pharmaceutical
Advertising” produced a publicly available list of complainants, those who had submitted
a formal complaint about a breach in pharmaceutical advertising law was identified. The
individuals or organizations that submitted the complaint, the law that was breached, and
the category of the complaint, and the details of the complaint were recorded in an Excel
spreadsheet for analysis. This data was collected to gather insights about the individuals
and organizations who express interests in DTCA regulations and policy. Two policy
documents by the Food and Drugs branch of Health Canada interpret the Food and Drugs
Act and Regulations on behalf of the Federal Government were also identified (Health
Canada 1996; Health Canada 2000).
The Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB), a pre-clearance
regulatory agency composed of high-interest stakeholders, website was accessed and its
16 constituent members identified (many of whom are themselves associations or
coalitions comprised of several organizational members). The webpages of those
constituent members were also accessed to find position papers or pages on
pharmaceutical advertising, and the members that make up the organizations in PAAB.
As can be seen in Table 2.1, the websites of 12 constituent members, and one Linkedin
profile (The Association of Medical Advertising Agencies does not have a website and
Linkedin is the only online resource with a description of the organization) were
reviewed for position papers, and eight position papers were identified and downloaded.
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Table 2.1: Data Collection of Documents Relevant to Pharmaceutical DTCA Policy
Stakeholders
Source

Number of
Documents

Number of
Stakeholders
identified

Number of
Websites
Found

Romanow
Commission
Pharmaceutical
Advertising Advisory
Board
Standing Committee
Report
Health Canada –
Health Product
Advertising
Complains

10

10

10

Number of
Constituent
Stakeholders*
Identified
63

1

13

12

375

1

1

13

127

1

1

1

56

Note: * Constituent Stakeholders are members of other organizations or associations,
and may belong to multiple organizations associations.
The House of Commons Standing Committee on Health included a list of 127
associations and individuals who contributed to its report, Opening the Medicine Cabinet:
First Report on Health Aspects of Prescription Drugs Report (Standing Committee on
Health, 2004). Factoring in the report’s significant focus on pharmaceutical advertising,
those participants in the Standing Committee consultations were informing decisionmaking (and the potential policy-making, should recommendations be implemented) on
pharmaceutical DTCA policy. These stakeholders were likely to have a position on
pharmaceutical DTCA policy, have interests that concern pharmaceutical DTCA, and
may continue to attempt to influence future pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking. It was
important to include these stakeholders in the study to better understand their role in
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking. The website of each association or individual was
accessed (if available) and searched for references, pharmaceutical DTCA policy
documents or, in lieu of a position document, the website was searched for references to
pharmaceutical DTCA. Similar stakeholders were grouped into different categories along
with available information on each stakeholder. Following the collection of the
stakeholder webpages, policy documents, and government documents, the analysis of
each document began. Stakeholders from each document were first identified. The
ensuing analytic process consisted of coding text for stakeholder power, position,
interests, and influence.
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2.6 Data Analysis
2.6.1

Coding

Excerpts of text and stakeholder names found in the documents and website texts
were organized in Excel files for analysis in terms of position, power, interests, and
influence. The stakeholders identified in the documents were coded for positions, power,
interests, and influence using specific criteria and coding definitions. Stakeholders were
then categorized by position, power, interests, and influence.

2.6.2

Criteria & Coding Definitions

Qualitative and quantitative content analysis of all documents was conducted to
identify the position, power, interests, and influence of each stakeholder. Vasismoradi et
al. describe the purpose of a content analysis as “to describe the characteristics of the
document’s content by examining who says what, to whom, and with what effect”
(Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013, p. 399). The analytic process of qualitative
content analysis is considered a “description and interpretation, both inductive, and
emphasizing context, integration of manifest and latent contents, drawing thematic map,
non-linear analysis process, no peer checking” (Vaismoradi, Turunen, & Bondas, 2013,
p. 399). The qualitative analysis was used to situate pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders
in terms of position, power, interests, and influence by interpreting the text collected from
policy documents and websites with context to pharmaceutical DTCA and policy;
keeping in mind that the source of the document or website, the context in which that
specific document was drafted, and the stakeholders involved has an impact on the
interpretation of that text.
This analysis makes use of quantitative counts, where specific words in a
document may be counted to the examine position, power, interests, and influence. The
quantitative content analysis was used for a number of purposes, including: grouping and
counting stakeholders to understand the size, power, and influence of a stakeholder, the
number of stakeholders with certain positions, power, interests, and influence, the
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number of stakeholders who are part of different associations, and the size of different
groupings of stakeholders (White & Marsh, 2006).

2.6.3

Code Definitions

Details of the codes and definitions – position, power, interests, and influences –
applied to this analysis are presented in this section. Table 2.2 provides a summary of the
codes and definitions (See Appendix A for examples and excerpts).
Table 2.2: Codes and Definitions
Variable

Definition

Question

Position

stakeholder’s
stance on
DTCA;
choosing to
either favour
more
restrictive
regulation, less
restrictive
regulation, or
maintain the
currently
regulatory
scheme

What is the policy stance
of the stakeholder?

Power

The quantity of
resources that
a stakeholder
has within his
or her
organization or
area and the
ability to
mobilize those
resources
What an actor
or group stands
to gain or lose

Interests

Codes and Definitions

Less regulated DTCA – policy
statement or policy involvement in
favour of less regulated DTCA.
More regulated DTCA – policy
statement or involvement in favour
of more regulated DTCA.
Maintain current regulation –
policy statement or involvement in
favour of maintaining the current
regulations.
What is the strength of that Low - A weak policy statement
position?
with respect to their position or that
the position had to be inferred, and
that there was few or no
policymaking involvement to
advance their position.
Medium - strength suggests either
a strong statement on DTCA policy
or policymaking involvement to
advance their position.
High – a strong statement on
DTCA policy and policymaking
actions that further their position.
How many resources does the Low – very little financial resources
stakeholder command?
or organizational capital
Medium – Some financial
resources or organizational
capital
High – significant and obvious
amounts of financial resources or
organizational capital

What are the interests of
the stakeholder?

Loss - stakeholder losses in a
financial or influential capacity as a
result of the current regulations
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Variable

Definition

Question

from a policy
change

Influence

2.6.4

influence is the
measure a
stakeholder’s
perceived
ability to
impact
regulatory and
legal events
regarding
DTCA, and the
stakeholder’s
desire to do so

How much is the
stakeholder ready to
initiate changes in more or
less restrictive DTCA
regulation?

How much is the
stakeholder able to assert
their position on a national
level?

Codes and Definitions
Neutral - stakeholder does not gain
or lose in a financial or influential
capacity as a result of regulations
Benefit - stakeholder benefits in a
financial or influential capacity as a
result of the current regulations
Low - readiness infers that the
stakeholder has participated few or
no policymaking functions
Medium - readiness infers the
stakeholder participated in some of
the policymaking functions.
High - stakeholder participated in
most or all policymaking functions.
Little to none - low amount of
policymaking participation and low
or medium resources
Medium - some policymaking
function participation and low,
medium, or high resources
Greatly - high policymaking
function participation and high
resources

Position
In the context of stakeholder analysis, ‘position’ is defined as “whether the

stakeholder supports, opposes, or is neutral about the policy” (Schmeer, 1999, p.8).
Contextualized for this analysis, position refers to a stakeholder’s stance on
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation; choosing to favour more restrictive regulation, less
restrictive regulation, or maintain the currently regulatory scheme. Varvasovszky (1998)
adds that the strength of the stakeholder’s position can and should be measured and
analyzed; this study adapts Varvasovszky’s work to employ three categories of strength
with which to label stakeholders: low, medium, and high. To assess the strength of a
stakeholder’s position, Varvasovszky adds “the strength of support or opposition is
assessed according to the level of resources committed to the actor’s policy position”
(Varvasovszky, 1998, p.1820). Stakeholders found to be participating in numerous
policymaking activities or venues, or showing evidence of using resources to influence
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking, were coded as “high, medium, or low” in strength
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of position with respect to other stakeholders’ allocation of resources towards furthering
their positions.
The stakeholder’s position on pharmaceutical DTCA regulation was coded as 1)
Less Regulated DTCA (in favour of less restrictive DTCA regulation), 2) More
Regulated DTCA (in favour of more restrictive DTCA regulation), or 3) Maintaining the
currently regulatory scheme. The strength of each stakeholder’s position on
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation was coded as high, medium, or low strength. Analyzing
a stakeholder’s position as less regulated DTCA, more regulated DTCA, or maintain
regulations was completed by a conducting a textual analysis of each stakeholder’s public
stance on pharmaceutical DTCA regulation as published in the collected documents or on
the stakeholder’s website. If a stakeholder had no public stance, then their position was
inferred from the stance of their constituent members (if available) or their policy-related
involvement. The strength of the stakeholder’s position was determined both by the
perceived (subjectively by the researcher) strength of the stakeholder’s position statement
(as evidenced by the language used by the stakeholder in the policy statement) and by the
actions taken by the stakeholder to advance its position (e.g. involvement in different
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking events). ‘High’ strength suggested a strong
statement on pharmaceutical DTCA policy and policymaking actions that further that
stakeholder’s position. ‘Medium’ strength suggested either a strong statement on
pharmaceutical DTCA policy or policymaking involvement to advance its position.
‘Low’ strength means that there was a weak policy statement with respect to its position
or that the position had to be inferred, and that there were few or no examples of
policymaking involvement to advance its position.

2.6.5

Power
Power is defined as “the quantity of resources that a stakeholder has within his or

her organization or area and the ability to mobilize those resources” (Schmeer, 1999, p.
17?). Buse and colleagues (2012) explain that power is typically understood as operating
in a relational sense, where one subject has influence or control over another. For this
project, power will be analyzed by assessing the amount of financial or organizational
resources at a given stakeholder’s disposal which can be used to exert influence on the
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policy agenda or other stakeholders. Different pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders will
have varying amounts of power, and that will shape the DTCA policymaking agenda as
each attempts to use that power to further its position on and interests in pharmaceutical
DTCA. Understanding the relative power of these stakeholders is important to analyzing
the stakeholder landscape for policy.
To measure the power of stakeholders in the pharmaceutical DTCA environment,
power was defined as the amount of resources at the stakeholder’s disposal in total by
way of publicly available documents regarding finances or financial status) and compared
to other pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders, and if an association has constituent
members. The number of members was factored into coding as “organization capital”, as
can be determined from the analysis of document text, website text, or the constituent
composition of the organization. A stakeholder’s organizational capital is dependent not
just on the number of constituent members but also the perceived size and power of those
members. ‘Low’ implies that this stakeholder does not wield many financial resources or
much organizational capital that can be applied to influence policy. ‘Medium’ implies
that the analysis determined that the stakeholders had some financial resources or
organizational capital with which to influence policy. ‘Large’ implies that the
organization had a significant and obvious amount of financial resources or
organizational capital that could be applied to influence pharmaceutical DTCA policy.

2.6.6

Interests
Identifying the interests of a stakeholder is instrumental in triangulating its

influence. Interests are “what an actor or group stands to gain or lose from a policy
change” (Buse et al., 2012, p. 213). Interests are distinct from position, as interests are
derived only the potential for benefit or loss incurred from a policy, not the stance of the
stakeholder in question on that specific policy.
The interests of the stakeholder were identified in this study through answering
one question, “what are the interests of the stakeholder” relative to pharmaceutical DTCA
policy. The codes used for this criteria were: benefit, neutral, and loss. ‘Benefit’ means
that the stakeholder benefits in a financial or influential capacity as a result of the current
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pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. ‘Neutral’ means that the stakeholder does not gain or
lose in financial or influential capacity as a result of the current regulations. ‘Loss’ means
that the stakeholder loses in a financial or influential capacity as a result of the current
regulations.

2.6.7

Influence
Stakeholder influence is considered to be the extent to which the views of a

particular stakeholder are reflected in initiatives for change, in agenda setting, in the
drafting of regulations and legislation, and in the major national forums (Varvasovsky,
1998). For the purposes of this project, influence was the expression of a stakeholder’s
position within the context of its interests, and through the application of its power. More
succinctly, influence is the measure of a stakeholder’s perceived ability to impact
regulatory and legal events regarding pharmaceutical DTCA, and the stakeholder’s desire
to do so. Adapted definitions from Varvasovsky were used in this study (Varvasovsky,
1998, p. 1821). Adapting Varvasovsky’s approach to Canadian pharmaceutical
advertising policy, the criteria for measuring pharmaceutical advertising were: how much
is the stakeholder ready to initiate changes toward more or less restrictive DTCA
regulation; how much is the stakeholder able to assert its position on the national level;
how much power does the stakeholder have on the outcome of a policy debate.
Influence was measured by coding for two questions: How much is the
stakeholder ready to initiate changes to more or less restrictive DTCA regulation (high,
medium, or low readiness); how much is the stakeholder able to assert its position on the
national level (high, medium, or little to none); how much a stakeholder was ready to
initiate change to more or less restrictive pharmaceutical DTCA regulation was measured
by the amount of participation in pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory functions (whether
that be PAAB, the Standing Committee, the Romanow Commission, or Health Canada
advertising complaints). ‘Policy-making functions’ in this study refers to any event,
report, commission, meeting, or similar policymaking event in which a stakeholder could
participate. ‘Low’ readiness indicates that the stakeholder has participated few or no
policymaking functions. ‘Medium’ readiness indicates the stakeholder participated in

33

some of the policymaking functions. ‘High’ readiness indicates that the stakeholder
participated in most or all policymaking functions.
How much a stakeholder is able to assert its position on the national level is coded
by how many policymaking functions it is participating in and the number of resources at
its disposal. ‘Little to none’ indicates a low amount of policymaking participation and
low or medium resources. ‘Medium’ indicates some policymaking function participation
and medium, low, or high resources. ‘Greatly’ indicates high policymaking function
participation and high resources.

2.6.8

Thematic Groupings
In addition to coding documents as described in the previous section, some

stakeholders were analyzed thematically. The Standing Committee report included 127
witnesses - both individuals and groups - who expressed interest in pharmaceutical
policy. These witnesses were considered stakeholders, however, the Report covers a
number of issues pertaining to pharmaceutical policy other than DTCA. The lack of
information on witnesses’ intentions for involvement and the lack of evidence about
which policy issues they were involved in means they could not be coded for position,
power, interests, or influence. Instead, these witnesses represent the broad range of
stakeholders that could potentially be involved in pharmaceutical DTCA; these
stakeholders were thematically grouped to represent the different groupings, or
“networks”, that could be involved in pharmaceutical DTCA. Thematic grouping was
achieved by reviewing the ‘about’ page (or website equivalent) of each organization’s
website for the organization’s mandate and purpose.

2.7 Results
The results of the analysis are presented as follows. A thematic grouping of the
stakeholders identified in the Standing Committee Report is described (Table 2.3)
followed by findings of the organizations represented more than once by the
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (Table 2.4). Shared constituent members
from associations found in the Romanow Commission Submissions and PAAB are
displayed in Figure 2.1. The positions of stakeholders found in the Romanow
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Commission Report and PAAB, and the strength of those positions are displayed in
Figure 2.2 (additional details can be found in Appendices B and C), followed by the
analysis of the power of those same stakeholders (Table 2.6), their interests (Table 2.7),
and their influence on pharmaceutical DTCA policy (Tables 2.8 & 2.9).
The 127 individuals and organizations listed in Opening the Medicine Cabinet:
Standing Committee Report on Health (2004), were organized into 15 different
“networks” of stakeholders (see again Table 2.3). The members of each network do not
necessarily have the same positions, power, interests, and influence, but are similar types
of organizations; they are the same in having in such common characteristics as similar
mandate, similar functions, or similar purpose. For example, the Canadian Centre for
Policy Alternatives and the Fraser Institute are both policy think tanks but hold to
different political views and may have different positions on policy issues; they perform a
similar function but would not be coded into the same network. These thematic groupings
represent the various policy networks that are interested in the broader pharmaceutical
policy environment, and within these networks are stakeholders with a specific interest in
pharmaceutical DTCA policy.
The analysis identified a broad range of stakeholders with an interest in
pharmaceutical policy and that may be interested specifically in pharmaceutical DTCA,
providing key insight on the types and number of stakeholders that may be involved in
pharmaceutical DTCA. Different thematic groupings of stakeholders have varying types
and numbers of organizations. For example, ‘Health Interested Organizations’ is the
largest grouping with 34 members. Universities/Academic Units, Unions, Research
Groups and Think Tanks, Pharmacists, Other Health Industry, and Government all have
between nine and fourteen members, suggesting considerable interest from a wide
spectrum of different stakeholders and groups.

35

Table 2.3: Thematic Grouping of Stakeholders into Networks by Stakeholder Type
from the Standing Committee on Health Report
Network

Stakeholders

Universities/Academic
Units

Centre for Health Services & Policy Research,
University of British Columbia; Faculty of
Pharmaceutical Sciences; University of British
Columbia; University of British Columbia Therapeutics
Initiative; Health Law Institute (University of Alberta);
University of Ottawa; Centre for Emotions and Health,
Dalhousie University; Dalhousie University; University
of New Brunswick Faculty of Nursing; University of
Quebec in Montreal
Patented Medicine Prices Review Board; Government
of Saskatchewan; Ontario Ministry of Health and LongTerm Care; Government of Manitoba; Vancouver
Native Health Authority; Alberta Health and Wellness;
North West territories Health and Social Services;
Brunswick Department of Health and Wellness; Nova
Scotia Department of Health
Institute of Health Economics; The Fraser Institute;
Vancouver Coastal Health Research Institute; Canadian
Centre for Policy Alternatives; Institute of Health
Economics; Saskatchewan Drug Research Institute;
Canadian Institute for Health Information; Canadian
Coordinating Office for Health Technology; Atlantic
Institute for Market Studies; Anemia Institute for
Research and Education
Canadian Union of Public Employees (Alberta
Division); Saskatchewan Union of Nurses; Canadian
Labour Congress; Canadian Union of Public
Employees; Congress of Union Retirees of Canada;
National Union of Public and General Employees;
Canadian Auto Workers Union; United Steelworkers of
America; Canadian Federation of Nurses Union
Better Pharmacare Coalition; British Columbia Health
Coalition; British Columbia Persons With Aids Society;
Society for Diabetic Rights; All Nation Hope AIDS
Network; Canadian Arthritis Patient Alliance;
Community Health Services (Saskatoon Association);
Saskatchewan Health Coalition; The Arthritis Society
(Saskatchewan Division); Addictions Foundation of
Manitoba; Manitoba Centre for Health Policy; Best
Medicines Coalition; Womens Health Clinic; Council of
Canadians; Canadian Health Coalition; Canadian
Cancer Society (Nova Scotia Division); Canadian
Mental Health Association; Nova Scotia Citizens Care
Network; P.E.I Health Coalition and MacKillop Centre
for Social Justice; New; Atlantic Centre of Excellence
for Womens Health; Coalition of Physicians for Social
Justice; Committee of People Living with HIV of
Quebec; Women and Health Protection, Drug Safety
Canada, Multiple Sclerosis Society of Canada; Canadian

Government

Research Groups and
Think Tanks

Unions

Health Interested
Organizations

Number of
Stakeholders
in Network
Type
10

9

10

9
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Network

Consumer
Associations

Pharmacists

HealthCare Workers

Brand Name
Pharmaceutical
Industry
Generic
Pharmaceutical
Industry
‘Other’ Health
Industry

First Nations Groups

Regulatory Groups
Aging Citizenry

Individuals

Stakeholders

Arthritis Network; Canadian Cystic Fibrosis
Foundation; Canadian Diabetes Association; Canadian
Network for Asthma Care; Canadian Treatment Action
Council; Osteoporosis Society of Canada; Alliance for
Access to Medical Information; Medical Reform Group
Downtown Eastside HIV/IDU Consumers' Board;
Pharmawatch; Consumer's Association of Canada
(Alberta); Union des consommateurs; Consumer
Association of Canada
Representative Board of Saskatchewan Pharmacists;
Saskatchewan College of Pharmacists; British Columbia
Pharmacy Association; Alberta College of Pharmacists;
Coalition for Manitoba Pharmacy; Manitoba Society of
Pharmacists; Manitoba Pharmaceutical Association;
New Brunswick Pharmacists Association, Ordres des
Pharmaciens du Québec; Canadian International
Pharmacy Association; Canadian Pharmacists
Association; Canadian Pharmacists Association; Ontario
College of Pharmacists; Ontario Pharmacists
Association
Canadian Nurses Association; Fédération des
infirmières et infirmiers du Québec; Canadian Medical
Association; The Royal College of Physicians and
Surgeons of Canada
Kerbapharma Inc.; Biogen Canada; Genzyme Canada
Inc.; BIOTECanada; Rx & D - Canada's Research
Based Pharmaceutical Companies; Gilead Science Inc.
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association

Market Media International Corp.; Canadian
Association of Chain Drug Stores, Brogan Inc., Palmer
D'Angelo Consulting Inc.; Le Groupe Jean Coutu (PJC)
Inc.; Pharmex Direct Inc.; ESI Canada; Green Shield
Canada; IMS Health, Montreal International
Assembly of First Nations, Indian Council of First
Nations of Manitoba; Native Council of Canada
(Alberta)
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board
Council of Senior Citizens Organizations of British
Columbia; Seniors' Action and Liaison Team; Canada's
Association for the Fifty-Plus; Canadian Pensioners
Concerned Inc.; Alliance of Seniors to protect Canada's
Social Programs
John McConnell, John Bury; Kay Schwartzman;
Michael Rachilis

Source: Standing Committee on Health (2004)

Number of
Stakeholders
in Network
Type

5

14

4

6

1

11

3

1
5

4
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2.7.1

Stakeholder Networks
PAAB is composed of a number of associations which are themselves networks of

stakeholders (see Table 2.4). Some of these stakeholders are part of multiple networks
which constitute the PAAB self-regulatory body. For example, Sanofi, a brand name
pharmaceutical drug manufacturer, is a constituent of four different associations which
are, in turn, members of PAAB. Stakeholders who are part of multiple PAAB
associations may have more power and influence in regulatory decision making as they
can access multiple networks in pursuit of their agendas.
Table 2.4: Constituent Stakeholders Represented More Than Once by
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board Members
Number of Times Represented by a PAAB
Member
4
3
2

Organization
Sanofi
Pfizer
AstraZeneca, CMA, Pharmascience, Teva,
Bayer, Boehringer Ingelheim,
GlaxoSmithKline, Johnson & Johnson, Procter
and Gamble, Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada
Inc, Eli Lilly, Eisai Limited, Roche, Janssen
Inc, Kalgene Pharma Inc, Merck, Novartis,
Novo Nordisk, Proeocyte diagnostics, Purdue,
Sunovian, Shire, Therapure.

Source: Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (2016)
PAAB is composed of a number of associations which are themselves networks of
stakeholders (see again Table 2.4). Some of these stakeholders are part of multiple
networks which constitute the PAAB self-regulatory body. For example, Sanofi, a brand
name pharmaceutical drug manufacturer, is a constituent of four different associations
which are, in turn, members of PAAB. Stakeholders who are part of multiple PAAB
associations may have more power and influence in regulatory decision making as they
can access multiple networks in pursuit of their agendas.
Of the 364 stakeholders identified in PAAB, 336 (92%) of the stakeholders were
represented by one network. (See Appendix B for a full list of constituent members of
PAAB associations.) There were 23 stakeholders represented by two networks, one
stakeholder was represented by three networks, and one stakeholder was represented by
four networks. Notably, of the 25 PAAB stakeholder constituent organizations
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represented by more than one network, 20 are brand name pharmaceutical drug
manufacturers, and 24 out of 25 are considered biotechnology companies. Pfizer and
Sanofi, the only organizations to be represented by more than two networks, are
international brand name pharmaceutical corporations operating in numerous countries.
Brand name pharmaceutical corporations may have the most ability to further their
pharmaceutical DTCA policy agendas or interests through their PAAB representatives as
they have the multiple networks through which to exercise their influence through
PAAB.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the connections between stakeholder associations, identified
in PAAB and the Romanow Commission, and their constituent members. A number of
associations or organizations may have multiple shared members with each other but
none with others; for instance, BIOTECanada (depicted in the top-center region of the
figure) shares three members with Consumer Health Products Canada (bottom-left), but
none with the Canadian Health Coalition (top-center/right). By examining the prior
mentioned organizations & associations we can note that Sanofi, Johnston & Johnston, &
Pfizer have at least two means of advancing their interest or positions (through either
BIOTECanada or Consumer Health Products Canada). Consumer Health Products
Canada and BIOTECanada both support maintaining current pharmaceutical DTCA
regulations while the Canadian Health Coalition supports more regulated pharmaceutical
DTCA.
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Figure 2.1: Shared Constituent Stakeholders Between Stakeholders in Romanow
Commission Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board
Note: The names around the periphery of this diagram represent associations or
organizations identified in PAAB and the Romanow Commission. Names positioned
along the straight lines are members of both organizations on either end of the line.
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2.7.2

Stakeholder Positions
The analysis of stakeholders identified in the Romanow Commission submissions

and PAAB members involved identifying and recording both the members’ positions
with respect to the regulatory status of pharmaceutical DTCA, and the strength with
which they held those positions. See Figure 2.2 below for details. Eight stakeholders, out
of 22 (36%), occupied the “maintain current regulations” pharmaceutical DTCA policy
position, five of whom held the position with “high strength”, one held the position with
“medium strength”, and one held it with “low strength.” Nine stakeholders occupied a
position supporting more regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA, six of which held that
position with “high strength” and three held it with “medium strength”. Just one
stakeholder, The Association of Medical Advertising Agencies, positioned itself in favour
of less pharmaceutical DTCA regulation, and that position was held with “high strength”.
CARP and the Best Medicines Coalition have no publicly available position on
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation.
Of note, most stakeholders occupy the “maintain current regulation” or “more
regulated DTCA” position with medium or high strength, suggesting that there is little
policy or political interest in changing the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.
When examining these findings one should remember that the current regulations are
quite prohibitive towards many forms of pharmaceutical DTCA, and that these
pharmaceutical DTCA policy positions exist on a continuum of regulation ranging from
“not regulated” to “prohibition”. The “maintain current regulations” position occupies a
space on that continuum nearer to “prohibition” than “not regulated”, as does “more
DTCA regulation”. In context, these findings infer that most stakeholders favor a
regulated pharmaceutical DTCA space, and that deregulation is not a popular policy
position amongst stakeholders.
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Figure 2.2: Stakeholders DTCA Positions & Strengths of those positions from
Romanow Commission Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board
Notes: High = a strong statement on DTCA policy and policymaking actions that further
their position. Medium = strength suggests either a strong statement on DTCA policy or
policymaking involvement to advance their position. Low = A weak policy statement
with respect to their position or that the position had to be inferred, and that there was
few or no policymaking involvement to advance their position. See Appendix D for
background information to this diagram represented in a table.
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2.7.3

Stakeholder Power
As shown in Table 2.5, from the 22 stakeholders identified from PAAB and the

Romanow Commission submissions, 17 or 77%, were categorized as “medium” or “low”
power, with eight (36%) of these stakeholder groups coded as “medium” and nine (41%)
coded as “low.” A smaller number of stakeholders, five (23%), were categorized as
“high” power.
Table 2.5: Stakeholder Power (Resources) – Romanow Commission Submissions &
Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board
High
•
•
•
•
•

BIOTECanada
Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association
Innovative Medicines
Canada
New Democratic Party
Canadian Drug
Manufacturers
Association

Medium
• The Association of
Faculties of Medicine of
Canada
• Canadian Medical
Association
• Canadian Pharmacists
Association
• Consumer Health
Products Canada
• Canadian Association of
Retired Persons
• Canadian Health
Coalition
• Canadian Labour
Congress
• British Columbia
Nurses Union

Low
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

The Association of
Medical Advertising
Agencies
Canadian
Association of
Medical Publishers
Best Medicines
Coalition
Federation des
medecines
omipracticiens du
Quebec
Canadian
Autoworkers Union
Ottawa Health
Coalition Canadian
Prince Edward
Island Health
Coalition
Dr. John Bury
(individual)
Women's Health
Network

Notes: High = significant and obvious amounts of financial resources or organizational
capital. Medium = Some financial resources or organizational capital. Low = very little
financial resources or organizational capital
All the high power stakeholders, with the notable exception of the New
Democratic Party, are pharmaceutical manufacturers associations, and all the high power
stakeholders have considerable financial resources. The New Democratic Party is one of
three major federal political parties and, as such, has considerable policymaking ability,
including the power to advocate for particular issues directly from within Parliament,
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participating in Parliamentary committee activities (including policy development), and
supporting and voting on potential legislation. Notably, medium power stakeholders are
mainly prominent health professional organizations with a mandate to advocate for
health-related issues and also include an association of medical school faculties that
produces evidence, the Consumer Health Products Association, and a national healthcare
lobbying association – all of these organizations have a distinct interest in advancing
patient or population health. Low power stakeholders are mainly cause or sectional
groups which are advancing a specific issues. For example, the Association of Medical
Advertising Agencies, in this low power group, is a single advertising agency which
holds a membership position at PAAB and may be advancing its own interests in
pharmaceutical advertising.
When the power and position of PAAB and Romanow Commission stakeholders
are considered together there is a concentration of high power stakeholders focused
towards one position, maintaining the current pharmaceutical DCTA regulations, with no
high power stakeholders supporting either a more regulated or less regulated position.
See Figure 2.3 for details. Four stakeholders are medium power and support maintaining
the current regulations, while five medium stakeholders support more regulated
pharmaceutical DTCA. Four low power stakeholders support more regulated
pharmaceutical DTCA, one supports less regulated pharmaceutical DTCA, and one
supports maintaining the current regulations. Most of the collective power in this Figure
is concentrated on the ‘maintain current regulations’ position, suggesting that this policy
might have the most support in future policy discussions.
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Figure 2.3: Power and Position of Stakeholders in Romanow Commission
Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board
Note: The diagram is divided into a number of quadrants, each represented a different
position and power combinations. Stakeholders in the same quadrant share the same
position and power.
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2.7.4

Stakeholder Interests
Interests were identified based on whether the stakeholders benefit from the

current regulations, experience loss from the current regulations, or are neutral to the
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory scheme. Whether the stakeholder experienced
benefit, loss, or neutrality was decided based on finances, power, influence, or any other
form of capital. Furthermore, if stakeholders had competing interests they were coded as
“neutral” as were stakeholders who had nothing to gain or lose or were indifferent to the
current regulations. See Table 2.6 for details.
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Table 2.6: Interests – Stakeholders identified from Romanow Commission
Submissions & Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board
Benefit
▪ Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association
▪ Canadian Drug
Manufacturers
Association
▪ Innovative Medicines
Canada
▪ BIOTECanada

Neutral
▪ The Association of
Faculties of Medicine
of Canada,
▪ The Association of
Medical Advertising
Agencies,
▪ Best Medicines
Coalition
▪ Canadian Association
of Medical Publishers
▪ Canadian Association
of Retired Persons
Consumer Council of
Canada Federation des
medecines
omipracticiens du
Quebec
▪ Canadian Health
Coalition
▪ New Democratic Party
▪ Ottawa Health Coalition
▪ Canadian Women's
Health Network
▪ Prince Edward Island
Health Coalition
▪ British Columbia
Nurses Union
▪ John Bury
▪ Canadian Autoworkers
Union
▪ Canadian Labour
Congress

Loss
▪
▪
▪
▪

Canadian Medical
Association
Canadian
Pharmacists
Association
Consumer Health
Products Canada
Consumer
Healthcare
Providers

Notes: Romanow Submissions refers to submissions to the Commission on the Future of
Healthcare in Canada during an open call for papers. PAAB refers to the Pharmaceutical
Advertising Advisory Board. Benefit = stakeholder benefits in a financial or influential
capacity as a result of the current regulations. Neutral = stakeholder does not gain or lose
in a financial or influential capacity as a result of regulations. Loss = stakeholder losses in
a financial or influential capacity as a result of the current regulations
Most stakeholders from PAAB and the Romanow Commission submissions have
“neutral” interests with respect to the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations: 14 out
of 22 (64%) stakeholder groups are coded as having “neutral” interests, four stakeholder
groups were coded as experiencing “benefit” from current regulations, and four
stakeholder groups were coded as “loss” from current regulations. Most stakeholders
have interests that do not conflict with, but do not necessarily benefit from, the current
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pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. Although advertising is still partly restricted, brand
name pharmaceutical manufacturers may benefit from the current regulations because the
current regulations do not adequately address cross-border advertising from the United
States and online advertising. Pharmaceutical drug manufacturers may benefit from some
built-in flexibility in the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations themselves, such as
allowing reminder ads and help seeking ads, and a reliance on industry self-regulation
such as PAAB for industry-led pre-clearance services for pharmaceutical ads. A reopened policy conversation about pharmaceutical DTCA advertising may lead to more
regulated DTCA, which is why brand name pharmaceutical companies may not be
interested in attempting to change the current regulations. The groups that may
experience loss from the current DTCA regulations are medical professional associations
which have to contend with the influence of medical advertising on their members’
relationships with patients, and consumer health associations which are concerned about
the impact of the advertising of pharmaceuticals on the public. In general, stakeholders
may not attempt to prompt pharmaceutical DTCA regulatory change if they are either
neutral in respect of or benefit from the regulations, as the majority of stakeholders in
these findings are.

2.7.5

Stakeholder Influence
Findings from the analysis of PAAB and Romanow Commission stakeholders’

influence, as measured by the stakeholder’s readiness to initiate policy change, suggest
that most stakeholders (10 out of 22; 45%) had “medium” influence; that is, they
participated in some policy functions. A smaller number of stakeholders, six (27%), were
categorized as “low” influence, and participated in few or no policymaking functions (see
Table 2.7).
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Table 2.7: Influence (readiness to initiate changes in DTCA regulation) – Romanow
Commission Submissions and Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board
Low
•
•
•

•
•
•

The Association of
Medical Advertising
Agencies
Canadian Association
of Medical Publishers
Federation des
medecines
omipracticiens du
Quebec
New Democratic
Party
Prince Edward Island
Health Coalition
John Bury*

Medium
• The Association of
Faculties of Medicine
of Canada
• Canadian Medical
Association
• Canadian Pharmacists
Association
• Best Medicines
Coalition
• Consumer Health
Products Canada
• Canadian Association
of Retired Persons
• Consumer Council of
Canada
• Canadian Labour
Congress
• Canadian Autoworkers
Union
• Canadian Women's
Health Network
• British Columbia
Nurses Union

High
•
•
•
•
•
•

BIOTECanada
Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association
Innovative Medicines
Canada
Canadian Health
Coalition
Ottawa Health Coalition
Canadian Drug
Manufacturers
Association.

Notes: High - stakeholder participated in most or all policymaking functions. Medium readiness infers the stakeholder participated in some of the policymaking functions. Low
- readiness infers that the stakeholder has participated few or no policymaking functions.
*John Bury is an individual citizen who made a submission to the Romanow
Commission.
Finally, six stakeholders (26%) were categorized as “high” influence, and were
found participating in all or most policymaking functions identified in this study. The
high influence (readiness) stakeholders are ablest to initiate policy change if necessary, as
they are positioned to do so through their policymaking functions. High influence
(readiness) stakeholders were the pharmaceutical manufacturers and health lobbying
bodies, medium influence (readiness) stakeholders were mainly health interested
associations and unions, and low influence (readiness) stakeholders were groups that
were either less focused on heath itself (e.g. New Democratic Party), or not participating
in policymaking functions (e.g. Canadian Association of Medical Publishers). See Table
2.8 for details.

49

Analyzing for influence on pharmaceutical DTCA policy, as measured by a
stakeholder’s ability to assert its position on pharmaceutical DTCA at the national level,
most stakeholders (12 out of 22; 55%) from PAAB and the Romanow Commission
largely occupied the “medium” influence category. There were four (18%) stakeholder
associations coded as “little to none” influence on pharmaceutical DTCA policy and six
(27%) stakeholders were coded as “High” influence. Resources, and therefore power, was
a consideration in analyzing stakeholders for their ability to influence pharmaceutical
DTCA policy. Findings suggest that high power stakeholder groups were generally
aligned with high influence groups (e.g. BIOTECanada), and medium power stakeholder
groups with medium influence groups (e.g. Best Medicine Coalition). However, these
findings do not necessarily mean they will choose to use that influence to affect policy.
Notably, the New Democratic Party has high power and high influence, but low readiness
to initiate policy change.
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Table 2.8: Influence (Able to assert position on a national level) – PAAB and
Romanow Commission Submissions
Little to none
▪ Ottawa Health
Coalition
▪ Prince Edward
Island Health
Coalition
▪ Canadian
Association of
Medical Publishers
▪ Best Medicines
Coalition

Medium
▪ Canadian Labour
Congress
▪ Canadian Autoworkers
Union
▪ Canadian Women’s
Health Network
▪ British Columbia
Nurses Union
▪ John Bury
▪ The Association of
Faculties of Medicine
of Canada
▪ The Association of
Medical Advertising
Agencies
▪ Canadian Medical
Association
▪ Canadian Pharmacists
Association
▪ Consumer Health
Products Canada
▪ Canadian Association
of Retired Persons
▪ Consumer Council of
Canada

High
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪
▪

Canadian Health
Coalition
New Democratic Party
Canadian Drug
Manufacturers
Association
BIOTECanada
Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association
Innovative Medicines
Canada

Notes: High – high policymaking function participation and high resources. Medium –
some policymaking function participation and medium, low, or high resources. Little to
none – low amount of policymaking participation and low or medium resources

2.8 Discussion
The pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment has a number of stakeholders of
varying power and influence participating in the policy environment. The roles of these
stakeholders in pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking can be understood in a number of
ways such as in terms of their position, power, interests, or influence. The aim of this
stakeholder analysis was to identify and conduct an analysis of the stakeholders relevant
to pharmaceutical DTCA in terms of their position, power, interests, and influence to
impact future policy and legal proceedings pertaining to pharmaceutical advertising.
Findings from this analysis suggest the following:
1) There is a wide-range of stakeholders from varying backgrounds in the
pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment;
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2) Many stakeholders are part of policy networks;
3) Stakeholders have varying positions, interests, and influence; and
4) There is a concentration of powerful stakeholders interested in maintaining
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.
Discussion of these key findings follow.

2.8.1

Range and Number of Stakeholders
A wide range of stakeholders from varying backgrounds were identified in this

study. A thematic analysis of the stakeholders found in the Standing Committee on
Health Report (2004) yielded 127 different individuals and organizations potentially
operating in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment. Those individuals and
organizations were thematically grouped into 15 different categories of stakeholders. The
stakeholders in each category may share interests or positions but are not necessarily part
of the same policy networks.
In similar work, Robert Alford, in the 1960s and 1970s, identified three structural
interest groups in health care politics: professional monopolists, the corporate
rationalizers, and, thirdly (considered as one group), the equal health advocates and
community health advocates (Alford, 1975). Buse and colleagues (2012) described the
‘professional monopolists’ conceptualized by Alford (1975) as “the doctors and to a
lesser extent the other health professionals whose dominant interests are served by the
existing economic, social and political structures of government and the health system”
(Buse et al. p.120). Corporate rationalizers often challenge the professional monopolists,
are interested in modern management methods and healthcare delivery, often in search of
cost-savings or additional revenues. Examples of such groups are private insurers,
commercial hospital chains, employers who want to lower the cost of insuring employees
(Alford, 1975). The third and final group are the ‘equal health advocates’ and
‘community health advocates’ who are described as sectional and interest groups
interested in access to healthcare, equal rights and patient rights, attention to the views of
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patients in population healthcare, and other public health issues. They may often act in an
activist or advocate capacity (Alford, 1975).
There is overlap between Alford’s three structural interest groups and the
stakeholders identified in this study, despite the 42 years separating the studies. The
thematic category of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders named ‘Health Care Workers’
and ‘Pharmacists’ aligns with Alford’s ‘professional monopolists’. The groups identified
in this study as ‘Other Healthcare Industry’, ‘Generic Pharmaceutical Industry’, ‘Brand
Name Pharmaceutical Industry’, and ‘Government’ align with the Alford’s ‘Corporate
Rationalizers’. Finally, the ‘Health Interests Organizations’, and ‘First Nations Groups’
in this study are consistent with Alford’s ‘equal health advocates’ and ‘community health
advocates’.
However, not all the thematic categories in this study can be neatly described as
falling into one of Alford’s three structural interest groups (1975). Those categories that
do not appear to fit into Alford’s groups are: ‘Universities/Academic Units’, ‘Unions’,
‘Research Groups & Think Tanks’, ‘Aging Citizenry’, ‘Consumer Associations’, and
‘Regulatory Groups’. This study identified additional groups which do not fit Alford’s
structural interest groups, and provides more detailed description of stakeholders in the
pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment. The stakeholders identified here are those
whose interests and positions are specific to pharmaceutical DTCA (yet within the
environment of healthcare politics).
The identification of a wide range of stakeholders represents a broader and more
nuanced view of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment than has been found in
previous studies. For example, Roberts (2011) similarly to Alford identified three broad
categories of stakeholders (referred to as “stakeholder groups”): Industry (representing
pharmaceuticals), General Practitioners (representing physicians), and the Public
(representing citizenry). This grouping of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders is very
similar to the structural interest groups identified by Alford (1975) by way of identifying
three broad categories of stakeholders. Roberts (2011) did not analyze the specific
stakeholders within each of his three categories, did not provide a more in-depth
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understanding of the different positions and interests held by stakeholders in each
category, and did not sufficiently capture the entire range of stakeholders that have been
identified in this study to have an interest in pharmaceutical DTCA policy. The present
study provides a richer and more detailed understanding of the stakeholder groups
operating in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy area than could be gleaned through
Roberts’ approach.
In Matear & Dacin’s study of the American pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders
they identified five stakeholder groups: 1) consumers, 2) physicians, 3) insurance
companies and formularies, 4) pharmacists, and 5) the government. Their findings are
more nuanced than those of Roberts (2011), however they still do not capture the full
field of stakeholder categories identified in this study, and, like Roberts, do not name the
specific organizations that would be grouped into each of their categories. One important
difference in our study is that insurance companies were not found to be a prominent
group. This may be explained by the differences in American and Canadian healthcare
systems and funding models, since private insurance companies play a larger role in the
United States than they do in Canada (where government funded healthcare forms that
largest part of the healthcare landscape) (Hacker, 1998).
While both Roberts (2011) and Matear and Dacin (2010) identified broad
categories of stakeholders or policy networks in their studies of the Canadian and the
American pharmaceutical DTCA, respectively, our work on pharmaceutical DTCA
identified more categories and provides details about the specific individuals and
organizations within these policy groupings. The significance of this finding is that the
breadth of organizations and individuals with policy interests in Canadian pharmaceutical
DTCA is larger than the breadth of players reported in those previous studies.

2.8.2

Policy Networks
This study also mapped the connections between various stakeholders and how

they may be connected through shared membership in various networks. PAAB, the
preclearance agency identified in Roberts (2006), is both an important regulatory
organization and represents a network of stakeholders with competing positions and
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interests in pharmaceutical advertising. The Romanow Commission (Commission on the
Future of Healthcare in Canada, 2002) was also an important policy event which involved
a number of stakeholders. A number of members of PAAB and witnesses to the
Romanow Commission are themselves associations with constituent organizations or
memberships which they have a mandate to represent. The power, positions, influence,
and interests of those constituents and members inform the position of each association
that is part of the PAAB network or made submissions to the Romanow Commission. A
number of these associations shared constituents or members, and those shared
constituents had more avenues through which they could advance their agendas. For
example, Sanofi, a pharmaceutical company, is a member of four associations in PAAB,
and can work through any of those associations to advance their pharmaceutical DTCA
agenda. The findings suggest that the associations in PAAB and those making
submissions to the Romanow Commission are best understood as sectional groups, which
seek to advance the positions and interests of their memberships. The most powerful and
influential of these sectional groups have been effective in leveraging their networks to
support their positions and interests, which has been found in this study to be to maintain
the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.

2.8.3

Positions, Interests, and Influence
Another finding of this study is that the Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA

policymaking environment consists of numerous stakeholders and networks who hold
positions on DTCA regulation that exist on a continuum ranging from no pharmaceutical
DTCA regulation to completely prohibiting pharmaceutical DTCA. The stakeholders
identified in this studied can be grouped into three broad positions on pharmaceutical
DTCA policy (less pharmaceutical DTCA regulation, maintain current regulations, more
pharmaceutical DTCA regulation). The stakeholders also pursue various interests (with
respect to whether the current regulations cause benefit or loss to the stakeholder, or
whether they are neutral), which informs their positions and how they choose apply their
power and influence. For example, a brand name pharmaceutical company may want to
maintain the current regulations so that a new pharmaceutical DTCA policy debate
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doesn’t open and potentially develop into a more regulated (and unfavourable, for this
brand-name company) policy environment.
Stakeholders positions on pharmaceutical DTCA policy were focused mainly of
one of two positions: to either maintain current DTCA regulations, or support more
regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. Only the Association of Medical Advertising Agencies
supported less regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. Eight stakeholders supported
maintaining the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations, and nine stakeholders
supported more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. These two positions are directions that
can be expected to be pursued by stakeholders if pharmaceutical DTCA policy changes
were to made in the future, it is unlikely that many stakeholders would pursue less
regulation.
Most stakeholders, 14 of the 22 (64%), have “neutral” interests in regards to the
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations, just four experience benefit, and four
experience loss from the current regulations. This may help explain why there is a
clustering of support on maintaining current regulations, but does not explain why a
number stakeholders support more pharmaceutical DTCA regulation. One possibility is
that the mandate of the organization (such as a union) supporting more regulation may
encourage them to support more regulation, even if the organization itself does not
benefit directly.
Stakeholder power is usually indicative of the stakeholder’s influence, for
example Innovative Medicines Canada is a ‘high power’ stakeholder and has a ‘high’
ability to assert their position on a national level. However, there are some exceptions.
For example, the Canadian Health Coalition is a ‘medium power’ stakeholder with a
‘high’ ability to assert themselves on a national level. For both categories of influence
(Readiness to initiate change in DTCA regulation, and ability to assert position on a
national level) most stakeholders had “medium” influence, suggesting that most
stakeholders alone cannot significantly change the pharmaceutical DTCA policy. Those
stakeholders “medium power” stakeholders are health professional organizations, unions,
and health interested stakeholders.
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By developing a more nuanced understanding of the positions, power, interests,
and influence of the stakeholders, and therefore the capabilities of each stakeholder and
how they may choose to apply themselves, our understanding pharmaceutical DTCA
policy has been enhanced. This stakeholder analysis suggests that the majority of high
power and high influence stakeholders tend to support the position to maintain current
DTCA regulation; this finding suggests that there may not be a desire to modify current
regulations in the near future. Typically, policy change is triggered by a “problem” or
influenced by stakeholders to get an issue on government’s agenda (Buse et al., 2012).
Our study findings suggest that there is little desire by stakeholders for government to act
on DTCA policy at this time.

2.8.4

Power, Stakeholders, and Maintaining the Status Quo
A focus of this study has been to understand how power is held and potentially

exercised by pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders in Canada. Power can be distributed in
a number of ways: two dominant theories of power distribution in policy-making are
pluralism and elitism (Buse, Mays, Walt, 2012). Pluralism is the belief that power to
influence and shape policy should be distributed amongst numerous stakeholders. These
numerous stakeholders then engage in communication and bargaining to protect and
further their interests, and influence policy. The contrasting theory to pluralism is elitism,
which contends that power is centralized on a powerful minority of stakeholders who
influence policy (Buse, Mays, & Walt, 2012). Understanding DTCA policy through the
lens of pluralism or elitism can inform our understanding of pharmaceutical DTCA
stakeholders, and which stakeholders have the most power or influence in shaping and
advancing pharmaceutical DTCA policy. Findings from this stakeholder analysis suggest
that there are a broad range of stakeholders – both individuals and organizations participating in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy arena; this is consistent with pluralism.
A number of stakeholder groups have formed coalitions or utilize networks to better
communicate their positions and interests on DTCA policy. However, there were a few
“high power” stakeholders, predominantly associated with the pharmaceutical industry,
exercising their position and influence to protect their interests; this is more consistent
with elitism. Findings from the analysis suggest that power in the pharmaceutical DTCA

57

policy arena aligns with a mixed pluralism and elitism approach (Buse et al., 2012).
Power exercised by stakeholders in future pharmaceutical DTCA policy may continue to
mirror this hybrid of a broad range of stakeholders along with influence from the elites,
the pharmaceutical industry.
Those elites, mainly the pharmaceutical industry, have the highest concentration
of power and currently wish to maintain the current Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA
regulations. While stakeholders were split in their positions on whether to maintain
current regulations or increase regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA, all the high power
stakeholders (e.g, Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association) and 40% of mediumpower stakeholders (e.g, Canadian Association of Medical Publishers) favoured
maintaining the status quo. Because of the power held by these stakeholders it is likely
that they would be able to influence policymakers to maintain the current pharmaceutical
DTCA regulations. The stakeholders whose position is to maintain the current regulations
(the most powerful grouping of stakeholders) may not agree with the recommendations of
the former Health Council of Canada, (Health Council of Canada, 2006) or the Standing
Committee on Health (Standing Committee on Health, 2004), which both called for more
regulated pharmaceutical DTCA. This may explain why there has been no
pharmaceutical DTCA policy change since the time these reports were released.
The majority of low power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Women’s Health
Network) and 50% of medium-power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Medical Association)
favoured increasing regulation, they may be less powerful and may be less able to
influence future pharmaceutical DTCA policy. Although equal numbers of stakeholders
in our study supported increased regulation of pharmaceutical DTCA as supported
maintaining the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations, it is the stakeholders
supporting the status quo who are likely more powerful. The diversity of stakeholders
identified in this analysis suggests a more pluralistic approach to power and
pharmaceutical DTCA policymaking in Canada. In this case, the pharmaceutical DTCA
stakeholders have formed formal and informal networks that are able to share views and
attempt to influence government (as evidenced by submissions to the Senate Standing
Committee and Romanow Commissions). While the stakeholder analysis did identify a
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few powerful “elites” (high power and high influence stakeholders), their impact on
DTCA was either limited or they contributed to current DTCA policy environment
standstill, which is consistent with their position on pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.
Findings from this study also suggest there are networks where low-power stakeholders
(e.g. Canadian Women’s Health Network) may join to network with higher power
stakeholders (e.g. such as PAAB) to enhance their own power to further their positions
and interests.

2.9 Conclusion
The important contributions of this work are a more detailed and granular
description of specific Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders than provided in
previous research, which has tended to describe stakeholders in a limited number of
broad categories. The mapping of the thematic groupings of stakeholders and the
networks of stakeholders contributes to our understanding of which stakeholders may
advance their interests and positions, and the influence they have in pharmaceutical
DTCA policymaking. Finally, when assessing the power of stakeholders, and analyzing
that power against their interests and positions, it is clear that the most power is
concentrated on maintaining the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations in Canada.
These findings may help explain the current pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment
and how stakeholders will position themselves in future pharmaceutical DTCA
policymaking.
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Chapter Three: Analysis of Supreme Court Interveners

3.1 Litigation Related to Questions Involved in
Pharmaceutical Advertising
3.1.1

Background on Pharmaceutical Advertising Regulation

Recall that research question #1, explored in Chapter 2, was:
Given that there is a literature gap on Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA
stakeholders, what can be learned about these stakeholders? The subsidiary
questions in Chapter 1 were:
1) Who are the direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising
stakeholders in the Canadian policy environment, and what are their
interests, positions, power, and influence?
2) What is the potential for these stakeholders to shape future
pharmaceutical DTCA policy?
This chapter continues the analysis of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment by
employing a narrower analysis of legal pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders. This chapter
focuses on answering research question #2:
Given the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court of Canada
processes and the presence of interveners in the landmark 2001 tobacco
advertising case in the Supreme Court of Canada, RJR-MacDonald v Canada
(1995), are the stakeholders identified in the response to Research Question #1
found as interveners in current pharmaceutical-related Supreme Court litigation?
From the answer to this question there arises two subsidiary questions:
1) If there are interveners present in pharmaceutical patent litigation before
the Supreme Court, what are the interests, positions, and influence in the
broader policy environment;
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2) If the RJR-MacDonald interveners are present, which stakeholders are
they and to what extent are they intervening?
As discussed earlier, pharmaceutical advertising is a core function of
pharmaceutical companies that intend to take their developed drugs to market, and an
important source of income for companies whose business model is dependent on
advertising revenues. Despite the perceived necessity of pharmaceutical advertising for
these companies, there is debate about the impacts of the practice. Mounting concern
about the ways advertising may alter pharmaceutical prescribing behavior by physicians
(Health Council of Canada, 2006), may misconstrue or exaggerate effects of the drugs,
and may contribute to increasing healthcare costs (Vakratsas, 2014) is prompting a
conversation about legislative and regulatory action to limit this form of advertising.
Most developed countries have decided to either comprehensively or partially ban directto-consumer advertising (DTCA), leaving only the United States and New Zealand with a
far less regulated pharmaceutical advertising environment (Mintzes, 2005).
Pharmaceutical advertising in Canada is subject to the regulations under the Food
and Drugs Act (RSC 1985, c. F-27, s 30). The specific parts of the Act which regulate
pharmaceutical advertising are:
•
•

Section 3(1), prohibiting consumer-directed advertisements for health products
that make claims to treat, prevent, or cure any diseases listed in Schedule A to the
Act;
Section 9(1), prohibiting false, misleading, deceptive or erroneous advertising of
products;

•

Section 20(1), stating that no person shall label, package, treat, process, sell, or
advertise any device in a manner that is false, misleading, or deceptive or is likely
to create an erroneous impression regarding its design, performance, intended use,
quantity, character, value, composition, merit or safety.
Pursuant to the Food and Drugs Act, the Food and Drug Regulations

(Consolidated Regulations of Canada [CRC], c 87) have been enacted. Within these
regulations, two sections of the Regulations, s C.01.044 and s C.08.002 (1), are
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particularly relevant to this research. Section C.01.044 prohibits consumer directed
prescription advertising beyond the drugs name, price, and quantity:
If a person advertises a prescription drug to the general public, the person shall
not make any representation other than with respect to the brand name, the proper
name, the common name and the price and quantity of the drug.
Section C.08.002 (1) prohibits the advertising of new drugs that have not been approved
for sale by Health Canada. (Note that “person” in the context of these laws and
regulations includes both individuals and corporations.)
There are two specific types of DTCA that do not violate the Food and Drugs Act
or regulations: “help-seeking ads” and “reminder ads” (Health Council of Canada, 2006).
A help seeking ad is defined as: “announcements that ask patients among the general
public having a particular medical disorder or experience a given set of symptoms to
consult a physician for discussion of treatment, or to call a 1-800 telephone number for
further information” (Government of Canada, 1996, p. v). Help seeking ads may be
considered non-promotional if a number of specific criteria are met: no specific drug is
identified, there is no implication that a drug is the sole treatment available for the disease
or condition, and no drug manufacturer’s name is mentioned. “Reminder ads” feature the
brand name product but not the condition or treatment, and are less common
(Government of Canada, 1996, p.v).
Canada once was perceived to have a more heavily regulated pharmaceutical
advertising environment. However, Health Canada, the Ministry responsible for this area
of federal government activity, modified its own interpretation of the Food and Drugs
Act and Food and Drug Regulations in 1996, and again in 2000 (Government of Canada,
1996; Government of Canada, 2000). Under this most recent interpretation by Health
Canada, the new regulatory environment can best be described as partial prohibition.1

Health Canada’s interpretation of the Food and Drugs Act provides guidance for pharmaceutical
advertisers but is not law itself.
1
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Although there has been no legislative or regulatory change in Canada, and
Health Canada made public their policy statements on advertising in 2000, there has been
a pervasive advance of advertising in the online sphere, and the increasing presence of
cross-border American advertisements in Canada. This has effectively created a scenario
where pharmaceutical advertising in Canada is, in effect, less2 regulated than it was in the
past (since these new forms of advertising distribution (online and cross-border) remain
to be addressed by updated regulations and regulatory enforcement mechanisms). This
situation has not gone unnoticed by government: in 2004 the House of Commons created
a Standing Committee on Health (Government of Canada, Parliament, 2004), and,
separately, in 2006 the Health Council of Canada3 produced a report on direct-toconsumer advertising of prescriptions drugs in Canada which drew heavily on the report
by the Standing Committee on Health (Canada, Parliament 2004). Both the Standing
Committee on Health and the Health Council of Canada independently produced
recommendations to strengthen the regulations on pharmaceutical advertising
(Government of Canada, Parliament, 2004, p 13; Health Council of Canada, 2006, p 11).
In the patent area, the pharmaceutical industry which are invested in DTCA are still
active but the brand and generic pharmaceutical companies are clearly divided (See Table
3.1). The pharmaceutical industry can be grouped into two different factions: The
“brand” name pharmaceutical industry and the “generic” pharmaceutical industry. The
primary difference between them is that the “brand” industry is more often involved in
the development of new pharmaceutical drugs. “Generic” pharmaceutical players will not
usually develop a drug but will “copy” a brand-name drug after its patent expires, when

An important distinction should be made between ‘less regulated’ and ‘deregulated’. ‘Less
regulated’ is a more apt description of the Canadian pharmaceutical advertising environment
because although Parliament and Health Canada have failed to address new forms of
pharmaceutical adverting distribution, the Act and Regulations have not been modified to create a
friendlier advertising environment (which would constitute a ‘deregulation’ consistent with freemarket principles). In short, a legislative action would be required to ‘deregulate’, and none has
been taken since the re-interpretation of the Act and Regulations by Health Canada in 2000.
2

3

The Health Council of Canada (2003-2014) was a federal council formerly mandated to monitor
the progress of health care renewal in Canada as outlined in the 2003 Health Accord, Romanow
Commission.
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the brand company loses market exclusivity, and the “generic” can begin to distribute its
“copy” free from patent infringement concerns.
Table 3.1: Pharmaceutical Companies at the Court as Parties to Pharmaceutical
Litigation
Number of
Appearances
1
2
3
4

Pharmaceutical Company
Brand
Pfizer, Merck, AstroZeneca,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Celgene
Sanofi-Aventis/Synthelabo,
GlaxoKlineSmith
NA
NA

Generic
Teva, Nu-Pharm, Biolyse
NA
NA
Apotex

Source: Reviewing the decisions to identify litigants.

3.1.2

Background on the Supreme Court of Canada its Processes
Recognizing the Supreme Court’s own policy-making potential, the Supreme

Court Rules (Rules of the Supreme Court, SOR/2002-156) provide for applications to
intervene. This is a process through which an applicant can apply to join ongoing
litigation in order to express its arguments, positions, and relevance to the questions and
issues in the legal proceedings (Rules of the Supreme Court, ss 55-57). Intervening is a
relatively new phenomenon in Canada: traditionally in Canada it is only the parties
involved in litigation who participate4. The tradition of intervening is common in
American legal proceedings (Kearney & Merrill, 2000, p. 756.).
The introduction of interveners into the Canadian judicial process creates another
venue in which stakeholders may influence policymaking. Canada’s Constitution Act
1867 divides power between the courts and the legislatures, keeping them independent,
each having the ability to act as a “check” on the other if it was ever to exceed its
constitutional powers (Waddams, 2010). Given the independence of the judiciary, it may
be of concern if certain stakeholders who have had policy-making influence on the

4

The definition of a party is: plaintiff or applicant and defendant, in an initiating action and, on
appeal, appellant or defendant.
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legislative side and with the executive branches also have influence on challenges made
in the courts to the same policies of the legislative and subordinate branches of
government.
These concerns multiply if the Supreme Court expands stakeholders’ ability to intervene.
In pharmaceutical advertising, there are powerful industry groups whose positions and
interests, as demonstrated elsewhere in this thesis, are likely to be factors in legislative
actions - the presence and power of these groups (if they exist as interveners in the
courts), should be scrutinized to fully understand what the impact could be is of these
stakeholders on judicial proceedings, and therefor policy.
The 1980s marked an increase in the number of interventions occurring in the
Canadian judicial system, an acknowledged move towards American court procedure,
where third parties have traditionally provide input to the courts (Dickens, 1977).5 In
1989, Michael Mandel labeled the newfound influence of interest parties in the Canadian
courts as the “legalization of politics” (Mandel, 1994).6
The relevant Canadian Supreme Court Rule states that:
The affidavit in support of a motion for intervention shall identify the person
interested in

the proceeding and describe that person’s interest in the proceeding,

including any prejudice that the person interested in the proceeding would suffer if the
intervention were denied (Rules of the Supreme Court, s 57).
The Rule (Meehan, 1994) describes the potential intervener in a way that, prima facie,
means an intervener must be a “stakeholder”, the latter being an individual, group or
organization interested in influencing the aims and actions of another organization or
policy-direction (Brugha & Varvovszky, 2000). In combination with identifying the

5
6

Bernard Dickens, “A Canadian development: non-party intervention” (1977) 40 MLR 666-676

Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto:
Wall & Thomson, Inc.) 71
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intervener applicant’s interests in the proceedings, the application for intervener status
must identify the position that the applicant intends to take with respect to the questions
in the proceedings, the applicant’s relevance to the proceedings, and reasons why
submissions will be useful to the Court and different from those of other parties (Rules of
the Supreme Court, s 57(2ab)). An intervener may not raise new issues, but at the judges’
discretion, may be permitted to make an oral argument in court in addition to submitting
a factum7 (The judge deciding whether to grant intervener status imposes length limits on
both the duration of the oral argument and the length of the factum) (Rules of the
Supreme Court, ss 58-59). The length of that factum, as determined by the judge hearing
the application for intervener status, may contribute to the impact that the factum may
have on the ultimate decision. An oral argument may have more impact on the parties and
judge than the written argument; the impact of the oral argument and the impact of the
written argument be affected by its allowed length (Ring, 1980).
The process of intervening begins when any interested person8 makes a motion
for intervention to a judge. The Court cannot accept non-applicants as interveners (with
the exception of attorney generals); if the health-interested stakeholders do not apply they
will not receive intervener status. In the case of an application for Leave to Appeal, the
motion to intervene must be submitted within 30 days after the filing of the application
for Leave to Appeal. In the case of the appeal, the motion to intervene must be submitted
within four weeks after the filing of the Appellant’s Factum. In the case of a Reference9,
the appeal must be filed within four weeks after the filing of the Governor in Council’s
factum (Rules of the Supreme Court, s 56). Further, the Supreme Court Rules state that
The affidavit in support of a motion for intervention shall identify the person
interested in the proceeding and describe that person’s interest in the proceeding,

7

A factum is a written document, submitted to the court, which like the factums of the parties,
describes the intervener’s positions and arguments.
8

The legal term “person” encompasses both individuals and corporations as persons.

9

A reference raises certain issues in the Court.
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including any prejudice that the person interested in the proceeding would suffer if the
intervention were denied (Rules of the Supreme Court, s 57(1)).
The motion must also identify the position the interested person intends to take
with respect to the questions in which it is intended the intervener, if accepted, will
intervene, and the proposed intervener’s reasons for believing the submissions would be
useful to the court and different from the other parties (Rules of the Supreme Court,
57(2)). The judge then reviews the motion, either granting or rejecting the intervention
application. The decision is announced but no oral or written reasons are provided for
granting or rejecting intervener status. If the judge chooses to grant the intervention,
limitations on the length of the factum that the intervener will submit may be imposed.
The judge may also choose or decline to grant the intervener time to make an oral
argument in the court.
This study is investigating the hypothesis that although there has been no
pharmaceutical advertising case that has reached the Supreme Court, the very same
stakeholders who would have a vested interested in acting as interveners on a prospective
pharmaceutical advertising case at the Supreme Court will have already identified
themselves as interested intervener parties in other pharmaceutical litigation before the
Supreme Court. This current analysis will attempt to predict which stakeholders will
attempt to become interveners in pharmaceutical advertising cases should be there be
litigation that reaches the Supreme Court of Canada and will predict whether, if they
apply, each stakeholder will be successful or unsuccessful in becoming interveners.

3.1.3

The Current Leading Health-Related Advertising Case in
Canada: RJR-MacDonald v Canada
RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] involved the Tobacco Products Control Act

(S.C, 1985, c. 20) that broadly prohibited all advertising and promotion of tobacco
products unless the packaging included health warnings and a list of toxic constituents
(Parliamentary Research Branch, 2013). RJR-MacDonald Inc., a leading tobacco
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company, sought a declaratory judgment that the whole Act was ultra vires10 (RJRMacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199) Parliament and invalid as an infringement of
freedom of expression as guaranteed by section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (1982); separately Imperial Tobacco Ltd sought the same relief.11 The
motions were heard together in the Quebec Superior Court which declared the whole Act
ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and an unjustified infringement of s.2(b) of the
Charter (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199). The decision was appealed by
the Attorney General (Canada) to the Quebec Court of Appeal where the decision was
reversed (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199). RJR-MacDonald and Imperial
Tobacco appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, which, like the Quebec Court of
Appeal, ruled in their favour (RJR-MacDonald v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199).
Two questions were addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada: (1) the
legislative competence of Parliament to enact the legislation under the criminal law
power or for the peace, order, and good government of Canada; and (2) whether the Act
infringed on section 2 of the Charter and, if so, whether that infringement was “saved”
under s.1. The Supreme Court found both that there was an infringement of s. 2(b) and
that it did not constitute a reasonable infringement justified under s.1 of the Charter. The
Act was stuck down. (See Figure 3.1 for diagram).

10
11

Ultra vires is the Latin term for “outside the powers of”.

Imperial Tobacco sought the same order but only in sections ss.4 and 5 of the Act, and 6 and 8
of the Act (advertisement of tobacco products and promotion of tobacco products, respectively).
The Quebec Superior court heard the two motions together.
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Figure 3.1: RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199
There were six interveners to the Supreme Court in RJR-MacDonald v Canada,
five formed a coalition. All five stakeholders either have an interest or mandate
pertaining to health issues, and successfully applied for intervention. The sixth intervener,
the Attorney General of Ontario, asked for and received leave to intervene without
applying nor submitting a factum.12 No interveners were rejected in RJR-MacDonald,

12

The Attorney General does not submit a factum or make an oral argument.
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clear evidence that the judges were interested in hearing the opinions of the healthinterested stakeholders. The interveners in the case were:
•

Canadian Cancer Society,

•

Canadian Council on Smoking and Health

•

Canadian Medical Association

•

Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada

•

Canadian Lung Association

•

Attorney General of Ontario

The five interveners in the coalition (all the interveners except the Attorney General of
Ontario) applied in unison for intervener status and submitted a single factum.
Interestingly, each intervener was granted fifteen minutes for oral argument; from this it
may be inferred that they together had an influential voice in the proceedings. These five
interveners also had the support (although the nature of that support is unspecified) of
twenty-two other prominent health organizations that are listed in the factum (Brief for
Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199). These twentytwo organizations were (Brief for Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada,
[1995] 3 SCR 199, para 10):13

13

•

Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada

•

Canadian Nurses Association

•

Canadian Public Health Association

•

Allergy Foundation of Canada

•

Canadian Association of Medical Oncologists

•

Canadian Association of Occupational Therapists

•

Canadian Association of Pathologists

•

Canadian Centre on Substance Abuse

•

Canadian Chiropractic Association

The Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of Canada, the Canadian Nurses Association,
and the College of Family Physicians of Canada are also present in Chapter 2.

79

•

Canadian Dental Association

•

Canadian Hospital Association

•

College of Family Physicians of Canada

•

National Cancer Institute of Canada

•

Non-Smokers' Rights Association

•

Physicians for a Smoke-Free Canada

•

Canadian Centre for Drug Free Sport

•

Canadian Thoracic Society

•

Canadian Nurses' Respiratory Society

•

Canadian Physiotherapy Cardio-Respiratory Society

•

Canadian Haemotology Society

•

Canadian Urologic Oncology Group

•

Canadian Pharmaceutical Association

Since pharmaceutical advertising and tobacco advertising are both scrutinized from a
public health perspective, one might expect similar (or the same) stakeholders to involve
themselves in any health-related legal case of importance as interveners.

3.1.4

The Only Pharmaceutical Advertising Litigation

While there has not yet been pharmaceutical advertising litigation before the Supreme
Court, RJR-MacDonald may be expected to provide evidence of what will occur when
such litigation does arise because the issues in the RJR-MacDonald case concerned
advertising related to a health topic. Prior to RJR-MacDonald, tobacco advertising was a
contentious form of marketing, just as pharmaceutical direct-to-consumer advertising is
today. As has been established above, all the interveners in RJR-MacDonald were healthinterested stakeholders.
An unsuccessful attempt to challenge the stipulations in the Food and Drugs Act that
prohibit pharmaceutical advertising reached the Ontario Superior Court, CanWest Media
Works Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) (Court File Number 05-CV-303001PD2;
mentioned in Women and Health Protection, 2007).
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CanWest MediaWorks Inc. also filed a motion for judicial review in the Federal
Court (CanWest MediaWorks Inc. v. Canada [2007] FC 752). The Respondents in the
Federal Court action (Health Minister and Attorney General of Canada) sought to have
this application either dismissed or stayed until the final outcome of the action,
mentioned above, brought by CanWest in the Ontario Superior Court was known. In the
result, in fact, no decision in the Ontario Superior Court case was ever rendered because
the case was adjourned, and never returned to court, due to the bankruptcy of CanWest
Media Works Inc.14 Before that adjournment, a coalition of stakeholders successfully
applied to intervene in the Ontario Superior Court case. Those interveners were:
•

Canadian Federation of Nurses

•

Canadian Health Coalition

•

Canadian Union of Public Employees

•

Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada

•

Society for Diabetic Rights

•

Medical Reform Group

•

Drug Safety Canada

•

Women and Health Protection

In deciding to dismiss the judicial review application brought in the Federal Court,
Justice Snider noted:
The fact is that a coalition of a number of interested parties has already
successfully sought intervener status in CanWest’s Charter challenge in
opposition to CanWest [in the Ontario Superior Court action]. It seems evident
that there are individuals and groups in Canada who are supportive of the DTCA
prohibitions and who may have public interest standing to bring an application for
judicial review in this Court to determine the issues (assuming that there are
reviewable issues). There may be many reasons why there has been no pursuit of
an order of mandamus in our Court by any other party. Failure, to date, by other
parties (with, for example, no commercial interest or with broader health
concerns) to seek mandamus does not elevate CanWest’s interest to one of
“public interest”.

14

There is no decision text available for the CanWest Media Works Inc. v Canada (Attorney
General) because the proceedings were indefinitely adjourned.

81

Justice Snider’s decision was unsuccessfully appealed by CanWest to the Federal Court
of Appeal (CanWest Mediaworks Inc v Canada (AG), 2008 FCA 207). The Federal Court
of Appeal said:
[t]hese interveners (members of a coalition of organizations representing, among
others, the interests of consumers of pharmaceuticals products, patients, a trade
union, and those who rely on employer-provided health benefit plans) are more
appropriate representatives of the public interest in the due enforcement of the law
than CanWest (at para 5).
Justice Snider, in the first instance in the Federal Court, did not accept that CanWest had
a public interest to present in the Federal Court. On the other hand, the members of the
intervener coalition in CanWest at the Ontario Superior Court were a diverse group of
health-interested and public-interest stakeholders (all of whom are identified in the
previous chapter of this thesis).
The interveners in the CanWest litigation were not the same stakeholders as the
intervener coalition in RJR-MacDonald. The CanWest interveners were more diverse
than the interveners in RJR-MacDonald, who were strictly interested in health, but they
were nonetheless similar because of the overlap in their public-interest mandates.

3.2 Previous Related Research
3.2.1

Background Research About Decision Making in the
Supreme Court of Canada
Some context for the current pharmaceutical patent litigation can best be

understood by reviewing “The Context of the Supreme Court’s Copyright Cases” by
Margaret Ann Wilkinson (Wilkinson, 2013). Prior to this research on copyright decisions,
there had been no study of intellectual property litigation decision patterns in the
Supreme Court (both copyright and patent are considered aspects of intellectual property
law): the studies either did not include copyright cases in their samples at all – or the
numbers of copyright cases heard by the Court were so minute in comparison with the
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scope of the study that it would be impossible to discern how the copyright cases fit. In
her seminal work, Wilkinson focused on the ten copyright-related decisions of the
Supreme Court between 2002 and 2012 and asked how these copyright decisions fit
patterns previously identified in studies of other jurisprudence of the court (Wilkinson,
2013). In particular, Wilkinson reviewed four major studies about the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence: 1) Songer & Siripurapu (2009), who studied unanimous decisions of the
Court between 1970 and 2003; 2) Emmett Macfarlane, who also focused on the
unanimous decisions of the Court (Macfarlane, 2010); 3) Peter McCormick focused on
analysis of concurrent reasons rendered by the Court between April 1984 and the end of
December 2006 (McCormick, 2008); and 4) Christine Joseph focused on solo dissents
and examining all 133 solo dissent judgments rendered in the Court between 1974 and
2003 (Joseph, 2006).
Wilkinson studied all the copright cases heard by the Supreme Court between
2002 and 2012.Wilkinson’s conclusions were that there had been a demonstrable increase
in interest by the Court for hearing copyright cases during those years, as compared to
any previous period in the Court’s history (Wilkinson, 2013). Moreover, in every case
heard after the first in the study, in 2002, the Court chose to sit as the full Court of nine
judges. There were three unanimous judgments – far fewer than the 63% of cases other
researchers had found – which Wilkinson attributes to the unique nature of copyright
making it harder for the court to achieve consensus (Wilkinson, 2013). Contrary to the
expectation set by Songer and Siripurapu’s work (2009) in other areas where unanimous
judgments occurred, the unanimous judgments in copyright did not occur in cases with
few issues involved but in the more complex ones (Wilkinson, 2013). The study found
that six of twenty-two sets of reasons for judgment delivered across the eleven cases were
written concurring with other judgments in the same decision (Wilkinson, 2013) and in
McCormick’s study of 1716 judgments between 1984 and 2006, he found 600 concurring
judgments – but found that their frequency had peaked in 1995-6. This, he noted, was
because the “dynamic period of flux and change [generated by the creation of the 1982
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] has come to an end … and few policydivergent responses need to be generated to prepare the field.” (McCormick, 2008 p.
166). He noted this propensity to multiple judgments, concurring in the result but putting
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forward difference reasoning, was important because “divided decisions demonstrate a
court that is both open to a variety of arguments… and willing to change its mind over
time.” (McCormick, 2008 p. 166) Of the eleven cases in Wilkinson’s study, five of the
courts were divided into a majority and minority dissents. In light of this, Wilkinson
finds, based on McCormick’s patterns, that there is still high level of uncertainty in
current Canadian copyright law. In looking the question of solo dissents raised by
Joseph’s research, Wilkinson observed that there were no solo dissents across the eleven
cases she studied. She further determined that the pattern in copyright decisions, where
there is a lack of solo judgments, a relatively large number of concurring judgments, and
a low number of unanimous judgments, differs from the overall pattern of the current
Supreme Court found in the earlier studies (Wilkinson, 2013). Wilkinson’s conclusions
will be returned to later in this manuscript where this study will examine how the patterns
discovered in the Supreme Court pharmaceutical patent litigation examined here compare
to copyright.
In his recently defended Masters of Law (LLM) thesis, “The Patented Medicines
(Notice of Compliance) Regulations: An Examination of the Decision Making Patterns in
these Cases at the Supreme Court of Canada,” Jason Newman identified a number of
pharmaceutical patent cases which involved a Notice of Compliance [NOC] (Newnman,
2016). His search produced six cases15 (Merck-Frosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of
National Health and Welfare) (1998), Bristol-Myers Squibb v Canada (Attorney General)
(2005), AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) (2006), Apotex Inc. v
Sanofi- Synthelabo Canada Inc (2008)., Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc. (2012),
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc.) (2015) (Newman, 2016). Of the cases he located, MerckFrosst Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) was decided in
1998 and so falls outside the perimeters of this study on Interveners. Notably, for reasons
which are unclear, Newman’s study does not include Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (2010),
which is a pharmaceutical patent NOC cases that falls within the timeline of both studies
and is included in this study’s analysis.

15

The years Newnman used as his search parameters are not mentioned in the thesis text.
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Newman found that the levels of volatility in decision-making in NOC intellectual
property cases is much lower than that found by Wilkinson in copyright intellectual
property cases (Newnman, 2016). Neither Wilkinson nor Newman examined anything
about interveners in the Supreme Court litigation they studied in their work.

3.2.2

Research on the Roles of Interveners in the Supreme Court
of Canada
In 2000, Amanda Burgess studied the impact of intervenors in the Supreme Court

by examining cases for the presence of interveners, and asking whether the presence of
the interveners’ arguments (or even presence) had an influence on the Supreme Court’s
decision. Burgess reviewed all the decisions written by members of the Supreme Court in
253 cases rendered from 1997 to 1999, but only the subset of those cases with interveners
present were analyzed. Burgess did not include any pharmaceutical cases in her analysis,
but any intellectual property cases rendered between 1997 and 1999 and included
interveners were analyzed in her study. Burgess (2000) made fifteen main observations:
1. interveners were present in approximately one-third of cases;
2. there were on average four to five interveners per case when there is intervention;
3. there was a 43% chance that the intervener would be a public interest advocate;
4. there was a 42% chance the intervener would be a government intervener;
5. there was a 60% chance the government intervener would be the Attorney
General of Canada, Quebec, Ontario, or Alberta;
6. there was a 15% chance that the intervener would be a trade union corporation, an
aboriginal group or an individual;
7. there was a 2% chance the intervener would be the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association;
8. eighteen interveners accounted for 45% of total interventions;
9. interveners were mentioned in the judgments written in over 40% of the cases in
which interveners were present;
10. there was a greater chance of the interveners being mentioned in a decision if that
intervener was one of two to nine interveners appearing in the case;
11. Justice Cory was the Justice most likely to mention an intervener;
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12. Justice Cory was most likely to mention an intervener by name;
13. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé was least likely to mention an intervener in her written
decision;
14. when an intervener was mentioned in the decision, the intervener’s argument was
linked to an argument put forth by the Appellant or the Respondent approximately
one-third of time; and
15. cases which contained a constitutional argument comprised over 40% of the cases
involving interveners (of these cases, 86% were likely to involve a Charter
argument. (Burgess, 2000, p.136)
This study relies on data generated exclusively before Beverly McLachlan became Chief
Justice of Canada (January 7, 2000): it does not overlap with the period of the present
study. The cases studied were decided relatively early, during the period of the
introduction of interveners into the Canadian legal system.
In “Interventions at the Supreme Court of Canada: Accuracy, Affiliation, and
Acceptance” (Alarie & Greene, 2010). Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Greene examined
interveners in the Court from January 2000 to July 2009. The researchers examined
decisions and published intervener material. Alarie and Green did not include intellectual
property (or patent) in their study. Their data set included only “Charter”, “criminal”,
“labour”, “tax”, and “aboriginal rights” categories of cases. They identified at least three
functions (accuracy, affiliation, and acceptance) that the practice of intervention can
perform:
The first possibility is that hearing from interveners might provide objectively
useful information to the court (i.e., interveners might promote the “accuracy” of the
Court’s decision making). A second possibility is that the practice of intervention allows
interveners to provide the “best argument” for certain partisan interests that judges might
want to affiliate with. A third possibility is that interventions are allowed mainly (if not
only) so that intervening parties feel they have had their voices heard by the Court and
the greater public (Alarie & Green, 2010, p. 386).
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Alarie and Green found 674 appeals in their categories were decided by the
Supreme Court between January 1 2000 and December 31 2008, and, of those, 330
included submissions by interveners (Alarie & Greene, 2010). Interventions in the
different areas of law studied were compared, and a finding was made that intervention in
Charter cases was the most common, at 90% of Charter cases (Alarie & Greene, 2010).
The authors also found that Charter cases had the highest average number of
interventions per case (Alarie & Greene, 2010). The study found that the proportion of
appeals with interveners rose more quickly over the eight years than the average number
of interventions per appeal (Alarie & Greene, 2010). The study found that appeals with
interventions had an average of 4.1 interveners, and that interveners (excluding Attorneys
General) had an average acceptance rate of 90% when applying. However, Alarie &
Green found that success in attaining status to intervene did not ensure that the intervener
succeeded in impacting the decision.

3.3 Design of Research on Interveners in Pharmaceutical
Cases
As noted earlier, litigation about pharmaceutical advertising, specifically, has not
reached the Supreme Court of Canada. However, patent litigation involving
pharmaceuticals has become common patent litigation at the Supreme Court, and as
discussed above, stakeholders who produce, manufacture and distribute pharmaceuticals
have a vested interest in pharmaceutical advertising. When litigation does arise in the
Supreme Court regarding pharmaceutical advertising, as in the single lower court case
already concluded (Women and Health Protection, 2007), these pharmaceutical
companies will be involved, if not as parties, certainly by intervention.
This study has only focused on pharmaceutical patent cases that reached the
Supreme Court, the highest court in the country and the one that ultimately decided RJRMacDonald. As established in the Supreme Court Act, a civil case that will reach the
Supreme Court of Canada is only one that contains an issue of public importance. There
is only a right to appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal matters, in all civil matters,
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such as those under discussion in this thesis, parties can only appeal if given leave to do
so by the Court itself. This permission can be given following an application for leave.16
It is clear that cases in the lower courts, and therefore the interveners who
participate in those cases, are less likely to have the same national importance as cases
and interveners in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court does not hear a civil case
unless it chooses to: in all other civil cases the highest court are the Courts of Appeal, and
all cases decided by the Supreme Court can only be heard if first decided by the Court of
Appeal and then appealed by the parties. Similarly, a case can be heard by the Court of
Appeal if a decision has been heard by a lower court or tribunal and then appealed.
It is also the case that it is at the Supreme Court (as mentioned earlier) that
interveners have the longest history in Canada. For these reasons, only Supreme Court
cases and applicants for intervention are included in this study.
To identify cases relevant to pharmaceuticals, the Supreme Court Decision
database was accessed. A search on the database was performed for “patent” cases. From
the selection of decisions produced by the Supreme Court online database the short
descriptions of each case were reviewed for relevance to pharmaceutical advertising.
Fourteen such cases were produced, and the fourteen cases’ full decision text were then
reviewed in detail to more accurately determine whether they met the inclusion criteria.17

16

Notwithstanding any other Act of Parliament but subject to subsection (1.2), an application to
the Supreme Court for leave to appeal shall be made to the Court in writing and the Court shall
(a) grant the application if it is clear from the written material that it does not warrant an oral
hearing and that any question involved is, by reason of its public importance or the importance of
any issue of law or any issue of mixed law and fact involved in the question, one that ought to be
decided by the Supreme Court or is, for any other reason, of such a nature or significance as to
warrant decision by it;
(b) dismiss the application if it is clear from the written material that it does not warrant an oral
hearing and that there is no question involved as described in paragraph (a); and
(c) order an oral hearing to determine the application, in any other case.
17

In some cases, it is difficult to determine whether a case meets the inclusion criteria from the
short description provided by the Supreme Court of Canada website database. In such situations
the case was tentatively included and flagged for more in-depth review.
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Of the fourteen cases, ten were relevant to pharmaceuticals, and therefore the study. Of
the ten cases that met the inclusion criteria, six of the cases involved interveners. When
aggregated, the number of interveners from the six cases is twelve, and there are 16 total
applications for intervention. In none of the cases did interveners join the proceedings
before the case reached the Supreme Court.
Of the ten Supreme Court decisions rendered in the select time period involving
pharmaceutical patent issues,18 Janssen-Ortho v Novopharm (Janssen-Ortho Inc. v
Novopharm Ltd [2005] SCC 33) (not included in Table 2) has not been included in the
analysis. The case had to be disqualified from the study because although it appeared to
meet the inclusion criteria, the case proceedings ended quite early – prior to the
timeframe in which stakeholders were able to apply for leave to intervene.
Decisions, dockets, and intervener briefs were collected for analysis in each
case19. The decision text and dockets were freely downloaded from the Supreme Court
website, the intervener briefs were retrieved at a cost from the Supreme Court Records
Center, which is contactable by email or phone call.20 Reasons for accepting or rejecting
interveners are not provided by the Court in decisions, intervener briefs, or dockets, and
for that reason we have no record of the Court’s logic in accepting or rejecting an
applicant for intervention.

18

On February 21, 2017, the author of this study became aware of a case currently (at the time
this paper is being written) before the Supreme Court, as of March 10, 2016. The case is not
concluded, and there is no decision yet. For these reasons the case is not included in this study.
AstraZeneca Canada Inc et al Apotex Inc, 2015 FCA 158.
19

Litigant factums were not collected, in part, because some were not publicly available. For
instance, Apotex v Sanofi-Synthelabo (2008) was subject to a "sealing order" For further
information on sealing order, see Irving & Creighton (2013).
20

The records centre archives intervener briefs in three formats, offline, on the internal digital
database, or hosted on the Supreme Court of Canada website. Fees of varying of amount may be
incurred to access the files hosted either offline or on the records centre internal digital database.
All records hosted on the Supreme Court of Canada website are free to download.; See appendix
E for links to decisions and websites where these resources can be retrieved or requested from the
Supreme Court.
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The decisions were used to obtain information about the content of the case, the
judges involved, the litigating parties,21 and the interveners. The case dockets were used
to identify applicants for intervener status, which applications had been successful or
unsuccessful, what submissions the successful intervener applications were allowed to
provide to the Court during the appeal proceedings (written documents or both written
documents and oral presentations) and the length of those representations (both written
documents and oral arguments are limited to a prescribed maximum length by the judge
who accepted the intervener application). The judge or prothonotary who accepted or
rejected the intervener application submission was also recorded.
Intervener briefs were examined for evidence of positons and interests. The
intervener briefs, when reviewed on their own and without context, are not sufficiently
comprehensible to understand the stakeholder’s positions or interests: intervener briefs
are predicated on an understanding of the issues at trial.22 The decisions were studied and
following that, the intervener briefs were studied.

3.4 Findings
3.4.1

Pharmaceutical Cases at the Supreme Court of Canada
Before a pharmaceutical is able to be part of the market in Canada, whatever its

patent status (in patent or out of patent), the pharmaceutical company seeking to market
and distribute the drug anywhere in Canada must obtain a Notice of Compliance (NOC)
from Health Canada. The NOC is an indication that the manufacturer has met the
regulatory requirements for the safety, efficacy and quality of the product (Health

A “party” in the decision is either the plaintiff or defendant. An intervener is not a party
involved in the lawsuit but an outside stakeholder who has successfully applied for intervener
status.
21

22

Decision in each case were examined prior to the analysis of Intervener Brief or Docket.
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Canada, 2014). Three classifications of cases were identified amongst the nine under
study here: notice of compliance cases,23 general patent cases, and non-patent cases.
Figures 3.2 to 3.10 each represent, diagrammatically, the pharmaceutical cases
studied in this research. The progress of each case through the court is indicated. The
presentation of the Figures is divided into four sections: first, the cases in which there
were no interveners are shown (Figures 3.2 and 3.3), second the cases where interveners
did apply but none were accepted by the Court are shown (Figure 3.4), third, those cases
are shown in which all the interveners who applied were accepted (Figures 3.5 to 3.7)
and, finally, those cases where interveners were present but only some of those who
applied were accepted by the Court (Figures 3.8 to 3.10). Within each of the four
sections, the Figures of the cases are presented in chronological order

3.4.1.1
3.4.1.1.1

Cases Without Interveners
Cases Where No Intervention Was Attempted

Apotex v Wellcome Foundation [2002]
GlaxoKlineSmith and Wellcome Foundation found that AZT, an antiretroviral
medication, could be used as treatment for HIV (Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd
[2002] SCC 77, hereinafter “Apotex v Wellcome Foundation”). Following this discovery,
and after testing by National Institutes of Health (NIH) scientists, GlaxoKlineSmith and
Wellcome Foundation filed for a patent in the United Kingdom from which the Canadian
patent claimed priority right.24 Apotex and Novopharm, generic drug manufacturers,
challenged the validity of the Canadian patent in the Canadian courts on the grounds that
(a) necessary utility had not been established as of the priority date of the patent, (b) the

23

Notice of Compliance (NOC) cases are a subset of intellectual property law, as are patent cases.
NOC cases may involve patent, but the presence of an NOC process in the issues meets the
criteria for an NOC case, and the exclusion from the Patent or
24

The priority right is time limited and allows the patent claimant to file a subsequent application
in a different country for the same invention, design, or trademark effective as of the date of filing
the first application.
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claims covered more than the invention, and (c) that the disclosure was misleading
because the NIH in full was not mentioned. The trial judge rejected these arguments. The
decision was appealed by Apotex to the Federal Court of Appeal, where the appeal was
dismissed. The case was by Apotex appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, where the
appeal was dismissed (See Figure 3.2) (Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd [2002]
SCC 77).25

Figure 3.2: Apotex Inc. v Wellcome Foundation Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 153, 2002, SCC
77

25

In each of the cases below, there is an accompanying figure which is a visual representation of
the case. The litigants are displayed at the top (plaintiff on the left, respondent to the right) and
the events are listed chronologically from the top to the bottom of the figure. The text under the
horizontal indicates what sort of action was taken
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Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) [2010]
Nu-Pharm unsuccessfully applied to Health Canada for an issuance of an NOC in
Canada in 1997 (Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) [2010] SCR 648,
hereinafter “Nu-pharm”). That decision was overturned on judicial review, and Health
Canada issued the NOC, but that decision was again overturned, on appeal to the FCA –
leaving Nu-Pharm without an NOC. In 2001, Nu-pharm initiated an application to
Federal Court for judicial review alleging Health Canada was acting unlawfully in not
authorizing Nu-Pharm to sell its drug, but this application was discontinued. In 2002, NuPharm filed a statement of claim in Federal Court against the Crown seeking injunctive
and mandatory relief and damages for various torts. The Crown was successful in getting
this application dismissed by seeking summary judgment on the grounds that the Federal
Court did not have the jurisdiction to hear the matter. This was appealed to the Federal
Court of Appeal, where the court decided in favour of the Crown. The decision was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled in favour of the appellant.
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Nu-Pharm (Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) [2010] SCR 648)

Figure 3.3: Nu-Pharm. v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 65, [2010] 3 S.C.R
648
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3.4.1.1.2

Cases Where Intervention Was Attempted

Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [2011]
Celgene is a New Jersey (US) based distributor of a pharmaceutical named
Thalomid, that since 1996 has sold to Canadians through the Special Access Programme
[SAP].26 Celgene obtained a Canadian patent in relation to Thalomid in 2006 (Celgene
Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [2011] SCR 3, hereinafter “Celgene”), at which point
the Patented Medicines Review Board requested pricing information from Celgene,
starting from the time it began selling the drug in 1995. Celgene initially complied but
later refused the requests as the medicine was “sold” in New Jersey and there the matter
is outside the Board’s authority. The Board responded that Celgene’s sales to Canada
under SAP were in the Canadian market and subject to its authority. The Board’s
decision was reversed on judicial review, but an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal
agreed with the Board. On appeal by Celgene the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the
Board (Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General) [2011] SCR 3).

The Special Access Programme, is described as Health Canada as: “provides access to nonmarketed drugs for practitioners treating patients with serious or life-threatening conditions when
conventional therapies have failed, are unsuitable, or unavailable. The SAP authorizes a
manufacturer to sell a drug that cannot otherwise be sold or distributed in Canada. Drugs
considered for release by the SAP include pharmaceutical, biologic, and radio-pharmaceutical
products not approved for sale in Canada.” Retrieved from: http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/acce
26
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Figure 3.4: Celgene Corp. v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1
S.C.R. 3
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3.4.1.2
3.4.1.2.1

Cases Where Interveners Appeal
Cases Where All Who Applied to Intervene Were
Successful

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada [2005]
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) developed a drug containing paclitaxel, marketed as
Taxol, which had anti-carcinogenic properties (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada
(Attorney General), [2005] SCR 533, hereinafter “Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.”). BMS
obtained a number of Canadian patents on the drug, but no on the active ingredient itself,
Paclitaxel. Working independently of BMS, Biolyse found that paclitaxel could be
extracted from a species of yew without killing the bush (therefore allowing the company
to extract the paclitaxel compound in sufficient quantities for commercial distribution).
Biolyse filed for a Notice of Compliance which BMS sought to quash. On application for
judicial review, a motions judge found that because Biolyse had neither applied for
obtained regulatory approval on the basis of bioequivalence, the NOC should be quashed.
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this judgment. The Supreme Court reversed this
decision (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General), [2005] SCR 533).
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Figure 3.5: Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R.
533
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) [2006]
In 1989, AstraZeneca obtained a NOC for Losec 20 from 1989 until 1996, when
AstraZeneca removed it from the market. In 2002, AstraZeneca obtained and registered
two more patents for Losec 20 with the Ministry of Health (MOH), despite the drug being
off the market (AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) [2006] SCR 560,
hereinafter “Biolyse”). Meanwhile, in 1993 Apotex had filed an NOC for omeprazole, a
generic version of Losec 20. The MOH determined that Apotex did not need to address
the after-issued patents held by AstraZeneca and granted Apotex the NOC in 2004.
AstraZeneca filed for judicial review, and the motions judge upheld the MOH’s decision.
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The Federal Court of Appeal reversed this decision and Apotex’s NOC was quashed. The
Supreme Court of Canada then reversed the decision of the FCA (AstraZeneca Canada
Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health) [2006] SCR 560).

Figure 3.6: AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R
560, 2006 SCC 49
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc [2008]
Sanofi-Synthelabo held the ‘875 patent which discloses a large class of over 250
000 combinations useful for inhabiting blood platelet aggregation activity (Apotex Inc. v
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc [2008] SCR 265, hereinafter “Apotex Inc. v Sanofi”).
Sanofi-Synthelabo also holds the subsequent ‘777 patent which discloses and claims
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clopidogrel bisulfate, marketed by Sanofi-Synthelabo under the trade name of Plavix as
an anti-coagulant. In 2003, Apotex, a generic manufacturer, served a notice of allegation
on Sanofi to obtain an NOC from the MOH to market its generic version of Plavix;
claiming the ‘777 patent was invalid. Sanofi successfully sought an order from the
Federal Court to block the NOC on the grounds that Apotex infringed on the ‘777 patent.
The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision. The decision was appealed the
Supreme Court which dismissed the appeal (Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc
[2008] SCR 265).

Figure 3.7: Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R 265, 2008
SCC
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3.4.1.2.2

Cases Where Only Some Who Applied Were Accepted

Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. V Canada [2012]
Health Canada received an access to information request, from another party,
related to two new drug submissions made by Merck Frosst (Merck Frosst Canada
Ltd. v Canada (Health) [2012] 1 SCR 23, hereinafter “Merck”). Health Canada identified
several hundred pages that could be disclosed by the access to information request.
Health Canada then notified Merck of the access to information requests and the intention
to disclose the identified pages to the requestor. Merck was given an opportunity to
explain which of these pages should remain confidential before Health Canada fulfills the
FOI request to the requestor. Health Canada agreed to further redactions but rejected
most of Merck’s objections. Merck filed for a judicial review of Health Canada’s
decision. The Federal Court found that Health Canada was about to contravene the
Information Act, and that 200 pages must be exempted from disclosure (while the rest
could be disclosed to the requestor). The Federal Court of Appeal allowed Health
Canada’s appeal and ordered all the pages disclosed to the requestor. The Supreme Court
ruled against the appellants (Merck Frosst) (Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada
(Health) [2012] 1 SCR 23).
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Figure 3.8: Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada (Health), 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1
S.C.R 23
Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc. [2012]
Pfizer holds the Canadian Patent 2 163 446 for use of a “compound of formula
(I)” or a “salt thereof” as a treatment for erectile dysfunction (Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer
Canada Inc [2012] SCR 625, hereinafter Teva). The Patent’s specifications for seven
cascading claims for successively smaller ranges of compounds. Sildenafil, the subject of
Claim 7 and the active compound in Viagra, is shown to be, by Teva, effective in treating
erectile dysfunction. Teva applied for an NOC to produce a generic version of Viagra. On
appeal by Pfizer, the Federal Court blocked the Ministry of Health from issuing the NOC.
Teva appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal and the decision by the Federal Court was
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upheld. Teva appealed this decision to the Supreme Court which ruled in favor of Teva
(Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc [2012] SCR 625).

Figure 3.9: Teva Canada Ltd. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2012 SCC 60, [2012] 3 S.C.R 625
Sanofi Aventis v Apotex Inc. [2015]
Apotex filed with Health Canada for an issuance of NOC for a generic drug and
received the NOC. Sanofi-Aventis and Bristol Myers Squibb applied to the Federal Court
against Apotex, and were successful in having the NOC squashed (SanofiAventis v Apotex Inc [2015] SCR 136, hereinafter Sanofi). Apotex then commenced an
action in The Federal Court to invalidate Sanofi’s patent. Sanofi then began an
infringement action in the Federal Court against Apotex. Then simultaneously, the
Federal Court, in the patent infringement action, decided in favor of Apotex and
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invalidated Sanofi-Aventis’s Patent. Sanofi appealed to the Federal Court of Appeal,
where the decision of the Federal Court was upheld. The decision was appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada but dismissed summarily, with the Supreme Court
unanimously agreeing with the FCA’s reasoning (Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc [2013]
FCA 209, para 1-10).

Figure 3.10: Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc., [2015] 2 S.C.R. 136

3.4.2

Interveners Across All Decisions
Of the nine decisions identified, six involved interveners (see Table 3.2). There

were a total of sixteen interventions applications (twelve successful, four unsuccessful)
across the six cases
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Table 3.2: Cases with and without interveners (Interveners in brackets)
Cases with Interveners
•
•
•
•
•
•

Cases without Interveners

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada
(Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R.
533, 2005 SCC 26 (CGPA & Pfizer)
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada
(Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R.
560, 2006 SCC 49 (CPGA, CRPC)
Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo
Canada Inc., [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265,
2008 SCC 61 (BIOTE, CGPA, CRPC)
Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada
(Health), 2012 SCC 3, [2012] 1 S.C.R.
(BIOTE)
Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada
Inc., 2012 SCC 60, [2012] 3 S.C.R.
625 (CGPA, CRPC)
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc., 2015
SCC 20, [2015] 2 S.C.R. 136 (CGPA,
CRPC)

•
•

•

Apotex Inc. v Wellcome
Foundation Ltd., [2002] 4
S.C.R. 153, 2002 SCC 77
Nu-Pharm Inc. v Canada
(Attorney General),
2010 SCC 65, [2010] 3 S.C.R.
648
Celgene Corp. v Canada
(Attorney General),
2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 3

Source: Reviewing decisions for intervener participation.
In the nine decisions involving pharmaceuticals a number of parties appealed
repeatedly (See Table 3.1).
There were not attempts to intervene made in all nine cases – and where
applications to intervene were made, results were mixed (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Applications to the Court
Cases with Interveners

Cases Without
Interveners

Total Cases

6

3

Total Intervener

15

1

Successful Applications

12

0

Unsuccessful Applications

3

1

Applications Made

Source: Reviewing case dockets for intervener applications.
Of the four instances in which an intervention application was rejected, one
rejection of an application for intervention (that of the Information Commissioner of
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Canada in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada, 2012) was due to failure to submit the
necessary documents by the necessary deadlines. Laboratoire Riva’s application in
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc (Court Docket, Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc [2015] 2 SCR
136) was dismissed by Justice Karakatsanis, BIOTECanada’s application in Teva Canada
Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. (2012) (Court Docket, Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc
[2012] 3 SCR 625) was dismissed by Justice Deschamps: the same judge that accepted
BIOTECanada’s application in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada (2012) in that same
year, 2012. Aside from Justice Deschamps, no justice participated in the selection of
interveners in more than two cases, and Justice Deschamps permitted intervener(s) to file
a 10-page factums and give oral presentations in both Merck Frosst Canada
Ltd. v Canada (2012) and Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. (2012). Because a
different judge was involved in the selection of interveners in every case (with the
exception of Justice Deschamps, who is seemingly neutral towards BIOTECanada
because they were accepted and rejected once by Deschamps) no single judge
significantly influenced the acceptance or rejection of the intervener applications, there is
no apparent bias in accepting or rejecting interveners by judges across the cases.
The majority of interventions were done by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association and Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies, who represent the
generic and brand name pharmaceutical industries, respectively (see Table 3.4 for a list of
successful and unsuccessful intervener applications organized by applicant).
Table 3.4: Interventions Across All Decisions
Interveners

Frequency
Successful

Unsuccessful

Application(s)

Application(s)

Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association

5

0

Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical

4

1

BIOTECanada

2

1

Pfizer

1

0

Laboratoire Riva Inc.

0

1

Information Commissioner of Canada

0

1

Companies

106

BIOTECanada represented the brand name pharmaceutical industry in one
intervention, and an unrelated matter to generic or brand name companies in another case
(Factum for BIOTECanada, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada (Health), [2012] 1 SCR
23). BIOTECanada had an application rejected on a case where both the Canadian
Generic Pharmaceutical Association and Canada’s Research Based Companies
successfully intervened (Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. [2012] 3 SCR 625).
BIOTECanada and Canada’s Research Based Companies have overlapping mandates,
and the Court has shown that it will accept Canada’s Research Based Companies
intervener application over BIOTECanada’s in certain instances where the both seek to
represent brand name pharmaceutical interests. Pfizer, a member of Canada’s ResearchBased Pharmaceutical Companies, held positions which favour the brand name
pharmaceutical industry during its intervention (Factum for Pfizer Canada, Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533).
Unsuccessful applications to intervene fell into three categories: 1) they did not
have interests or arguments which support the generic or pharmaceutical industry (as is
the case in Laboratoire Riva Inc.’s application), 2) the argument raised was already
addressed by another intervener, and did not make the criteria for originality
(BIOTECanada’s application in Teva v Pfizer), 3) there was no application by the
opposite pharmaceutical camp (e.g., if a brand name intervener applied, there was no
application by the generic parallel intervener), and so there would be a perceived
imbalance in the arguments (as was the case with Canada’s Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Companies’ application in Celgene Corp. v Canada ).27 The only case
with no interveners and but an application is Celgene Corp. v Canada (2011) where only
Canada’s Research Based Companies submitted an application but was dismissed.

27

The Information Commissioner of Canada initially submitted an application for intervention
but missed the deadlines necessary to submit the necessary documents.
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All the successful intervener applicants can be categorized as supporting generic
or brand name companies, and at least one from each camp is involved if there is
intervention on a case that might concern certain brand name or generic drugs.
In total, there were fifteen separate applications for intervener status, and twelve
were successful. Six stakeholders were responsible for the fifteen intervener applications,
and four stakeholders were successful in their applications. In cases with interveners,
three cases had all intervener applications accepted, and three cases did not have all
intervener applications accepted. In cases without successful intervener applications,
there was one case with an application for intervener status, and three with no
applications.
Table 3.5: Generics and Brand Name Parties28
Type of Case

Number of Cases with
Interventions/Total
Number of Cases

Number of Successful
Intervention
Applications

Number of
Unsuccessful
Intervention
Applications

Notice of Compliance
General Patent

4/5
1/2

9
2

1
1

Other, non-patent

1/2

1

2

The majority of intervention applications, ten out of sixteen (62.5%) are NOC
cases, and 80% of NOC cases have interveners (See Table 3.5). NOC litigation has the
highest proportion of interveners of the three classifications identified in this study. It
appears likely that stakeholders view NOC litigation as uniquely important, and are
willing to intervene. General Patent cases follow the same pattern of intervention (a brand
name and generic intervener) but in lower numbers; only one of the two cases featured
intervention, and they received only three out of fifteen total applications for intervention.
The ‘other’, non-patent, cases only featured one intervener and did not follow the pattern
of having a brand and generic intervener present.

28

Nu-Pharm is excluded as it does not meet either criteria.
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Litigants and interveners can be categorized as being representative of the brand
name or generic pharmaceutical industry, or ‘other’. Table 3.6 lists the parties and
interveners and their respective affiliations.
Table 3.6: Generic and Brand Name Parties29
Classification of Party or
Intervener
Brand Name

Litigants

Intervener

Pfizer, Merck, AstroZeneca,
Bristol-Myers Squibb,
GlaxoSmithKline, Celgene, SanofiAventis/Synetholab

Generic

Apotex, Teva

Other

Wellcome Trust

Canada’s Research-Based
Pharmaceutical
Companies
Pfizer Canada Inc.
BIOTECanada
Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association
Laboratoire Riva
Information
Commissioner of Canada

The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association had five successful
intervention applications and no unsuccessful applications, Canada’s Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Companies had four successful applications and one unsuccessful
application, BIOTECanada had two successful applications and one unsuccessful
application, Pfizer had one successful application and no unsuccessful applications,
Laboratoire Riva Inc. and the Information Commissioner of Canada each applied
unsuccessfully.

3.4.3

Patterns in the Interventions
When the cases are organized chronologically and reviewed for the presence and

length of written factums and oral and arguments, it can be seen that oral arguments have
become more common, but the length of both factums and oral arguments have been
shortened in more recent cases (See Table 3.7).

29

Nu-Pharm is excluded as it does not meet either criteria.
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Table 3.7: Length and Time Allowances for Factums and Oral Arguments
Case
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v
Canada (A.G)
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v
Canada, 2005
AstraZeneca Canada Inc v
Canada, 2006
Apotex Inc. v SanofiSynthelabo Canada Inc, 2008
Merck Frosst Canada Ltd v
Canada, 2012
Teva Canada Ltd. V Pfizer
Canada Inc, 2012
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc,
2015

Length of Written Factum
(pages)
20
20

Length of Oral Argument
(minutes)
15 (for each intervener in
the coalition)
15

20

15

15

10

10

10

10

10

10

10

Source: Intervener factums of each the interveners in the cases listed above
In all the cases, with the exception of, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (2005),
the interveners (if there was more than one) received the same length allowances for
written factums and time allowances for oral arguments. In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v
Canada, both the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association and Pfizer were
permitted a twenty-page factum, but only Pfizer was allowed to make a fifteen-minute
oral argument in the Court, and the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association was
not allowed to make an oral argument. Pfizer’s intervention in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.
v Canada is also the only intervention by a company instead of an association.
Remarkably, Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies did not apply for
intervention on that same case. In every other case the intervention is by an association,
not a company.
Because of the shortening of interveners’ written and oral arguments over time
found in this study, it appears that each interveners’ influence in the courts is diminished
as there is less space and time to present a convincing argument. Of the cases with
interveners, four of the six cases involved a full court and two did not. All three cases
without interveners had full courts; the presence of a full court, or not, does not seem to
have an impact on intervention.
Of the six cases with interveners, four had a unanimous judgments and two had
majorities with minority dissents (none involved solo dissents). The three cases without
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interveners all the cases were unanimous. This suggests that the presence of interveners
may contribute to differing opinions amongst the justices in pharmaceutical patent cases
and RJR-MacDonald (See Table 3.8).
In RJR-MacDonald, with a full court of nine judges, there are seven different
judgments filed. Two dissents to the majority decision written: the dissenting judges
were: La Forest J, with whom L-Heureux-Dube and Gonthier joined (RJR-MacDonald
Inc. v Canada [1995] 3 SCR 199, para 2-119), and a solo dissent written by Cory (RJRMacDonald Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199, para 121). There are five independently
filed judgments which make up the majority: Lacobucci, McLachlin, Major, Lamer,
Sopinka. The interveners’ positions did not support the position taken by the majority
judges, but their positions are aligned with the position taken by the dissenting judges (La
Forrest J and Cory K).

Table 3.8: Judgments and Types of Dissent in Pharmaceutical Cases
Case

Unanimous

Split
Solo
Dissent

Joint
Dissent

Majority

Apotex Inc. v
Wellcome Foundation
Ltd., [2002] 4 S.C.R.
153, 2002 SCC 77
[Full Court]

McLachlin C.J. and
L’Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier,
Iacobucci, Major, Bastarache,
Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

0

0

NA

Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v Canada
(Attorney General),
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 533,
2005 SCC 26
[Full Court]

NA

0

Bastarache
J. (Major
and
Charron JJ.
concurring
)

AstraZeneca Canada
Inc. v Canada
(Minister of Health),
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 560,
2006 SCC 49
[Full Court]
Apotex Inc. v
Sanofi-Synthelabo
Canada Inc., [2008] 3
S.C.R. 265, 2008
SCC 61

Binnie J. (McLachlin C.J. and
Bastarache, LeBel,
Deschamps, Fish, Abella,
Charron and Rothstein JJ.
concurring)

0

0

Binnie J.
(McLachlin
C.J. and
LeBel,
Deschamps,
Fish and
Abella JJ.
concurring)
NA

Rothstein J. (Binnie, LeBel,
Deschamps, Fish, Abella and
Charron JJ. concurring)

0

0

NA
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Case

Unanimous

Split
Solo
Dissent

Joint
Dissent

Majority

[Not Full Court– 7
Judges]
Nu-Pharm Inc. v
Canada (Attorney
General), 2010 SCC
65, [2010] 3 S.C.R.
648
[Full Court]
Celgene Corp. v
Canada (Attorney
General),
2011 SCC 1, [2011] 1
S.C.R. 3
[Full Court]
Merck Frosst Canada
Ltd. v Canada
(Health), 2012 SCC
3, [2012] 1 S.C.R.
[Full Court]3

Rothstein J., Binnie, LeBel,
Deschamps, Abella, Charron
and Cromwell JJ. concurring

0

0

NA

McLachlin C.J. and Binnie,
LeBel, Deschamps, Fish,
Abella, Charron, Rothstein
and Cromwell JJ.

0

0

NA

NA

0

Deschamp
s J. (Abella
and
Rothstein
JJ.
concurring
)

Teva Canada Ltd. v
Pfizer Canada Inc.,
2012 SCC 60, [2012]
3 S.C.R. 625
[Not Full Court – 7
Judges]
SanofiAventis v Apotex
Inc., 2015 SCC 20,
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 136
[Full Court]

LeBel J. (McLachlin C.J. and
Deschamps, Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell and
Moldaver JJ. concurring)

0

0

Cromwell J.
(McLachlin
C.J. and
Binnie,
LeBel, Fish
and Charron
JJ.
concurring)
NA

McLachlin C.J. (Abella,
Rothstein, Cromwell,
Moldaver, Karakatsanis,
Wagner, Gascon and Côté JJ.
concurring)

0

0

NA

3.4.4

Content of the Interventions
The formatting of every intervener factum will typically, loosely, follow the same

basic format. The factum begins with a statement of the facts, the questions of the case
(issues), the intervener arguments, a section concerning costs of the intervention, and a
table of authorities. Depending on the issues in the case other sections may appear in the
factum.
Recall that for an application for intervention to be successful the applicant must
demonstrate:
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1. The intervener’s interests in the proceedings
2. The position the applicant intends to take with respect to the legal questions in
the proceedings
3. The applicant’s relevance to the proceedings
4. Reasons why the applicant’s submissions will be useful to the Court
5. Any prejudice that the applicant would suffer if the intervention were denied
It is not possible to know for certain how each successful intervener satisfied the judge
hearing the application for intervention on any or all of these five points: the reasons why
the judge hearing the application for intervention accepts or rejects the application are not
delivered in writing and are therefore unknowable. However, from interveners’
subsequent factums submitted to proceedings, it may be determined how certain
arguments made would also have formed a basis on which the judge hearing the
application for intervention would have been able to find the criteria for intervention
were satisfied. For instance, a factum which subsequently speaks to the facts and
questions surrounding the issues in the case demonstrates that the intervener satisfies the
requirement for intervention of proving the intervener’s interest in the proceedings and its
own interests.
The ‘arguments’ section of the factum also demonstrates how the intervener
would have satisfied, during its application to intervene, the ‘position’ requirement, its
relevance to the proceedings, and why its submissions would be useful to the Court. The
interveners do not explicitly state their relevance to the Court in the factums, but
arguments provided by the interveners are framed as coming from the position of the
brand or generic pharmaceutical industry, which protect the interests of innovators (the
brand argument) or represent cost savings and access to pharmaceuticals (the generic
argument). These are perspectives which may not be represented by the litigants, would
useful to the Court, and satisfy the question of the intervener’s usefulness to the Court.
The final question, which asks if the applicant would experience any prejudice if the
application were denied, is irrelevant by the time the factum is written because the
applicant has already been accepted as an intervener and can no longer experience the
prejudice incurred by a rejected application.

113

The majority of each intervener factum is always dedicated to the specific issues
of the case. For instance, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada, the Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical Association argued against “evergreening” (Factum for Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical Association (CGPA), Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney
General) [2005] 1 SCR 533) which is specific to the issues of the case (evergreening
refers to a company attempting to extend the length of its patent). The CGPA, throughout
its factum, sides with the litigant Biolyse and makes an argument in support of Biolyse.
Similarly, in AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada (2006) the CGPA is again arguing
against the same “evergreening” issue. In Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo the CGPA
addresses double patenting, which stifles generic development. In Teva Canada Ltd. v
Pfizer Canada Inc the CGPA support disclosure of information in patents, which
promotes generics by allowing for emulation. Finally, in Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex the
CGPA promotes an interpretation of the Patent Act and the Regulations that ensure a
timely entry of competitive generic products and thereby reduce healthcare costs. There
is no generic representation in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada because the issues of
the case revolved around a freedom of information request, which is not an issue which
necessitates generic representation.
Turning again to Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada, Pfizer Canada argues that it
is interested in protecting its brands and products through patent which, again, is an issue
discussed in the case (Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1
SCR 533). Pfizer Canada’s argument concerns a single issue brought up in the Court:
Pfizer's submissions are limited to one point only: this Court should make it clear
in its reasons respecting this appeal that, even if s. 5 (11) of the PM(NOC)
Regulations can apply to an innovator's NDS, s. 5(1.1) does not apply to a purely
administrative NDS filed by a drug manufacturer to effect a name change, a
change of address, and the like (Factum for Pfizer Canada, Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v Canada (Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533, p. 1).
Throughout the factum Pfizer discusses this issue with respect to innovative drug
manufacturers, and argues against Biolyse, a litigant in the case and a generic
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pharmaceutical company.
In AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v Canada Canada’s Researched Based
Pharmaceutical Companies was interested in the protection of intellectual property and
brand. In Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc argued for protecting “selection
patents” and the patent regime from being changed. In that same case, BIOTECanada
(another brand industry representative makes a similar argument, stating: “Selection
patents advance patent law policy by rewarding the fruitful efforts of subsequent
inventors who discover and disclose to the public the unexpected and advantageous
properties of compounds in previously identified classes” (Factum for BIOTECanada,
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. [2008] 3 SCR 265, para 2). BIOTECanada also
intervened in Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada, arguing for a non-pharmaceutical
related issue related to document disclosure during a freedom of information requisition:
“An innovative company that submits trade secrets, confidential information and
commercially sensitive information to a government institution is vulnerable to release of
that information.” (Factum for BIOTECanada, Merck Frosst Canada Ltd. v Canada
(Health) [2012] 1 SCR 23, para 10). In Teva Canada Ltd. v Pfizer Canada Inc. the
CRBPC Addressing improper interpretation of AZT case in lower courts and its effect on
patentees. Finally, in Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex Inc. (2015) argued for an interpretation of
the regulations what fairly determine what damages and compensation are fair and
predictable.
In The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association, another intervener in the
case, also squarely addressed the questions before the Court. After positioning itself as an
association of generic drug manufacturers, it describes its interest in the proceedings:
CGPA submits that the anticompetitive effect of the PM(NOC) Regulations arises
in large part because first persons can trigger the 24-month automatic stay
repeatedly in respect of a single second person drug product, by listing multiple
patents over time (Factum for CGPA, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada
(Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533, para 5).
This argument is expanded on throughout the factum, occupying most of the document.
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The CGPA also addresses the issue of public policy and health policy in its factum, but
the public interest argument is far less prominent, occupying less than a tenth of the total
space in the factum. The CGPA addresses the public interest by speaking to access and
the cost of drugs:
The resulting additional cost to the public for this single drug over the four years
may be in the tens of millions of dollars. There are many drugs which have been
or are being delayed for long periods of time by litigation under the Regulations at
great cost to the public (Factum for CGPA, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v Canada
(Attorney General) [2005] 1 SCR 533, para 37).
The pattern observed in the intervener factums in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v
Canada, where the interveners mainly address the specific issues of the case and where
the public interest is a minor and secondary argument, repeats itself throughout all the
intervener factums analyzed for this study. It is also the case in all the factums that brand
industry pharmaceutical interveners (like Pfizer in Bristol-Myers) will support the brand
name litigant and generic pharmaceutical interveners (like the CGPA in Bristol-Myers)
will support the generic litigant.
Across all the decisions, ten of the twelve interveners make a public-interest
argument, typically a minor argument. Only in Apotex v Sanofi-Synthelabo did the
interveners more prominently feature the public-interest issue, and, in that instance, doing
so is a response to claims by Apotex pertaining to public-policy: thus it is the case that
the finding that all factums address the issues of the case is consistent across all the cases,
including Apotex v Sanofi-Synthelabo because the public policy conversation within that
case is more prominent, and so a more prominent public-policy conversation in the
intervener factums follows from that focus in the litigation itself (Factum for
BIOTECanada, Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. [2008] 3 SCR 265, para 27;
Factum for Canada’s Research Based Companies, Apotex Inc. v Sanofi-Synthelabo
Canada Inc. [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265., p. 6; Factum for CGPA, Apotex Inc. v
Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc. [2008] 3 SCR 265, para 47). It is notable that none of the
interveners are cited or mentioned in the text of the decisions themselves that were
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rendered by the Supreme Court judges.
The coalition of interveners in RJR-MacDonald (The Canadian Cancer Society,
The Canadian Council on Smoking and Health, The Canadian Medical Association, The
Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, The Canadian Lung Association) do not follow
the same pattern of content in their (collective) factum as the generic and brand industry
interveners. The structure of the factum begins with an introduction of the coalition of
interveners, followed by the perspective of the interveners on the Tobacco Products
Control Act, an extended section on the medical facts supporting the legislative objective
[of the TPCA], a section describing the aims of tobacco advertising, and the level of
support behind a tobacco advertising ban. The interveners still meet the criteria for
intervention because they were successful in intervening, and the four criteria for
intervention present in the brand and generic pharmaceutical intervener factums
(interests, position, relevance to the issues, usefulness to the Court) are still seen in the
coalition factum in the “perspectives of the interveners” section and subsequent sections
which present evidence for the ban that may not otherwise have been mentioned in the
proceedings. The interveners are explicit in their goal to ban tobacco advertising as a
matter of public health policy:
In the representations made to Parliament, the Interveners and other members of
the Canadian medical and health community provided detailed background
information concerning the medical consequences of tobacco use. The Interveners
unanimously supported, and continue to support, the TPCA as part of a multifaceted approach to reduce and ultimately eliminate disease and death caused by
the use of tobacco products. A multi-faceted approach to achieving this objective
is supported by both the U.S. Surgeon General and by the World Health
Organization. The compelling medical testimony presented to the committees was
consistent with the medical evidence which was subsequently adduced at trial in
the present case (Factum for Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v
Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199).
The majority of the factum described the medical evidence supporting a ban on tobacco
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advertising, the benefits to the public, and the broad public support to do so. A short part
of the factum is dedicated to the facts and issues in the case.
The final set of interveners, from the CanWest Charter challenge litigation
(Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions, Canadian Health Coalition, Canadian Union of
Public Employees, Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada,
Society for Diabetic Rights, Medical Reform Group, Drug Safety Canada, Women and
Health Protection) did not submit factums because the proceedings never reached the
point in which they would have been able to do so.

3.5 Analysis and Questions
3.5.1

Is There a Relationship Between the Presence of
Interveners and the Volatility of the Area of Law?
In her primary analysis of intellectual property cases in the Supreme Court,

Wilkinson noted, with respect to copyright cases specifically, that based on earlier studies
there is a level of volatility in the Supreme Court’s decision-making in this the area of
law that differs from the general level of volatility in Supreme Court decisions; this was
supported by her findings that there are a large number of dissents and concurring reasons
in copyright cases during the Chief Justice McLachlin’s term. However, pharmaceutical
patent litigation does not seem to exhibit the same patterns found by Wilkinson in
copyright cases. As seen in Table 3.10 reporting on judgments and dissents on
pharmaceutical patent decisions, there were six unanimous decisions, no concurring
opinions, and three dissents (none of them solo dissents). In comparison to copyright
cases there is a low level of volatility in pharmaceutical patent decisions. The decision in
RJR-MacDonald is more volatile as there was a concurring dissent and a solo dissent, and
more analogous to the decision-making pattern found by Wilkinson in copyright cases.
The findings in this study concerning decision-making patterns in pharmaceutical patent
cases before the Supreme Court are consistent with the findings of Newnman (2016),
where there was a low level of volatility.
Litigants before the court in the pharmaceutical patent cases mirror the same basic
divisions as do the interveners: both litigants and interveners are divided between their
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belonging to the generic pharmaceutical lobby and the name brand pharmaceutical
groups, the only exception is the Wellcome Trust who are categorized as “other”. The
only three litigants who are involved in more than one case are Apotex, a generic
pharmaceutical company, who was involved in four cases, and SanofiAventis/Synthelabo, who was involved in two cases, and GlaxoSmithKline, a name brand
pharmaceutical company, involved in three cases.
Of the litigants, seven brand name pharmaceutical companies (Teva, Pfizer,
Merck, Astro-Zeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Celgene) were each involved in one
case as either plaintiffs or defendants, and Biolyse, a generic company, was only involved
in one case. In five cases, generics and name brand corporations were litigating against
one another, all these cases had interveners. One case featuring a generic company
litigating against a brand name company did not have any interveners. The three cases
that did not feature generic pharmaceutical companies and brand name pharmaceutical
companies litigating against each other do not include interveners. For those stakeholders
also present in the Supreme Court of Canada litigation analyzed in this Chapter 3, their
interests, influence, and power are demonstrated in this environment of judicial
proceedings in ways that parallel these demonstrated characteristics in Chapter 2. The
“positions” of brand and generic companies, on the other hand, are opposed to each other
in patent litigation whereas in the DTCA context they were found to be the same.30

3.5.2

Is There a Relationship Between the Type of Issue and
Those Who Intervene?
When one analyzes the causes of action that have given rise to pharmaceutical

cases in the Supreme Court it becomes apparent the majority arise from NOC actions
(See Table 3.9). Of the nine pharmaceutical cases identified, five were notice of
compliance cases, two were general patent cases, and two were non-patent cases. Far less
frequently, the cases arise from matters of pure patent law with two cases rising from
their own particular circumstance, not related to NOCs or patent. These last two were

30

Referring to the positions, power, interests, and influence found in Chapter 2.
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classified as ‘other’. There is a pattern of intervention in NOC cases, general patent cases,
and ‘other’ cases, each of which is different than the others.
Table 3.9: Cases With or Without Successful Interveners
Cases with Only
Successful Intervener
Applications

Cases Which Involved
Atleast One
Unsuccessful
Intervener
Application

Cases Without
Intervener
Applications

Notice of Compliance

3

1

1

General Patent

1

0

1

Non-Patent

1

1

0

As can be seen in Table 3.10, every time there was an intervention by a generic
industry association (The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association), there was an
intervention by a brand industry association or group (Canada’s Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Companies, Pfizer Canada, BIOTECanada). The significance of this is
that for each generic industry argument made by an intervener there is a corresponding
argument by a brand industry intervener.
Table 3.10: Classification of Cases
Classification of Case

Case

Successful Intervener
Applicants

NOC Cases

Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v Canada (Attorney
General), [2005] 1
S.C.R. 533, 2005 SCC
26
AstraZeneca Canada
Inc. v Canada (Minister
of Health), [2006] 2
S.C.R. 560, 2006 SCC
49

Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association, Pfizer
Canada Inc31.

Apotex Inc. v
Sanofi-Synthelabo
Canada Inc., [2008] 3

Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association, Canada’s
Research-Based
Pharmaceutical
Companies
Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association, Canada’s

Unsuccessful
Intervener
Applicants
None

None

None

Pfizer substitutes Canada’s Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v Canada (Attorney General).
31
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S.C.R. 265, 2008 SCC
61

Nu-Pharm Inc. v
Canada (Attorney
General), 2010 SCC 65,
[2010]
Teva Canada Ltd. v
Pfizer Canada Inc.,
2012 SCC 60, [2012] 3
S.C.R. 625
General Patent Cases32
Sanofi-Aventis v Apotex
Inc., 2015 SCC 20,
[2015] 2 S.C.R. 136

Non-Patent Cases

3.5.3

Apotex Inc. v Wellcome
Foundation Ltd., [2002]
4 S.C.R. 153, 2002 SCC
77
Merck Frosst Canada
Ltd. v Canada (Health),
2012 SCC 3, [2012]
Celgene Corp. v
Canada (Attorney
General), 2011 SCC 1,
[2011]

Research-Based
Pharmaceutical
Companies,
BIOTECanada
No Intervener(s)

No Intervener(s)

Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association, Canada’s
Research-Based
Pharmaceutical
Companies
Canadian Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association, Canada’s
Research-Based
Pharmaceutical
Companies
No Intervener(s)

BIOTECanada

BIOTECanada

Information
Commissioner of
Canada
Canada’s
Research-Based
Pharmaceutical
Companies

No Intervener(s)

Laboratoire Riva

No Intervener(s)

Does the Pattern of Intervention in Pharmaceuticals Mirror
Intervention in RJR-MacDonald or CanWest?

RJR-MacDonald and CanWest litigation deal with issues of public-health, tobacco
advertising and pharmaceutical advertising. The plaintiffs in both cases are challenging
legislation which limits what advertising they can produce and distribute. In the CanWest
(Women and Health Protection, 2007) charter challenge on DTCA which Ontario
Superior Court, the coalition which intervened was entirely composed of health interested
stakeholders (Women and Health Protection, the Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions,
the Canadian Health Coalition, the Canadian Union of Public Employees, the

32

General patent cases and non-patent case are collectively referred to as non-NOC cases.
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Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, the Society for Diabetic
Rights, the Medical Reform Group, and Terence Young for Drug Safety Canada). These
stakeholders more closely resemble the interveners in RJR-MacDonald v Canada (The
Canadian Cancer Society, the Canadian Council on Smoking and Health, the Canadian
Medical Association, the Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada, and the Canadian Lung
Association) than they do the interveners in the pharmaceutical patent cases by way of
being public interest and health interested stakeholders. These health-interested
stakeholders who are intervened in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest litigation are not
intervening in pharmaceutical cases before the Supreme Court.
One hypothesis arising from the finding that the interveners from RJRMacDonald are not attempting to intervene in pharmaceutical related Supreme Court
proceedings is that they were uninterested in patent litigation. This was not unexpected
because the issues of RJR-MacDonald were concerned with tobacco and tobacco
advertising, whereas pharmaceutical related Supreme Court proceedings are mainly about
pharmaceuticals and patent.
Another possible explanation is that the public interest is already represented by
the brand name and generic pharmaceutical industry, and so health-interested
organization are not compelled to intervene. The frequency and success of interventions
by the generic and name brand pharmaceutical lobbies is evidence that the Supreme
Court itself sees the arguments they present as geared towards the public interest. The
name brand pharmaceutical industry often argues in its submissions for innovation,
science, and medicine, whereas the generic industry will make an argument for healthcare
costs and accessibility. This can explain why brand name and generic applications are so
often successful. The absence of applications from a public health body, or healthinterested stakeholders in these cases as intervener applicants may suggest that the public
interest argument is already being presented by the brand and generic pharmaceutical
stakeholders. With fewer resources (by comparison to pharmaceutical companies), and
less available legal expertise they may not see the strategic need to intervene to make
public-interest arguments.
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3.6 Conclusions
Recall that the focus of this chapter is to answer research question #2:
Given the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court of Canada
processes in Canada and the presence of interveners in the landmark 2001
advertising case in the Supreme Court of Canada, RJR-MacDonald v Canada, are
the stakeholders identified in the response to Research Question #1 found as
interveners in current pharmaceutical related Supreme Court litigation?
The answer to this question must be contextualized by the fact that pharmaceutical
advertising, although yet to have a landmark case in the Supreme Court, has a number of
stakeholders who have interests in pharmaceutical patent. This study has identified
prominent stakeholders in the pharmaceutical industry who have a recorded history of
initiating and being involved in high-level cases and have the potential to influence
DTCA policy on a national level. Most notably, the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association and Canada’s Research Based Companies have established a behavior and
interest in intervening on such cases but Pfizer and BIOTECanada are also interested
parties. All these parties were identified as pharmaceutical advertising stakeholders in the
analysis reported in Chapter 2.
Most interventions were undertaken by a few stakeholders (see again Table 3.10,
five of the interventions (33% of successful interventions, 45.4% of total applications)
were by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association who are present in 80% of
cases with interveners. Four of the interventions are by Canada’s Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Companies [brand] (33% of successful interventions, 26.7% of total
applications) who are present in 66% of cases. Together the interventions by the
Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association and Canada’s Research-Based
Pharmaceutical Companies represent nine of the twelve total interventions. Initially, it
would seem that the generic pharmaceutical lobby is more successful at intervening than
the name brand lobby, positioning it as the most powerful network of stakeholders. This
conclusion however becomes less certain if one organizes interveners by their respective
mandates and their arguments as they pertain to a case (as presented in their intervener
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factums). Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies, BIOTECanada [brand],
and Pfizer [brand] all represent the interests and positions of the name brand
pharmaceutical industry. This rebalances the perception of influence, the name brand
industry produced seven interventions across the data set, while generics produced five.
Only two lobbies’ positions, the brand industry and generic industry positions, were
represented here as there was no evidence of any other successful interventions. The only
application by an entity that is not in the brand name or generic pharmaceutical lobby
was by the Information Commissioner of Canada, abandoned.33

Table 3.10: Interventions Before and After December 2008
Cases Before December 2008
Cases After December 2008
Cases With
Cases Without
Cases With
Cases Without
Interveners
Interveners
Interveners
Interveners
Bristol-Myers
Apotex Inc. v
Merck Frosst
Nu-Pharm Inc. v
Squibb Co. v
Wellcome
Canada
Canada
Canada (Attorney
Foundation
Ltd. v Canada
(Attorney
General) [2005]
Ltd.[2002]
(Health) [2012]
General) [2010]
AstraZeneca Canada NA
Inc. v Canada
(Minister of Health),
[2006]
Apotex Inc. v
NA
Sanofi-Synthelabo
Canada Inc. [2008]

Teva Canada Ltd. v
Pfizer Canada Inc.
[2012]

Sanofi
Aventis v Apotex
Inc., 2015 SCC 20
[2015]
Source: Case decisions for intervener participation.

Celgene Corp. v
Canada
(Attorney
General) [2011]
NA

The majority of pharmaceutical cases found in this study have interveners. The
six to three (66%) ratio of pharmaceutical cases with interveners (against cases without
interveners) found in this study, between 2002 and 2016, is higher than the average
proportion of cases with intervention found by Alarie & Green (2010) between January

33

One group of stakeholders not addressed in this study are those who would be willing or are
interested in submitting applications for intervener status but either lack the financial resources or
expertise to submit an application. The ability of stakeholders to submit applications to the
Supreme Court for intervention is a that should further have investigated in the future but is
outside the scope of this study.
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2000 and December 2008, which was 49% (330 of 674). However, in this study there are
cases decided after December 2008. If the number of cases studied here are separated into
those decided before 2008 (the same timeline as Alarie and Greene) and those decided
after, three of four, (75%) of the pharmaceutical cases decided before December 2008
have interveners whereas only three of five (60%) of cases decided after December 2008
have interveners. Alarie and Green found that rates of intervention in the Supreme Court
had been rising since 2000, reaching a high of 61.8% in 2007. This may explain why the
findings in this study are not only higher than that found by Alarie and Greene but also
much higher than the 33% acceptance rate that Burgess (Burgess, 2000) found in her
study of the impact of interveners in the Supreme Court between 1997-1999. The very
small numbers involved in this analysis of pharmaceutical cases may suggest that
pharmaceutical patent litigation inventions before 2008 are in-line with the rates of
intervention found in the Supreme Court by Alarie and Greene, although appearing
somewhat higher.34 However, when it is considered that cases containing a constitutional
argument constituted over 40% of the 33% of cases involving interveners that Burges
(Burgess, 2000) found – and that there are no constitutional issues raised in any of the
nine pharmaceutical cases studied here – the rate of acceptance of interveners by the
Supreme Court in (non-constitutional) pharmaceutical litigation is high.
Alarie and Green found that an average of 4.1 interveners (Alarie & Greene,
2010) were present on an appeal with intervention – and this was consistent with
Burgess’ finding of four to five interveners per case: in our study, a smaller number of
interveners per case is found for pharmaceutical patent cases (an average of two
interveners per appeal). The smaller number of interveners in each pharmaceutical case
may reduce the impact of such interventions. It is certainly the case that no
pharmaceutical judgments cited any interventions made, whereas, as discussed above,
Burgess not only found interveners mentioned by the judges in judgments but also found

Alarie & Greene’s study ceased data collection in 2008, whereas this study has collected cases
up to 2015. A more recent analysis of intervention at the Supreme Court of Canada will be
necessary to determine if the findings in this study are consistent with the broader rate of
intervention
34
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that this was more likely where there were between two and nine interventions in the
case.
In pharmaceutical patent litigation in this study, of the fifteen total applications
for intervener status, the acceptance of twelve interveners (80%) suggests that most
interveners can expect to be successful if they choose to apply. However, even this high
rate of acceptance is slightly lower than the 90% Supreme Court acceptance rate found by
Alarie and Greene in their study of other types of litigation (Alarie & Greene, 2010).
Despite the differences in scope between this study and that conducted by
Burgess, a number of the findings by Burgess resonate with those found in this study. She
found that a relatively few interveners made up a large portion of interventions: in this
study there is a very small pool of stakeholders intervening across all the cases. On the
other hand, the type of intervener reported by Burgess differs completely from the
predominant interveners found in this study of pharmaceutical litigation: here there is
only one unsuccessful or incomplete attempt an intervention by a “government” figure –
the Information Commissioner in the Merck litigation – whereas Burgess reported a high
proportion of government-related interventions in her data. In this study, there are no
interventions even attempted by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, trade unions,
individuals, or aboriginal groups found in Burgess’ study.
A central finding is that the interveners from CanWest litigation and RJRMacDonald were not found to be intervening in pharmaceutical patent litigation, which is
raises the question: why are the Interveners from RJR-MacDonald and CanWest not
involved in pharmaceutical patent litigation? Can we expect the stakeholders we have
found intervening in pharmaceutical patent cases to intervene on pharmaceutical
advertising cases that reach the Supreme Court?
The interveners from CanWest and RJR-MacDonald may not be intervening on
pharmaceutical patent cases for a number of reasons. The two most likely reasons are: 1)
They believe that the public interest argument is adequately represented by the brand
name and generic pharmaceutical industry interveners or 2) They do not have the
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expertise or resources to intervene on a growing number of pharmaceutical patent cases
and prefer to allocate resources to higher impact actions.
Since there has been clear interest by health and public interest stakeholders to
intervene in the Supreme Court in RJR-MacDonald, and that there has been demonstrated
interest by health and public interest stakeholders to intervene on the CanWest DTCA
case, it can be reasonably assumed that these stakeholders would apply to intervene on a
pharmaceutical advertising case that reaches the Supreme Court of Canada.
Pharmaceutical patent interveners, in all cases, only joined the proceedings when they
reached the Supreme Court. This may explain why they are not present in CanWest, as it
only reached the Ontario Superior Court. Factoring in these stakeholder’s history of
intervening on pharmaceutical cases at the Supreme Court, it is likely they would
continue to intervene, this includes if a DTCA which reaches the Supreme Court of
Canada. However, the arguments of the brand name and generic pharmaceutical industry
interveners may change.
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4

Chapter Four: Synthesis

4.1 Introduction
This fourth and final chapter will briefly summarize the studies described in
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. These findings will be compared to the findings of prior
literature on pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders. Finally, a discussion of the implications
for further research on Canadian pharmaceutical DTCA policy, both advocacy directed
toward government decision-making and advocacy directed toward influencing outcomes
in court litigation, will follow.

4.2 Summary of Findings in Chapter 2: Analysis of
Canadian Pharmaceutical Advertising Stakeholders
Recall that in Chapter 2, to address a literature gap on Canadian pharmaceutical
DTCA stakeholders, a number of questions were posed: who are the direct-to-consumer
pharmaceutical advertising stakeholders in the Canadian policy environment? what are
their positions, power, interests and influence? what is the potential for these stakeholders
to shape future pharmaceutical DTCA policy?
The findings were:
1) There is a wide-range of stakeholders from varying backgrounds in the
pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment;
2) Stakeholders are part of policy networks;
3) Stakeholders have varying positions, power, interests, and influence;
4) There is a concentration of powerful stakeholders interested in maintaining
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.
Discussion of these key findings follows.
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4.2.1

There is a Wide Range of Stakeholders from Varying
Background in the Pharmaceutical DTCA Policy
Environment.

A thematic analysis of the stakeholders in the Standing Committee on Health Report
(Standing Committee on Health, 2004) revealed 127 different individuals and
organizations potentially operating in the pharmaceutical DTCA space. Those
stakeholders were thematically grouped into 15 different thematic categories:
1. Universities/Academic Units
2. Government
3. Research Groups and Think Tanks
4. Unions
5. Health Interested Organizations
6. Consumer Associations
7. Pharmacists
8. Healthcare Workers
9. Brand Name Pharmaceutical Industry
10. Generic Pharmaceutical Industry
11. ‘Other’ Health Industry
12. First Nations Groups
13. Regulatory Groups
14. Aging Citizenry
15. Individuals
The identification of 15 different thematic categories of stakeholders presents a broader
and more nuanced view of the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment and its
stakeholders than had previously been noted. Previous analyses of pharmaceutical DTCA
stakeholders have broadly defined the categories of potential stakeholders but did not
collect the names of the organizations and individuals within each stakeholder category,
which limits the usefulness of those studies for understanding pharmaceutical DTCA
policy. Roberts (2011) identified three categories of stakeholders: industry, general
practitioners, and the public. Matear and Dacin (2010) identified five categories of
stakeholders: consumers, physicians, insurance companies and formularies, pharmacists,
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and the government. These are fewer categories of stakeholders than identified in this
study, and there is no list of stakeholders who might be placed in each category. It is
important to understand what types of stakeholders may be operating in the
pharmaceutical DTCA space, and who exactly they are, and this is a major contribution
of this study.

4.2.2

Stakeholders are Part of Policy Networks
The connections between stakeholders identified in this study have also been

mapped in this study. The Pharmaceutical Advertising Advisory Board (PAAB) was
identified as an important network, and a number of the stakeholders in PAAB are
themselves associations with constituent members. A number of the stakeholders who
made submissions to the Romanow Commission (Commission on the Future of Health
Care in Canada, 2002) are also associations with constituent members. By crossreferencing the membership in the associations found in PAAB and the Romanow
Commission it became apparent that some stakeholders’ associations share members. The
individuals and organizations who are part of multiple stakeholder associations have
multiple avenues through which they can advance their agendas. For example, Sanofi (a
brand pharmaceutical manufacturer) is a member of four associations in PAAB, and can
work through any of those associations to advance its pharmaceutical DTCA agenda.

4.2.3

Stakeholders Have Varying Positions, Power, Interests, and
Influence
Stakeholders in the pharmaceutical DTCA policy environment are numerous, and

vary in their positions, power, interests and influence. The stakeholder positions exist on
a continuum ranging from “no regulation” to “completely prohibited” but can be grouped
into three positions: less regulated, maintain current regulations, and more regulated.
Roberts (2011) conducted a rudimentary analysis of her three stakeholder groups
(industry, general practitioners, and the public) and hypothesized about whether they
would support or reject four policy options, but this was different from identifying the
pharmaceutical DTCA policy positions of individual stakeholders as has been done in
this study. Matear and Dacin (2010), in their secondary literature analysis, examined the
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prevailing sentiment of categories of stakeholders towards pharmaceutical DTCA, but
does not provide the positions of individual stakeholders on pharmaceutical DTCA
policy. This study identifies both the positions of individual stakeholders on
pharmaceutical DTCA and the positions of individual stakeholders on pharmaceutical
DTCA policy.

4.2.4

Power, Stakeholders, and Maintaining the Status Quo
Findings from the stakeholder analysis in Chapter 2 suggest that the highest

concentration of power is held by the stakeholders who wish to maintain current
pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. Stakeholders in general were split in their positions,
between maintaining current pharmaceutical DTCA regulation or increasing regulation of
DTCA, but the all the high-power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association) and 40% of medium-power stakeholders (e.g. Canadian Association of
Medical Publishers) favoured maintaining the status quo. Because of the power held by
these stakeholders, it is likely that they are able to influence policymakers to maintain the
current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. The majority of low-power stakeholders (e.g.
Canadian Women’s Health Network) and 50% of medium-power stakeholders (e.g.
Canadian Medical Association) favoured more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA, but they
are less likely to able to influence policymakers to increase the regulation of
pharmaceutical DTCA.

4.3 Summary of Findings in Chapter 3: Analysis of
Interveners in the Supreme Court of Canada in
Pharmaceutical Litigation
There has not yet been any litigation in the Supreme Court of Canada involving
pharmaceutical DTCA. There was litigation in the mid-1990s in the Supreme Court that
involved DTCA in the tobacco industry (RJR-MacDonald) -- and the opposition to the
then regulatory environment for that industry was founded upon health concerns. It
involved a number of interveners – all of them active in health policy-making. None of
these interveners came from the pharmaceutical sector.
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Just as the tobacco industry advertised in a regulated environment in the mid1990s, so too does the pharmaceutical industry in Canada currently advertise in a
regulated environment. As established in Chapter 3, this Canadian pharmaceutical
DTCA environment has remained unchanged by statute or regulation throughout this
century. As established in Chapter 2, there are those involved in the pharmaceutical
DTCA policy environment who would like to see it changed.
The regulatory environment for DTCA advertising affecting the tobacco industry
was unalterably changed by the Supreme Court through its decision in RJR-MacDonald.
The Supreme Court is increasingly allowing interventions such as occurred in RJRMacDonald. Given the interests of the healthcare lobby in outcomes related to
pharmaceutical DTCA, one might expect those who “lobbied” the Court, through
intervention in the RJR-MacDonald case, to have a similar interest in “lobbying” the
Court though intervention in pharmaceutical cases. However, there have been no such
cases brought to the Supreme Court and this hypothesis cannot be directly tested. On the
other hand, as described in Chapter 3, there has been a good deal of litigation brought to
the Court involving other issues in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly litigation
involving patents related to that industry – an industry key to health outcomes in this
country. One might expect the same interveners in this litigation as were involved in the
RJR-MacDonald health related advertising litigation – and if the same interveners had
been found, this would have been a good predictor, one would have thought, of those
who would seek to intervene in future pharmaceutical DCTA litigation. These were the
premises underlying the research reported in Chapter 3.
It will be recalled that the overall research question posed in Chapter 3 was: given
the relatively recent rise of interveners in the Supreme Court process in Canada and the
presence of interveners in the landmark advertising case RJR-MacDonald v Canada, are
the stakeholders identified in Chapter 2 found as interveners in current pharmaceutical
related Supreme Court litigation?
There were two subsidiary questions involved in the Chapter 3 discussion: if the
stakeholders identified in Chapter 2 were found as interveners in current pharmaceutical
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related Supreme Court litigation, which interveners and to what extent? And, for those
interveners identified in Chapter 2 also found to be present as interveners in Supreme
Court of Canada litigation, do their interests, positions, influence, and power parallel that
identified for them in Chapter 2 in the broader policy environment?
There were a number of key findings from the stakeholder analysis of interveners
in Chapter 3. The interveners in the DTCA case of RJR-MacDonald in the Supreme
Court were:
•

Canadian Cancer Society,

•

Canadian Council on Smoking and Health

•

Canadian Medical Association

•

Heart and Stroke Foundation of Canada

•

Canadian Lung Association

•

Attorney General of Ontario

The CanWest litigation, the only instance yet where a litigant has attempted to challenge
the pharmaceutical DTCA law in Canada, saw a similar situation, with respect to
interveners, at its very earliest court level, to the situation of interveners at the Supreme
Court level hearing about DTCA law in RJR-MacDonald: although the CanWest case
(Women and Health Protection, 2007) was indefinitely adjourned prior to the submission
of the intervener factums (and never returned to court), a coalition of public-interest
stakeholders applied for intervener status. Those interveners were:
•

Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions

•

Canadian Health Coalition,

•

Canadian Union of Public Employees

•

Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada

•

Society for Diabetic Rights

•

Medical Reform Group

•

Drug Safety Canada.

•

Women and Health Protection
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The interveners in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest do share a number of features. Despite
not being the exact same coalition of stakeholders (which is to be expected when
considering the issues of the case), the interveners are all public interest stakeholders.
Furthermore, in each case these interveners apply as a coalition, and not as individual
stakeholders, for intervener status. Both RJR-MacDonald and CanWest are cases where a
plaintiff challenges restrictive advertising legislation involving health. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to compare the factums of the interveners in RJR-MacDonald and CanWest
because no factum(s) were submitted in CanWest.
On the other hand, in the Supreme Court cases involving pharmaceutical patent
litigation that were collected and analyzed, four stakeholders have successfully applied
for intervener status in these cases. Of the 12 successful applications for intervener status
in these pharmaceutical cases, five were by the Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association four were by Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies, two
were by BIOTECanada, and just one was by Pfizer Canada.
•

The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association (in 5 cases),

•

Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies (in 4 cases),

•

BIOTECanada (in 2 cases),

•

Pfizer Canada (in 1 case)

These successful applicants for intervener status can be divided into two distinct groups:
generic pharmaceutical industry interveners (The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association) and brand pharmaceutical industry interveners (Canada’s Research Based
Pharmaceutical Companies, BIOTECanada, Pfizer Canada). A pattern of intervention
was discussed: in most cases, a brand intervener and a generic intervener will appear.
Only in cases where the issues before the court did not directly concern the validity of
pharmaceutical patents was there only one intervener.
The Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical Association is a generic pharmaceutical
industry stakeholder: a high-power stakeholder whose position on pharmaceutical DTCA
is to act to maintain the current regulations, who benefits from the current regulations,
and is a high influence stakeholder.
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Canada’s Research Based Pharmaceutical Companies is identified as a brand
name pharmaceutical industry stakeholder: it has had its named changed to Innovative
Medicines Canada. Innovative Medicines Canada is a high power stakeholder whose
position on pharmaceutical DTCA is to maintain the current regulations. It benefits from
the current regulations and is a high influence stakeholder. BIOTECanada is also a brand
name pharmaceutical industry stakeholder, though a medium-power stakeholder
(compared to Innovative Medicines Canada’s high power). BIOTECanada’s position on
pharmaceutical DTCA is also to maintain the current regulations and it also benefits from
the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. Like Innovative Medicines Canada, it is a
high-influence stakeholder. Pfizer is a pharmaceutical company who is represented by
three associations in PAAB (BIOTECanada, Innovative Medicines Canada, and
Consumer Health Products Canada), which makes it the organization with the second
most avenues through which to achieve pharmaceutical DTCA policy change through
PAAB (surpassed only by Sanofi, which is represented four times in PAAB because
Innovative Medicines Canada represents two Sanofi subsidiaries).
These two brand association stakeholders, BIOTECanada and Innovative
Medicines Canada, and the generic association, Canadian Generic Pharmaceutical
Association, all support maintaining the current regulations on pharmaceutical DTCA,
are all high-power, and are all associations of other organizations. The finding that they
are all also interveners on pharmaceutical patent litigation at the Supreme Court both reaffirms this study’s assertion that these stakeholders are in fact high power, but also
suggests that to successfully, and individually, apply for intervener status at the Supreme
Court, a stakeholder may need to be high-power. These high-power stakeholders are best
positioned to intervene on a pharmaceutical advertising case which reaches the Supreme
Court of Canada. These stakeholders’ interest in court intervention may also be an
indication of the policy expertise and resources at their disposal, and the lack of
applications for intervention by other stakeholders could be explained by a possible lack
of policy expertise and resources.
All the interveners identified in these pharmaceutical patent cases in the Supreme
Court, and in the CanWest litigation, are among those identified in the stakeholder
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analysis of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders in Chapter 2. The RJR-MacDonald
interveners are not found in Chapter 2. It is likely the case that they are not present in the
pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholder holder analysis because RJR-MacDonald was
primarily a case about tobacco advertising, and so the stakeholders interested in the
implications of tobacco advertising policy are different than those interested in
pharmaceutical DTCA policy.
In CanWest, the coalition of interveners was different from that in RJRMacDonald and yet dramatically similar. The Canadian Health Coalition is a health
interested organization, medium-power, supports more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA,
high influence, and has neutral interests (neither gaining nor losing) from the current
pharmaceutical DTCA regulations. The other interveners in CanWest are not associations
in PAAB and did not submit documents to the Romanow Commission (2002). However,
most were found in the Standing Committee Report (Standing Committee on Health,
2004), and categorized: The Canadian Federation of Nurses Unions and Canadian Union
of Public Employees are categorized as unions, and the Communications, Energy and
Paperworkers Union of Canada can also be classified as union (although they did not
participate in the Standing Committee, they fit the profile of a union). The Medical
Reform Group, Drug Safety Canada, and the Society for Diabetic Rights, and Women
and Health Protection are categorized in this study as Health Interested Organizations.
The pharmaceutical DTCA positions and interests of these organizations is not
recorded, but they are a cross-section of health-interested organizations and unions. Like
those who intervened in RJR-MacDonald, they applied as a coalition. Unlike the
pharmaceutical patent interveners (discussed further below), with the exception of the
Canadian Health Coalition, the interveners in CanWest are not associations of other
organizations. There are a number of reasons why they may have chosen to apply as a
coalition: 1) to improve the chances that the application would be accepted; 2) to increase
the potential impact of the intervention; and 3) to pool financial and legal resources.
In none of the pharmaceutical cases at the Supreme Court did a coalition of health
interested stakeholders – or even individual health interested stakeholders – apply to
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intervene such as had collectively applied and intervened in RJR-MacDonald at the
Supreme Court, or applied in the more recent lower court action involving CanWest (both
DCTA cases). The only applicant which qualifies as a public-interest intervener in this
study of pharmaceutical litigation before the Supreme Court was the Information
Commissioner of Canada, which was ultimately unsuccessful in its application for
intervener status.
The coalition of health-interested interveners in RJR-MacDonald did not follow
the same pattern of intervention in their collective factum as was the pattern for the
interveners in the pharmaceutical cases at the Supreme Court. The structure of the RJRMacDonald health-interested interveners’ factum begins with an introduction of the
coalition of interveners, followed by the perspective of the interveners on the Tobacco
Products Control Act (Factum of the Intervener Coalition, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v
Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199), an extended section on the medical facts supporting the
legislative objective of that Act, a section describing the aims of tobacco advertising, and
the level of support for a tobacco advertising ban. The interveners are explicit in their
goal to ban tobacco advertising as a matter of public health policy, and this is the most
prominent theme throughout the factum.
The content of the intervener factums in the pharmaceutical patent cases typically
followed a different pattern: the majority of the factum was always dedicated to the
specific issues of the case and a small section of the factum discussed public-policy
issues. Dependent on whether a brand or generic pharmaceutical intervener submitted the
intervener factum in hand, the arguments made by the intervener reflected those made by
the brand or generic litigant in the case. The RJR-MacDonald interveners were solely
concerned about the public health policy implications of the issues before the Court.

4.4 Conclusions of the Study
Chapter 2 identified a broad range of stakeholders interested in Canadian
pharmaceutical DTCA policy, and Chapter 3 identified a small set from within that range
who have applied and been admitted by the Supreme Court of Canada as interveners in
recent pharmaceutical patent litigation in the Supreme Court. All the interveners admitted
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to the lower court litigation involving pharmaceutical DCTA, CanWest, are also
identified in the Chapter 2 stakeholder analysis of pharmaceutical DTCA stakeholders.
To be an intervener in a court action, one must apply. That all these interveners admitted
to the actions examined also appear in the Chapter 2 pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholder
analysis confirms that some pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholders are taking the policy
step of deciding to apply to intervene in judicial proceedings as well as being active in
lobbying activities before Parliament and Cabinet. This adds an important new element to
our understanding of stakeholders in pharmaceutical DTCA policy: at least those also
directly interested in pharmaceutical policy, as well as pharmaceutical DTCA policy,
have decided Supreme Court intervention activity is an important part of lobbying for
change. This contributes an important new dimension to our understanding of
pharmaceutical DTCA policy going forward.
It is also important to note that the type of pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholder
active in previous Supreme Court DTCA litigation, involving not pharmaceutical DCTA
but tobacco DCTA, has also been involved in the only known pharmaceutical DCTA
litigation in Canada, though that litigation has never continued or been completed even at
the trial level. That type of pharmaceutical DCTA stakeholder is not the stakeholder that
has decided to become involved in pharmaceutical Supreme Court hearings not related to
DCTA.

4.4.1

Pharmaceutical DTCA Stakeholders and Potential DTCA
Policy and Litigation
This study is, fundamentally, a “snapshot” in time. However, long after its

conclusion the stakeholders identified in pharmaceutical DTCA policy and
pharmaceutical patent litigation will continue operating. Some liberty has been taken to
anticipate how stakeholders may participate in a renewed discussion about
pharmaceutical DTCA policy and potential legislative or regulatory change, or if
pharmaceutical DTCA litigation, similar to CanWest or, in the tobacco context, RJRMacDonald, ever reaches the Supreme Court of Canada.
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The generic and brand industry pharmaceutical patent case interveners have
opposing arguments on the issues of those cases. However, this research has
demonstrated that both these types of stakeholders have a common policy position on
pharmaceutical DCTA: to maintain the current pharmaceutical DTCA regulations.
Considering the history of intervention at the Supreme Court by both these
pharmaceutical stakeholder groups, they are likely to intervene on pharmaceutical DTCA
litigation if it reaches the Supreme Court of Canada, and would both argue to maintain
the current regulations. However, given their past patterns of court intervention, they
would likely only intervene if such cases reach the Supreme Court of Canada.
There are a number of medium power stakeholders who support more regulated
pharmaceutical DTCA (e.g, Canadian Pharmacists Association, British Columbia Nurses
Union, Canadian Health Coalition), which may be likely candidates to intervene in a
coalition of interveners. Other likely candidates to intervene are any stakeholders
categorized as health interested organizations, unions, or healthcare workers. These
stakeholders are likely to argue for more regulated pharmaceutical DTCA.
The likelihood of a pharmaceutical DTCA case reaching the Supreme Court of
Canada is reduced, it would seem, because so few stakeholders identified in this study are
interested in less pharmaceutical DTCA regulation. The situation is the same in terms of
anticipating legislative or regulatory change to current pharmaceutical DTCA legislation
or regulation: there is a large number of stakeholders interested in maintaining (with the
largest number of strong stakeholders in this camp) or increasing regulation, and few
whose policy position it is to reduce the regulations. This helps explain why there has
been so little legislation, regulation or litigation concerning pharmaceutical DTCA in the
past two decades.

4.5 Limitations
As is the case in most research, there were some limitations to these studies. In
the first study (Chapter 2), only publicly available documents were collected and
analyzed. Pharmaceutical DTCA policy has not been a major focus in recent years, and
because of this, some of the policy documents available are dated. Further, the
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assessment of position, power, interests, and influence was limited to information
available in documents and websites, and, on occasion, some information was not
available. In the second study (Chapter 3), it was not possible include a study of all the
factums filed by the parties to each case being examined – although the study which was
completed here, of all the intervener factums, was possible. The subject matter of patent
litigation is, by its nature, very valuable information and secrecy is often a key element.
For this reason, certain of the cases had “sealing orders” which prevented the collection
or study of litigants’ factums. One other unavoidable gap in available evidence caused the
study to take form that it has: the Judges of the Supreme Court who hear the applications
for intervention in cases to be heard in their court do not ever reveal the reasons for their
decisions to permit or deny an applicant. For this reason, it is only possible to make
observations about whether or not an intervener receives leave, not why.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Examples and Excerpts of Coded Text
Code

Coding
Category

Example
Organization

Example Quoted Text

Source

Position

More
Regulated
DTCA

Canadian Health
Coalition

“That a prohibition on
direct to consumer
advertisements of
prescription drugs be
strictly enforced, given the
lack of evidence of health
benefits and the serious
potential for harm. Federal
legislation should ban
advertising, which includes
both the product’s name
and indications for use, and
ban cross-border direct to
consumer advertising”
(p.28)

Standing Together
For Medicare: A
Call to Care: A
Submission to the
Romanow
Commission f the
Future of Health
Care in Canada –
Canadian Health
Coalition –
November 2001

Maintain
Current
Regulations

New
Democratic
Party

“We must also maintain
our ban on direct-toconsumer drug advertising
(DTCA)—a practice
prohibited in almost all
countries outside the
United States and New
Zealand.” (p.14)

New Democratic
Party Submission
to the Romanow
Commission

Less
Regulated
DTCA

Association of
Medical
Advertising
Agencies
(AMAA)

“I manage an Agency that
creates advertising and
content spanning various
mediums, including the
sales representative, print,
digital, online, radio, and
TV. My objective, to cross
media disciplines with staff
who can tackle everything
from, tablet details to print
to radio to TV, all with the
smart thinking and rigor
Bio-Pharmaceutical
Advertising requires by
law” (para. 1).

https://www.linked
in.com/in/terrycull
y/

High

Canadian
Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association

11 high-income
pharmaceutical companies
members, these members
forming the executive

http://canadiangen
erics.ca/aboutus/committees/

Power
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committee of the CGPA
(coalition of generic
industry companies)
http://canadiangen
erics.ca/aboutus/our-membercompanies/

Medium

Canadian
Medical
Association

“Today the CMA has more
than 85,000 members, and
advocates on behalf of both
members and their patients
— on Parliament Hill,
during federal election
campaigns and in the
media. The CMA also
takes the lead on public
health issues.” (Para. 3)

Assets > 35,000,000.
Revenues > 46,000,000

Interests

Low

Canadian
Women’s
Health Netowrk

Benefit

Innovative
Medicines
Canada

“In March 2013 we, along
with the Centres of
Excellence for Women’s
Health and the Réseau
québécois d’action pour la
santé des femmes, lost our
main source of funding
from Health Canada. This
major change has been
both a loss and an
opportunity to develop new
strengths and direction
while continuing to focus
on what Canadian women,
researchers and policy
makers expect from us—
objective, trustworthy and
topical information about
the health issues that matter
most to Canadian women.”
(p.3)
“We work tirelessly to
further our members’
interests as outlined in our
Strategic Objectives.”
(Para. 3)

https://www.cma.c
a/En/Pages/history
-missionvision.aspx

https://www.cma.c
a/Assets/assetslibrary/document/e
n/about-us/2013CMA-FinancialStatements.pdf

http://www.cwhn.c
a/sites/default/files
/PDF/Annual_Rep
ort_2012-13.pdf

http://innovativem
edicines.ca/about/o
ur-mission-andvision/
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Neutral

Canadian
Women’s
Health Network

•
•

•

•
•
•

Loss

Influence
(able to
assert
position on
a national
level)

The Canadian Women’s
Health Network (CWHN):

http://www.cwhn.c
a/en/aboutus/missi
on

“Establishes a visible
national presence for
women’s health in Canada.
Provides user-friendly and
reliable health information,
resources and research.
Works to change
inequitable health policies
and practices by
contributing women’s
voices and expertise.
Acts as a knowledge broker
for researchers, clinicians,
decision makers, media and
the public.
Encourages communitybased participatory
research.
Monitors emerging issues
and trends affecting
women’s health.
Acts as a forum for debate
on women’s health
research and policy issues.”
(Para. 3).

“May strain the
relationship between
patients and providers, for
example if a patient’s
request for an advertised
prescription drug is
refused” (Para. 3).

http://policybase.c
ma.ca/dbtwwpd/PolicyPDF/P
D03-01.pdf

High

New
Democratic
Party

“Major Canadian political
party with official
opposition status and 103
MPs” (Para. 6). (Post-2015
election the NDP has 44
MPs in the house of
commons).

http://www.ndp.ca/
about-ndp

Medium

Canadian
Medical
Association

Several submissions to
government for policy
changes.

https://www.cma.c
a/En/Pages/submis
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sions-togovernment.aspx

Low

Ottawa Health
Coalition

“The Ottawa Health
Coalition brings together
people across the Ottawa
region to protect and
improve public healthcare
for all. We work to stop
cutbacks and privatization,
and promote democratic
debate about healthcare
policy that affects all of us”
(Para. 1)

https://ottawahealt
hcoalition.ca/about
/
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Appendix B: Full List of PAAB Constituent Members
PAAB
Association

Constituent Members

BIOTECanada

AbbVie Canada, Accel-Rx Health Sciences, Acuitas
Therapeutics, AdeTherapeutics Inc., Advanced Medical
Research Institute of Canada, Aegerion Pharmaceuticals,
Agricultural Institute of Canada, Agrisoma BioSciences
Inc., Ag-West Bio Inc., Akshaya BIO Inc., Alethia
Biotherapeutics Alexion Pharma Canada, AMGEN
Canada Inc., AmorChem, Angiochem Inc., Antibe
Therapeutics, Appili Therapeutics, Aqua Bounty Canada,
Inc., Aquinox Pharmaceuticals Inc., AstraZeneca Canada
Inc., Augurex Life Sciences Corp., Aurinia
Pharmaceuticals Inc., AusBiotech Ltd., Avir Pharma Inc.,
Bayshore Specialty Rx Ltd., BELLUS Health Inc.,
BioAlberta, BioAmber Canada Inc., Biodextris ,
BioEnterprise Corporation, Biogen Canada Inc.,
Bioindustrial Innovation Canada, Bio-K Plus International
Inc., BioMarin Pharmaceutical Inc., BioNB, BioNova,
Biopham Management Inc., BIOQuébec, Biotechnology
Industry Organization, BioVectra Inc., Blake, Cassels &
Graydon, LLP, Blanchard Law Office, Bloom Burton &
Co., BMS Canada Risk Services, Borden Ladner Gervais
LLP, Bristol-Myers Squibb Canada Inc., Canada’s
Venture Capital and Private Equity Association, Canadian
Seed Trade Association, Caprion Biosciences Inc.,
Cardiome Pharma Corp., CDRD Ventures Inc., Ceapro
Inc., Celator Pharmaceuticals Corp., Celgene Inc.,
Celverum Inc., Centre for Probe Development &
Commercialization, Centre for the Commercialization of
Antibodies and Biologics, Chelation Partners, CO2
Solutions Inc., Contextual Genomics Inc., CQDM,
Critical Outcome Technologies Inc., CTI Life Sciences
Fund, Cyclenium Pharma Inc., Cynapsus Therapeutics
Inc., Dalton Pharma Services, Del Mar Pharmaceuticals,
Drug Development and Innovation Centre, Eisai Limited,
Eli Lilly Canada Inc., Encycle Therapeutics, Gene Inc.
Ernst & Young LLP, ESSA Pharmaceuticals Inc., Farris,
Vaughan, Wills & Murphy LLP, Fasken Martineau
DuMoulin LLP Folia Biotech Inc., Formation Biologics
Inc., Genentech, GenePOC Inc., Genome Canada,
Genzyme Canada, Global Public AffairsGMD Pharma
Solutions, Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP, Grifols
Highland Therapeutics, Hoffmann-La Roche, iCo
Therapeutics Inc., Immunovaccine Inc., ImStar
Therapeutics Inc., Innovation PEI, Innovative Targeting
Solutions Inc., InnovoXL Inc. Institute for Research in
Immunology and Cancer-Commercialization of Research,
InSymbiosis Management Inc., Intercept Pharma Canada,
International Centre for Infectious Diseases, Intrinsik
Health Sciences Inc., Ipsen Biopharmaceuticals Canada
Inc., iTP, Biomedica Corp., Janssen Inc., Johnson &
Johnson – JLABS, Kairos Therapeutics, KalGene Pharma
Inc., Kane Biotech Inc., KMT Hepatech Inc., Korea

Number of
Constituent
Members
209
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Biotechnology Industry Organization, KPMG, Laurent
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Life Sciences, Association of
Manitoba, LifeSciences Ontario (LSO), Life Sciences
British Columbia, Linnaeus Plant Sciences Inc., MaRS
Discovery District, Marsala Biotech Inc., McKesson
Canada, MEDEC MedGenesis Therapeutix Inc.,
Medicago Inc., Medicure Inc., Mēdunik Canada, Merck
Canada Inc., Milestone Pharmaceuticals, MSI
Methylation Sciences Inc., National Research Council
Canada, Neomed Institute, NeoVentures Biotechnology
Inc., Neurodyn Life Sciences Inc., New Zealand Biotech,
Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Technology
Industries, NoNO Inc., Northern Biologics Inc., Norton
Rose Fulbright LLP, Novartis, Pharmaceuticals Canada
Inc., Novicol International Holdings, Novo Nordisk
Canada Inc., Okanagan Specialty Fruits Inc., OncoGenex
Technologies Inc., Oncolytics Biotech Inc., Ontario
Bioscience Innovation Organization, Pangaea Group, PanProvincial Vaccine Enterprise, Patient Access Solutions
Inc., PBR Laboratories, Pfizer Canada Inc., PlantForm
Corporation, POS Bio-Sciences, Precision NanoSystems,
Inc., Prevtec Microbia Inc., PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP, Prince Edward Island BioAlliance, Pro Bono Bio
Inc., ProMIS Neurosciences, ProNAi Therapeutics
Canada, PROOF Centre of Excellence, Protagenic
Therapeutics Canada Inc., Proteocyte Diagnostics Inc.,
Qu Biologics, Raptor Pharmaceuticals , Renaissance
Bioscience Corp., RepliCel Life Sciences, Replikins Ltd.,
Research Canada, Resverlogix, Royal Bank of Canada,
Sanofi Pasteur Limited, SemiosBio Technologies Inc.,
Sequence Bio, Sernova Corp., Shire Pharma Canada
ULC, Shoppers Drug Mart Specialty Health Network,
SignalChem Lifesciences Corporation, SinoVeda Canada
Inc., Sirona Biochem Corp., Smart & Biggar
Fetherstonhaugh LLP, Sobi Inc., SolAeroMed Inc.,
Soricimed Biopharma Inc., Sound Insurance Services
Inc., SPharm Inc., Taiga BioActives Inc., Takeda Canada
Inc., TEC Edmonton, Teralys Capital Fund of Funds L.P.,
Teva Canada Innovation, Therapure Biopharma Inc.,
Thrasos Inc., Transition Therapeutics Inc., Trillium
Therapeutics Inc., UCB Canada Inc., University of
Guelph, University of Manitoba, University of Waterloo,
Vaccine and Infectious Disease, OrganizationInternational Vaccine Centre, Valeant Canada LP,
Valneva Canada Inc., VBI Vaccines, Versant Ventures
Canada Ltd., Vertex Pharmaceuticals Inc., Viable
Healthworks Corp., viDA Therapeutics Inc., Viventia
Biotechnologies Inc. VWR International, Wex
Pharmaceuticals Inc., Wilson Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati,
Xagenic Canada Inc., Xenon Pharmaceuticals Inc., Zenith
Epigenetics Corp., Zymeworks Inc.
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PAAB
Association

Constituent Members of Association

The
Association of
Faculties of
Medicine of
Canada

Western University/Schulich School of Medicine and
Dentistry, University of Toronto, University of
Saskatchewan, University of Ottawa, University of
Manitoba, University of Calgary/Cumming School of
Medicine, University of British Columbia, University of
Alberta, Université Laval, Université de Sherbrooke
Universiteé de Montréal, Queens University, Northern
Ontario School of Medicine McMaster University, McGill
University, Dalhousie University
Terry Cully

The
Association of
Medical
Advertising
Agencies
Canadian
Association of
Medical
Publishers

Canadian
Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association
Canadian
Medical
Association
Canadian
Pharmacists
Association
Best
Medicines
Coalition

Number of
Constituent
Members
16

No
constituent
organization
members

Canadian Medical Association (CMA), Canadian
Urological Association (CUAJ), The College of Family
Physicians of Canada, Healthcare Media Partners Inc.,
JLS Media, Keith Communications Inc., Parkhurst
Publishing, Pulsus Group, Rogers Healthcare Group A
Division of Rogers Media, STA Healthcare
Communications
Actavis Pharma Company, Apotex Inc., Fresenius Kabi
Canada Ltd, Mylan, Pharmascience Inc., Sandoz Canada
Inc., Taro Pharmaceuticals, Teva Canada Limited, ACIC

10

Canadian Physicians

Information
Not Available

Canadian Pharmacists

Information
not available

Arthritis Consumer Experts, Asthma Society of Canada:
Better PharmaCare Coalition (BC), Canadian Arthritis
Patient Alliance, Canadian Breast Cancer Network,
Canadian Epilepsy Alliance, Canadian Hemophilia
Society, Canadian Pain Society, Canadian Skin Patient
Alliance, Canadian Society of Intestinal Research,
Canadian Treatment Action Council, Cancer Advocacy,
Coalition of Canada, Canadian Association of Retired
Persons, Creating Synergy Health Coalition (AB),
Gastrointestinal Society:
Hepatitis C Council of British Columbia, Kidney Cancer
Canada: , Lymphoma Foundation Canada, Ovarian
Cancer Canada: Monique Beaupré-Lazu, Tourette
Syndrome Foundation

20

9
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Consumer
Health
Products
Canada

Bayer Healthcare, Consumer Care, Blistex Corporation,
Boehringer Ingelheim Canada Ltd., Church & Dwight
Canada Combe Incorporated, Delivera, Dormer
Labratories Inc, GlaxoSmithKline Consumer Healthcare,
Johnson & Johnson Inc. Lallemand Health Solutions,
Pendopharma, a Division of Pharmascience Inc., Pfizer
Consumer Healthcare, Procter & Gamble Inc., Purdue
Pharma, Reckitti Benckiser

15

Innovative
Medicines
Canada

Amgen, Astellas , AstraZeneca, Bayer, Boehringer
Ingelheim Bristol-Meyers Squibb Canada, Brunel ,
Ceapro, Charles River Labratories, Conundrum Solutions,
Council for continuing pharmaceutical education, Eli
Lilly Canada, Eisai Limited, EMD Serono Canada, EC
Endoceuticals, Ferring Pharmaceuticals Genome Canada,
Gilead, GlaxoSmithKline, GlyPharma, Roche Innoviva,
JSS Research, Janssen, KalGene, Leo Pharma, MedicaGo,
Merck, Novartis, Novo Nordisk, Nucro Technics Otsuka
Canada pharmaceutical inc., Paladin, Pediapharm inc.
Pfizer, Proteocyte diagnostics, Promometic, Purdue,
Ropack, Sanofi, Sanofi Pasteur, Servier, Shire, Sunovion,
Takeda, Therapure, Thera technologies, Vantage biotrials

48

Canadian
Association of
Retired
Persons
Consumer
Council of
Canada

300,000 individual members across Canada

No
constituent
organization
members
14

Canadian Fuels Association, Canadian Life and Health
Insurance Association, Credit Union Central of Canada,
Electrical Safety Authority, Enbridge Gas Distribution,
Interac, Investment Funds Institute of Canada, Ontario
Motor Vehicle Industry Council Procter and Gamble
Canada, Real Estate Council of Ontario, RESCON, Retail
Council of Canada, Technical Standards and Safety
Authority, Visa Canada
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Federation des
medecines
omipracticiens
du Quebec

Association of General Practitioners of the Lower St.
Lawrence, Association of General Practitioners in the
Mauricie, Association of General Practitioners BoisFrancs, Association of General Practitioners of Montreal,
Association of Quebec CLSC doctors, Association of
Northwest General Practitioners of Quebec, Association
of General Practitioners of the South Shore, Association
West of General Practitioners of Quebec, Association of
General Practitioners North Shore, Association of General
Practitioners of Quebec, Association Estrie of General
Practitioners, Association Richelieu-Saint-Laurent general
practitioners, Physicians working in psychiatric facility,
Association of General Practitioners in the Saguenay /
Lac St-Jean, Association Gaspésie of General
Practitioners, Association of Southwest General
Practitioners, Association of General Practitioners
Laurentides-Lanaudière, Association of General
Practitioners of Yamaska, Association of General
Practitioners Laval

19
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Appendix C: Alternative Position & Strengths of Position Diagram

Source: Stakeholder DTCA policy documents and websites.
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Appendix D: Stakeholder’s DTCA Positions & Strengths of Those Positions From
PAAB & Romanow Submissions
Strength
of
Position
High

Less Regulated
DTCA

Maintain Current
Regulations

More Regulated
DTCA

The Association
of Medical
Advertising
Agencies

Canadian Labour
Congress; Canadian
Autoworkers Union;
New Democratic
Party; Canadian
Generic
Pharmaceutical
Association;
Innovative
Medicines Canada

Medium

None

BIOTECanada

Low

None

Canadian
Association of
Medical Publishers;
Consumer
Healthcare Providers

Canadian Health
Coalition; Ottawa
Health Coalition;
Canadian Women's
Health Network;
Prince Edward
Island Health
Coalition; British
Columbia Nurses
Union; The
Association of
Faculties of
Medicine of Canada
Canadian Medical
Association;
Canadian
Pharmacists
Association;
Federation des
medecines
omipracticiens du
Quebec
None

No Official
Position
None

None

Best Medicines
Coalition;
Canadian
Association of
Retired Persons;
Consumer
Council of
Canada

Source: stakeholder policy documents and websites
Notes: High = a strong statement on DTCA policy and policymaking actions that
further their position. Medium = strength suggests either a strong statement on DTCA
policy or policymaking involvement to advance their position. Low = A weak policy
statement with respect to their position or that the position had to be inferred, and that
there was few or no policymaking involvement to advance their position.
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Appendix E: Cases, Intervener Briefs, Docket References
Case Reference
RJR-MacDonald Inc. v
Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199

Intervener Brief Reference
Reference re RJR-MacDonald
Inc. v Canada, [1995] 3 SCR 199
(Factum of the Intervener the
Attorney General of Ontario court
file no. 23460 and 23490)
Reference re RJR-MacDonald
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